US Department of State Daily Briefing #2:
Thursday, 1/3/91
Boucher
Source: State Department Deputy Spokesman Richard
Boucher
Description: 12:45 PM; Washington, DC
Date: Jan 3, 19911/3/91
Category: Briefings
Region: MidEast/North Africa, Central America,
Subsaharan Africa, E/C Europe
Country: Iraq, USSR (former), El Salvador, Syria, Latvia,
Lithuania
Subject: Terrorism, Human Rights, State Department,
Military Affairs, Democratization
MR. BOUCHER: Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. I
have three statements for you: El Salvador, the Baltics, and
Somalia; and we'll get onto other matters.
Q Consider them done.
Q Just hand them out.
[FMLN Downing of US Helicopter in El Salvador]
A No. Let's start off with Salvador. Yesterday, at
2:30 p.m., three U.S. Army crew members were killed when their
transport helicopter was shot down by small arms fire in eastern
El Salvador. The FMLN guerrillas have claimed responsibility
for the shooting. The helicopter was on a routine mission
returning from San Salvador to its base in Honduras.
The bodies of the U.S. servicemen were recovered by the
Salvadoran armed forces and taken to San Salvador. Their names
are being withheld pending notification to their families.
The FMLN claimed in radio broadcasts that the three
servicemen were found dead inside the aircraft. However, there
appears to be a serious inconsistency in the FMLN's story. The
helicopter landed in a controlled fashion. Nevertheless, all
three U.S. servicemen had apparent gunshot wounds to the head
and two of them had no other apparent wounds. A forensic team
from the United States is about to arrive in El Salvador to
investigate the circumstances of these deaths.
This FMLN action comes at a time when the FMLN claims
to be interested in reaching agreements to end the war. Once
again, the guerrillas' actions belie their words. This time, it
is Americans, not Salvadorans, who are the victims of the FMLN's
hypocrisy.
We extend our sympathy to the families and colleagues
of the servicemen who died yesterday.
Questions on that? Jim.
Q You're suggesting, then, that they were executed
after they crash-landed?
A We have a forensic team that's on its way down
there that will investigate more fully the circumstances. There
were also some eyewitnesses. Our Embassy has sent people up to
the site and was interviewing them this morning. As I said, the
evidence, the information, that we have so far on the gunshot
wounds shows that the initial story put out by the FMLN is very
much inconsistent with the facts as we know them.
Q Do you have radio tower traffic that indicates it
landed safely?
A I can't go into, I think, the basis of our
statement, but we do know that it landed in a controlled
fashion.
Q Richard, do you have any evidence of the kind of
range at which these shots were fired into the head?
A At this point, those kinds of things have to be
investigated, and I can't give you that information now. We
hope that our forensic team and the Salvadoran government and
army investigators who are working on this will give us more
information shortly.
Q You said that -- you referred to this FMLN action.
What is it exactly that the United States is accusing the FMLN
of doing?
A They have claimed responsibility for the shooting
down of the aircraft.
Q So the action you're referring to there is the
shooting down of an aircraft which you say landed in controlled
fashion?
A And which they say -- they claim that the aircraft
was shot down and that there were three servicemen who died as a
result of that action. I can't tell you exactly who shot them,
when, where, and how, but they have claimed responsibility for
the whole incident.
Q OK. I guess what I was getting at is, the United
States doesn't say that the plane was shot down. The United
States says the plane came down in controlled fashion. Yet you
say there is some action taken by the FMLN.
A The United States says that the helicopter was
shot down by small arms fire in eastern El Salvador although it
was able to land in a controlled fashion. The gunshot wounds to
the three servicemen who died were to the head and that two of
these people had no other apparent wounds.
Q You're not accusing the FMLN at this point of
firing those gunshot wounds into the head of American soldiers,
are you, or --
A That has to be developed by the forensic team.
Q Were there other people in the helicopter?
Q Richard, can you add anything at all to the way in
which this helicopter was shot down?
A Excuse me?
Q Can you add anything at all to the way that this
helicopter was shot down?
A No, I can't at this point. As I said, we're going
up to the site. We are interviewing people. It was flying a
route along the Pan American Highway, which is not a zone of
conflict.
Q Richard, do you hold the FMLN responsible for the
deaths of the American servicemen?
A I think they themselves have admitted their
responsibility; and, yes, we do.
Q Were there others in the aircraft other than the
three Americans?
A I don't know that at this point. Defense might be
able to give you that.
Q Why was the helicopter there?
A As I said, it was a routine, regular kind of
mission. The helicopter and the crew are based in Honduras.
They were returning to Honduras after completing a mission to El
Salvador which involves logistical and administrative support to
the U.S. military personnel in El Salvador. The aircraft has no
role in supporting the Salvadoran armed forces and no role in
combat in El Salvador.
Q Do you know what the number of the U.S. military
personnel stands at now in Salvador?
A I'm not sure of the exact number. I think it's
limited to 55.
Q Is there action by the United States against the
FMLN contemplated pending the results of this investigation?
A I'm not exactly sure what further action you're
referring to. But certainly as more information is developed on
the exact responsibility, we will hold those accountable who
performed this action.
Q It's not clear to me what it is this helicopter
was doing there. You said it was not supported by Salvadoran --
A It was flying.
Q Yeah, well. It was not supporting the Salvadoran
military.
A It's a regular, routine kind of flight that comes
in from Honduras. It involