US Department of State Daily Briefing #46:
Thursday, 3/21/91
Boucher
Source: State Department Deputy Spokesman Richard
Boucher
Description: 12:34 PM, Washington, DC
Date: Mar 21, 19913/21/91
Category: Briefings
Region: MidEast/North Africa, Caribbean
Country: Iran, Israel, Iraq, Kuwait, Cuba
Subject: Arms Control, Terrorism, State Department,
Immigration, Regional/Civil Unrest
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)
[Update: Iraq-Kuwait Border]
MR. BOUCHER: Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. I
thought in starting off, I'd update you on two things. The
first is I was asked a question about the so-called 1963 border,
and I've looked into that somewhat. The border has been used in
practice for almost six decades by the two countries, and it was
agreed between them in 1963.
The issue now before the Security Council is whether in
view of Iraq's violation of that border, the United Nations
should formalize the demarcation of the border as part of its
effort to restore international peace and security in the
region.
Q You are speaking of the border between Kuwait and
Iraq --
MR. BOUCHER: That's right.
Q -- not the border between Iraq and Iran. Is that
correct?
MR. BOUCHER: This is the border between Iraq and
Kuwait, and we referred in our discussion of the elements of the
U.N. resolution, the resolution would -- what's the word? --
offer specific recognition of the 1963 border between Kuwait and
Iraq.
Q Is it true that this border, as it was established
just prior to the war, represents about a six-mile difference
between what it was back in '63? In other words, Iraq has
slowly but surely eaten five or six miles of Kuwaiti territory
from that '63 line.
MR. BOUCHER: That's not -- my understanding is that
the border as established 60 years ago, almost, was the same one
that was operative on August 1 of last year. But this had been
the border in practice.
Q But there is no --
MR. BOUCHER: It was agreed to formally by the
countries involved in 1963, and that's why I say the issue now
is whether the United Nations should take the step of
demarcating that border.
Q And do you know as a matter of fact if it's the
U.S. position that if the declaration is -- resolution is
adopted, is it the U.S.'s intention or even does it know if it
is a legal fact that this precludes any discussion between
Kuwait and Iraq over their border? Because during the war, when
you were eager for [Iraq] to pull out, the Kuwaitis and the U.S.
said, "Hey, you know, if they're willing to talk, okay with us
if the restored government wants to talk to Iraq, fine." Is
that by the boards now?
MR. BOUCHER: Well, Barry, I think one of the things
that we made clear during the war, was that the goal of the
effort was to restore the legitimate Government of Kuwait, and
it's up to the legitimate Government of Kuwait to make any
decisions about negotiations of any kind that it wants to enter
into or not enter into.
So, as I said, the issue that we're focused on now is
not so much the placement of the border -- because the border
has been there for sixty years -- the issue is whether the
United Nations should demarcate that border.
Q Should the United Nations act cover the so-called
"neutral zone" or "neutral area" between the two countries?
MR. BOUCHER: I don't believe there is a so-called
"neutral area" in that section.
Q It is somehow trilateral. It's Saudi Arabia,
Kuwait, Iraq, as far as I understand.
MR. BOUCHER: I'm not familiar with that. I'd have to
check on that and see if there is such a thing.
Q But you are saying, though, that the pre-August 2
border is pretty much the same or exactly the same as the 1963
border.
MR. BOUCHER: That's my understanding. Yes. O.K.?
[Iraq: Civil Unrest]
The only other thing is since I get asked every day,
rather than waiting for the question, I thought I'd give you the
update on unrest in Iraq.
Fighting between government forces and dissidents
continues in the north. Dissidents remain in control of large
portions of the predominantly Kurdish areas of northern Iraq,
including areas close to the cities of Kirkuk and Mosul.
Heavy fighting was continuing early today in the
immediate vicinity of the City of Kirkuk and probably inside the
city itself. Fighting continues in the south with some
particularly heavy fighting taking place early today in the
vicinity of the Shi'a holy city of Karbala. And that's the
update.
Q Well, the Kurds are making, you know, cheers,
tossing hats, or whatever you toss in the air in Kurdistan, and
they seem to be on the verge of declaring some sort of a
provincial autonomy. In fact, they claim to have the whole
province.
Looking to you again for any policy statement as to
whether the U.S. would look in disfavor at Kurdish autonomy.
MR. BOUCHER: Barry, I'd just have to cite for you two
things that establish our policy, because you're dealing with
something you say they're on the verge of doing that we haven't
even seen yet.
Q Well, they sound exuberant and ecstatic and --
MR. BOUCHER: There are two elements of policy to
consider in that. The first is that we strongly believe in the
territorial integrity of Iraq, and we don't seek its
dismemberment. The second is that it's for the Iraqi people to
decide their leadership, their future structure of government,
and any other internal considerations.
Q Richard, the Mujahedin held a news conference this
morning, claiming that their National Liberation Army of Iran is
playing an important role in the fighting, particularly in the
south but also around Kirkuk.
Do you know if they are involved, and, if so, to what
extent?
MR. BOUCHER: I hadn't seen that report, so I hadn't
asked the specific question, but I don't have any further
information on the Iranian involvement other than what I gave
you yesterday.
Q Well, it comes into question particularly because
of the Secretary's allusion this morning to a Lebanonization of
Iraq. You mentioned the word "dissidents." Who exactly are
they? Do they also include Iranians who filtered across the
border?
MR. BOUCHER: Again, I discussed the issue of Iranian
support yesterday. I don't have anything to add to that today,
Jim.
Q The allegations that the Iraqis are using acid --
MR. BOUCHER: I don't have anything on those reports.
Q Is acid a chemical weapon?
MR. BOUCHER: Acid is not, in the sort of formal
international law sense, in the various agreements and
activities of the international community, used or considered a
chemical weapon, although it's a chemical that could conceivably
be used as a weapon.
Of course, its use -- speaking hypothetically since I
don't have anything to confirm it, you know -- against
insurgents or demonstrators would, obviously be barbaric and
inhumane. Depending on the circumstances, I am told such use
could be a violation of various other provisions of
international law.
Q But that doesn't fall under President Bush's
warning not to use chemical weapons, even though the effect on
someone who gets mustard gas thrown at them or sulphuric acid
thrown at them -- they're not likely to appreciate the fine
niceties of the difference.
MR. BOUCHER: Well, that's why I say that, you know, we
would consider a use of something like that as barbaric and
inhumane, and it could conceivably violate various provisions of
international law.
Q One more. Maybe you can explain something to me
that I don't understand about the U.S. policy towards this
unrest. The United States says -- and you've just said -- that
it's for the Iraqi people to choose their leadership, etc. Yet
they can't do so through elections. The only way they can do so
is through violence, through a revolt, in which the sides are
not equally armed. In other words, the only way for an Iraqi
who wants to get rid of Saddam Hussein is to actually risk his
life in a rebellion.
Shouldn't the United States be doing something to level
the playing field in some way, since it wants Saddam Hussein to
go?
MR. BOUCHER: Alan, it's neither our intent nor our
purpose to try to choose the future leadership of Iraq. It's
not in our intent or our purpose to try to intervene in the
internal situation in Iraq.
Q Well, by doing nothing, aren't you just basically
giving Saddam Hussein a free hand to use his superior forces to
crush this revolt?
MR. BOUCHER: Well, that remains to be determined.
[Iraq: Testimony of Ambassador Glaspie]
Q Can I ask you something about Ambassador Glaspie's
testimony, if you're through with statements? Are you?
MR. BOUCHER: Sure.
Q If, indeed, the Iraqis put out a doctored or
inaccurate version of what she had said -- that she had warned
Saddam Hussein not to invade Kuwait -- why did the President and
the Secretary of State not correct the record? Why was she left
sort of in the position of having been accused by a government
you don't like of doing something that evidently she didn't do?
Why didn't they take her off the -- why did they leave her
twisting in the wind?
MR. BOUCHER: Well, I'd have to disagree strongly with
your characterization of what the President and the Secretary of
State did. They --
Q Hanging out to dry -- (inaudible).
MR. BOUCHER: I'll disagree with that too. Have we got
any other phrases you want me to disagree with? They both
addressed the issue several times. We addressed the issue here
many times. I think we reminded you that it was an Iraqi
transcript that we could not, would not vouch for.
We reminded you of its origins. We reminded you that
we gave you on July 26 a readout of the meeting where we
described both what Ambassador Glaspie had said to Saddam
Hussein
and what Saddam Hussein had said to Ambassador Glaspie, and
we've
said repeatedly that we stood by our readout of that meeting.
Q That's not entirely correct, Richard. I mean,
Secretary Baker, when he was on "Meet the Press," was
specifically asked whether Ambassador Glaspie's performance in
the meeting was on his instructions. His answer was that
"312,000 cables go out from the State Department every day," and
the clear implication was that it was not on his instruction.
So he did not clarify the record. The fact is he
muddied the record by making it appear that she was not acting
on his behalf. And the question is why, as you said, we could
not vouch for the transcript, but Ambassador Glaspie wasn't
telling you that. She clearly was saying that she can vouch for
the transcript. It's false.
MR. BOUCHER: Again, Tom, we've reminded people of the
origins of the transcript. We reminded people that we had given
a readout of that meeting, and we've said clearly that we stood
by that readout of the meeting.
The Secretary addressed the issue several times. He
said that April was a fine public servant and various other
things about that.
Q He also said that he was not --
MR. BOUCHER: O.K. And as you listened to April's
testimony yesterday, I think it was understood that she didn't
receive, in fact, specific instructions for that meeting. She
had had instructions over the course of weeks, and that that
meeting was unexpected, and she carried out the similar -- you
know, she repeated the instructions she had had before.
So the issue of instructions, I think, has been further
clarified by her, and it's in no way inconsistent with what the
Secretary said.
Q The issue, in all fairness, isn't really
instructions. The issue is the fact that an Iraqi transcript
was out there. What started the whole story was the fact that a
transcript was out there which suggested that April Glaspie
appeased Saddam Hussein.
April Glaspie has testified yesterday that that
transcript was a fabrication. Had anyone during the last seven
months, from this podium or any other government official,
simply said, "That transcript is a fabrication," there would
have been no story here. Why did no one say that?
Q I think, Tom, you're a more experienced journalist
than I am. I'm not sure I can agree with you that there would
have been no story here. During the period in question, forming
the coalition, prosecuting the war, we said repeatedly we
weren't interested in starting a sideshow, starting a side
debate, on who took better notes of the meeting.
The readout that we gave on July 26 of that meeting,
that we stood by, said very clearly -- and I don't remember the
exact words, I don't have them with me -- that Saddam tried to
reassure her of his peaceful intentions, and that she said very
clearly it was in our view that the crisis had to be solved
peacefully. That is entirely consistent with the details that
she gave out yesterday.
We stood by that transcript, by that readout of it. If
anyone had, I think, cared to do a detailed examination of the
Iraqi transcript, knowing its origins, perhaps the view might
have been different.
Q Well, you know, Richard, it's partly, of course,
whether the State Department defended a diplomat, but also
what's baffling is why wouldn't the State Department say that he
had been properly warned? In other words, why would they let a
contrary version, because you wanted to drive home the point
that the guy was told -- "this stupid guy," as she describes him
-- was told not to invade Kuwait, but he was too stupid to
understand that.
I don't understand. I suppose people in the public
service have to take a certain amount of trashing for the good
of the country or something, but how about the good of the
policy? Why didn't you -- not you, but why didn't Mr. Baker on
one of his many television appearances say something about the
doctoring of what she had told Saddam Hussein?
MR. BOUCHER: Barry, if you're dealing with the issue
of whether Saddam had been warned or not, again we had repeated
many times the statements that we made in the two weeks leading
up to August 2. We had very clearly, in the briefings here and
in other public statements and testimony, said that we had
interests and friends in the region that we would stand by.
That record was evident, clear, and we referred you to
it many, many times. The Secretary addressed the issue as well
-- the issue of the so-called "green light" that was the
assumption that people made based on the Iraqi transcript. And
he said several times that it was ludicrous to assume that we
had given him a green light.
And we said, as we say today, that the issue was not
really the two weeks before August 2. The issue was Iraq's
invasion of Kuwait on August 2. We were dealing with that --
the results of that. We were forming a coalition, and we were
prosecuting a war. That was the focus for us, and that remained
the focus for us.
Q Are you suggesting, Richard, there wasn't time to
correct the record?
MR. BOUCHER: No, I'm not. I don't think the record
needed correcting. The record was clear.
Q Richard, there was no vigorous effort on the part
of the Department to correct the record. All of those responses
you just described came in response to questions posed by others
-- members of Congress, members of the press. There was no
campaign to get out there and clear this record for the sake of
the policy, the Department or the Ambassador.
MR. BOUCHER: Bill, we repeated many, many times what
the statements were. You asked the questions. We answered the
questions. We considered the Iraqi transcript to be a sideshow.
We said we were not interested in starting a side debate on
that transcript. Our focus throughout the crisis remained the
crisis, and what we could do about it.
Q But, Richard, you never disputed it. You were
asked repeatedly. If it wasn't you, it was Margaret, but you
were asked repeatedly from here. The questions were addressed
to the podium. I know, because I addressed some of them. You
were asked if you disputed that transcript, and you never did.
MR. BOUCHER: And we said that, "We're not interested
in starting debate over the notes." We said that, "We're not
interested in dealing with this Iraqi transcript." We said we
gave a readout of the meeting on July 26. We stand by that
readout. And, as I said, that readout was accurate and remains
accurate today.
Q In the name of the Department now, Richard, would
you now say the Iraqi transcript was a fabrication?
MR. BOUCHER: I would say what April said yesterday --
that it was heavily edited to the point of inaccuracy.
Q Richard, you say that your statements before then
were quite clear, but there were other statements which fuzzed
the issue. For example, Kelly's testimony before the Hamilton
Subcommittee and others where it was quite -- where it was said,
for example, that there is no defense alliance, no defense
commitment between the United States and Kuwait and anybody else
in the Gulf; and other suggestions when, in response to members
of the press and members of Congress, the answers were not
nearly as clear or as forthright as you are now describing them.
For example, when asked about the possibility of an
invasion, I think it was you, about two or three days before the
invasion said, "What is needed is not statements but a return to
calm," or something. I'm paraphrasing. In other words, there
was no warning -- no clear, coherent, persistent, consistent
warning from the State Department.
So what I'm asking, was there a clear policy that was
badly enunciated, or what?
MR. BOUCHER: Jim, I think there was a clear policy
that was clearly enunciated, and I'd refer you to the record.
If you want to do a further analysis of the entire record, feel
free to do so. You have additional information from the
information that April Glaspie was providing to the Hill
yesterday and today. That's accurate, that's useful information
for you if you want to do a further analysis.
Q Just to clarify, you now say that the transcript
was highly edited to the point of fabrication and you've known
that for the last 7 months?
MR. BOUCHER: And we've been unwilling and
uninterested, particularly during the period when we had a major
diplomatic effort and a war going on, in getting into a debate
over the transcript, whether it was a general one or whether it
was a line-by-line one. If we'd started a line-by-line debate,
I'm sure we'd still be doing it now.
Q Even though you knew full well that the reputation
of one of your senior Ambassadors in the region was being
sullied as a result of your not saying anything?
MR. BOUCHER: Tom, I just have to refer you to the
statements that the Secretary and the President made during the
course of this crisis where they stood up for Ambassador Glaspie
and where the Secretary, in particular, said the charges that
she had somehow given a green light were just ludicrous. John.
Q She didn't deny yesterday that she had made the
comment about our policy being one of desiring Arabs to solve
Arab disputes but that that comment was combined with a warning
to Saddam Hussein, of some sort, not to invade Kuwait. Were
those the instructions? Was Baker aware of those instructions?
In other words, I'm still confused about whether the Secretary
actually gave her the instructions to make those two points or
whether some other officials gave her those instructions in the
cable that she described and Baker was unaware of the fact that
she had conveyed that message?
MR. BOUCHER: John, again, the question of instructions
was addressed by Ambassador Glaspie on the Hill yesterday. The
instructions that she had, that she carried out, the statements
that she made to the Iraqi government -- I think she cited
several of statements that we've made back here -- that she then
turned over and used on repeated occasions in her meetings with
the Foreign Ministry -- they were consistent with the policy.
She was saying the same thing out there in her meetings
as we were saying back here both publicly and privately.
Q The impression is there, right or wrong, that
Baker has deliberately put some distance between himself and
what she said. Were those instructions ones that he approved,
that he was aware of, that he authorized?
MR. BOUCHER: I frankly don't know what cables he
authorized at the time.
Q Richard, I may be a little bit dense, but can you
explain to me how putting out this version of the conversation
would have damaged the effort to build the coalition?
MR. BOUCHER: Norm, it's basically whether we were
interested in getting into the issue. The issue of this
transcript was not the issue. The issue was Iraq's invasion of
Kuwait.
The diversion of attention, the creation of a side show
was not something that we felt appropriate and necessary at the
time. We gave a readout of the meeting. We stood by the
readout of the meeting, and we stood by Ambassador Glaspie. So
I don't have any problems with what we did.
Q In fairness, Richard, the side show was created
because you weren't responding and defending her. Not because
you were. Had you responded and defended her, according to the
way you're doing today, there never would have been a side show.
MR. BOUCHER: The side show was created by the Iraqi
release of the transcript.
Q And punctured immediately by a statement saying it
was a fabrication?
MR. BOUCHER: We were not interested in playing that
game. It's anyone's supposition as to what might have happened.
I guess our feeling was that if we started it, there would be
no end to the questions. We'd probably still be doing this
today.
Q Which we are.
Q Richard, she said yesterday that Saddam Hussein was
conciliatory in the meeting and after the meeting the threats
against Kuwait stopped. Yet we now know, and I suppose you knew
at the time, that the military buildup continued. The day
before the invasion took place, the Secretary of State discussed
the buildup with the Soviet Foreign Minister in Irkutsk.
Why was she allowed to leave her post?
MR. BOUCHER: I don't have any particular answers on
that decision at this point. She was.
Q Was she called back here?
MR. BOUCHER: I don't have any further explanation.
One of the elements was that she was -- Saddam Hussein had asked
her to convey this message back to President Bush of his
peaceful intentions.
I don't have any further gloss on the issue of why she
left post at that particular moment.
Q She did that in the cable. She was schedule to
leave, as I think she told -- according to the transcript -- on
some kind of leave and expressed her gratitude of being able to
get out?
MR. BOUCHER: I think she basically went ahead with
plans that had been made before.
Q She spoke about massive deception. Was the United
States deceived by that meeting? She certainly seems to suggest
that she was.
MR. BOUCHER: That meeting was part of a total picture
of what she was getting in Baghdad, what other people were
getting from the Iraqis, what our Allies and other people in
other countries who were following situation -- what they
thought -- as well as the information that we had from
intelligence sources.
If I remember correctly, on the first day the President
indicated what we knew from various intelligence sources and
when we knew what was about to happen.
Q The consequence of her leaving was that the United
States was represented, ably no doubt, but all the same was not
represented by one of its foremost Arab experts by a person who
was not an Arab expert and didn't even speak Arabic; correct or
not?
MR. BOUCHER: Joe Wilson performed ably and admirably.
I don't think anyone can say that there were negative
consequences from the fact that Joe Wilson was in Baghdad and
that April was back here.
Q Nevertheless, she was the senior officer. She was
the Ambassador?
MR. BOUCHER: That's a fact, yes.
Q Do you know if the Department has any plans for
Ambassador Glaspie?
MR. BOUCHER: It would not be for me to announce, in
any case. I don't have anything particular on that.
Q Do you agree with her characterization that both
the United States and other governments were foolish because
they didn't realize that he was stupid and didn't believe the
clear and repeated warnings? Were you foolish?
MR. BOUCHER: It's not a word that I often use from
this podium, but I don't take exception to her characterization
of how things were viewed. I think, as I said, we've made other
statements about what we knew and what we thought. Those stand
on the record.
Q What's the difference between "foolish" and
"stupid?"
Q Richard, unless you're going to answer that --
MR. BOUCHER: No, I'm not.
[Iran: US Contacts]
Q -- how does the U.S. deal with Iran now in this
post-war period? We were told -- maybe it was said here, too,
but were told on the plane that the U.S. used to update them on
the war situation and there's a continuing way of being in touch
with them. But I'm not sure if it's through the Swiss. Is
there any direct U.S. contact with Iran at this point?
MR. BOUCHER: The channel that we use to communicate
with Iran, we've spoken of before. Our third-party
representative is the Swiss Government, and we use them to
communicate with Iran.
Q Is that the only channel to Iran at this point?
MR. BOUCHER: If you're asking, "Do we have direct
contacts other than the technical negotiations that go on in The
Hague over the financial issues and the Algiers Accords," we
don't have any direct contacts. The issue came up, I think, a
week or so ago and all of us restated our long-standing policy:
That we would meet with an authorized representative to discuss
substantive issues of hostages and terrorism.
Q Do we have indirect contact through, other than
the Swiss? The Syrians, for instance?
MR. BOUCHER: Barry, the acknowledged channel is the
one through the Swiss. They are the third-party protecting
power.
Q You're not ruling out --
MR. BOUCHER: That's the only one I'm in position to
talk about.
Q What sort of official messages are being passed on
that channel now as Iran becomes more and more overtly involved
in the situation in its neighboring country? Has there been a
statement, for example, which the U.S. Government has been
making publicly, that we don't think it's in anyone's interest
to interfere in their neighbor's business? Have you been saying
that sort of thing through this channel?
MR. BOUCHER: John, we have not, in almost all cases in
the past, specified what we've been saying to the Iranians
through that channel, or exactly how often and when it had been
used.
I don't have anything on it for you today. I'll be
glad to ask but I'm not expecting to get an answer at this time.
Q Obliquely put, have you had words to Iran about
not messing around next door?
MR. BOUCHER: We've made very clear our views on that
publicly -- the President has. We have from here.
Q You frequently say publicly and privately when you
are trying to express something. Have you expressed that view
privately to the Iranians through any channel?
MR. BOUCHER: That's the question you asked earlier.
I'll be glad to check for you, but I'm not confident that I will
have an answer on what we said to the Iranians in that channel.
Q A very specific proposal or feeler, or whatever
you want to call it, was made some time ago to Iran along the
lines that you describe -- that we would authorize, or the
United States would authorize a one-on-one meeting between a
State Department official and a Foreign Ministry official to
talk about the whole relationship. Have you had any response to
that? That was made last fall.
MR. BOUCHER: We talked about that last week. The
Iranians had not taken us up on the offer. I'm not aware that
they have at this point either.
Q Can you check whether they've, within the last
week, taken this up?
MR. BOUCHER: I'll check and see.
Q Speaking of following up, the Secretary said on
the plane that he would be following up on his consultations
with various countries of the Middle East on the telephone.
It's Thursday. Anything to report?
MR. BOUCHER: No, I really don't have anything
particular. I haven't asked for the full list of his phone
calls. I know that officials at other levels are in touch with
the governments and the places he visited, and we're discussing
the issues internally and how to proceed. But I haven't really
checked on his phone list.
Q Do you know if he has asked for any specifics, as
he told us he would be, of any of these governments?
MR. BOUCHER: I just don't know about it.
Q This morning, King Hussein was on television
saying that as far as he was concerned he was ready to revive
the proposal for a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation if
that was acceptable to other parties. What's the U.S. view of
that at this point?
MR. BOUCHER: I think that would be the kind of
specific thing that I'm not in a position at this point to try
to address. Let's go to David.
Q On Iraqi television today, Saddam Hussein was shown
meeting with a senior Iraqi cleric, a grand ayatollah, whose
name I can't pronounce.
MR. BOUCHER: They were kind to me and didn't even put
the name in my guidance, so I don't have to try.
Q Some of the rebel organizations are saying that
the man was kidnapped. Does the U.S. know what happened?
MR. BOUCHER: We don't have any way of offering one
version or the other -- confirming the validity of one version
or the other. We've seen the media reports in Iraq as well as
the claims by the opposition members.
I think our only general view would be to say that,
obviously, anyone appearing on Iraqi television is not
necessarily a free agent.
[Israel: Department Report on the Occupied
Territories]
Q Richard, is there any State Department information
about the speed of settlement of Soviet emigres on the West Bank
and other Occupied Territories? There's one report that it's
three times what has been said, or something like that. Have
you anything on that?
MR. BOUCHER: No, I don't have any particular details
or assessments like that for you at this point. There was a
report that we had to do for Congress that was just sort of a --
let me find out what it was. It is a report that we submitted
to the House Appropriations Committee. The request for the
report from Congress accompanied the Foreign Operations Export
Financing and Related Programs Appropriations bill for Fiscal
Year 1991.
We provided a report on Israeli settlement activities
in the territories occupied by Israel in 1967. It was sent to
the Committee on Wednesday morning.
Q Other than the contacts with the Kurdish rebel
leaders that you have acknowledged before which have been of a
human rights nature, now that the Kurds apparently control what
you yourself describe as large portions of territory in northern
Iraq, has the State Department had additional contactswith any
of these Kurdish groups -- any official contacts?
MR. BOUCHER: There's none that I'm aware of, John.
Q And why is the reason for that when they are
controlling more and more -- normally, the U.S. Government loves
to talk to opposition types, especially when you publicly said
you wouldn't mind if the current leader were dead. (Laughter)
MR. BOUCHER: The issue of meetings is addressed on a
case-by-case basis as people come to town and ask to meet with
us. I'm not only not aware of any meetings but I haven't heard
of any requests one way or the other in recent days.
Q Wouldn't you seek them out? We seek out
opposition leaders in other countries all the time.
MR. BOUCHER: In this case, our policy on meetings with
the Iraqi opposition is something that's determined on a
case-by-case basis, and we decide what meetings are appropriate
when we get requests.
Q On that previous question, what was the gist of
the State Department's report to the Appropriations Committee?
MR. BOUCHER: It was a report on settlement activities
in the territories occupied by Israel in 1967. I'm told it was
not a study with conclusions. It basically reviewed the
information that was available.
Is there such settlement or is there not?
MR. BOUCHER: There is settlement activity. It's a
report on the activity --
Q Of the emigres?
MR. BOUCHER: I don't know at this point what the
details on the emigre -- how they were handled and --
Q Are you going to make it public?
MR. BOUCHER: It's similar to many other reports that
we provide to Congress. Where the Congress requests a report,
we provide it to the Congress and then leave it to them to
decide on the public release.
Q Richard, just a follow up on the Kurd question.
Have any U.S. diplomats based in Turkey or Syria met with
Kurdish leaders recently?
MR. BOUCHER: David, I'm not aware of any meetings.
I'll double check to make sure that's the case.
Q Just a semantic quibble on your opening statement
about the large portions of northern Iraq. Yesterday, I think
it was large areas. Are you sort of suggesting that the
fighting has narrowed, or are you just changing words?
MR. BOUCHER: No, I think we decided to use a different
word today. I don't think it's meaningful in any way.
Q Where does the bidding stand on a U.N. ceasefire
resolution which, I gather, is going through a series of
permutations and combinations of it in New York?
MR. BOUCHER: We have presented copies of a draft
resolution to the members of the Security Council for their
consideration. Consultations on this draft are on-going in New
York, Washington, and Security Council member country capitals.
Q Is this a U.S. draft or is this the British draft?
MR. BOUCHER: It's a draft that was typed up by us.
It's the result also of -- (Laughter) It's a U.S. draft, Bill,
but it's based on considerable consultations that the Secretary
and the President have had.
Q Is there any Chinese element in this draft? A
serious question: Have you taken enough soundings to be able to
tell us if everybody agrees that Iraq should be deprived of
lethal weapons capabilities and stockpiling?
MR. BOUCHER: At this point, lethal weapons, weapons of
mass destruction, I think I'd only note that the President and
John Major addressed it when they were in Bermuda. I don't
really have anything to add at this point.
The draft is a matter of consultation with other
countries at this point.
Q The Chinese were consulted all along -- before the
typing took place, there was consultation?
MR. BOUCHER: I don't know exactly which countries were
consulted in the past few weeks.
Q Richard, has the State Department or any other
agency asked the half dozen countries that are harboring Iraq's
civilian aircraft -- Yemen, Sudan, Mauritania, India, a couple
of others -- not to return them because it would violate the
sanctions, the U.N. economic sanctions?
MR. BOUCHER: Let me look into that and get something
on it.
Q There's a report in a British newspaper today that
said that Kuwait has threatened to withdraw money from several
European banks unless they block as much as $5 billion in secret
Iraqi accounts. Apparently, this is money that has escaped the
sanctions.
Is the United States aware of it, and has it taken any
position on this?
MR. BOUCHER: I haven't seen the report, Carol. I'll
have to look at it. I'm not familiar with that.
Q Another area?
MR. BOUCHER: Yes.
[Cuba: MiG Pilot Defects]
Q Do you have anything on this Cuban pilot who
defected aboard a MiG-27?
MR. BOUCHER: A MiG-23, I think. We'll find out
shortly. A Cuban Air Force officer flew a MiG-23 fighter to the
Key West Naval Air Station on March 20, landing just before
noon. The pilot has requested political asylum and his request
is being processed. At the pilot's request, we're not releasing
his name.
Q What happens to the airplane?
MR. BOUCHER: Our general practice is to return Cuban
Government-owned aircraft and vessels. I'm told the last -- the
only previous Cuban MiG defection occurred in 1969. It was a
MiG-17, and the aircraft was returned to Cuba.
Q How soon will this one be returned?
MR. BOUCHER: I don't know, Bill.
Q In boxes, or --
Q Richard, there's a report that the United States
has changed its policy with regard to a plebiscite in Kashmir.
Do you have any guidance on that?
MR. BOUCHER: I'm afraid I don't, Alan. It's a subject
that I might look into.
Q Thank you.
MR. BOUCHER: Thank you.
(Press briefing concluded at 1:11 p.m.)
(###)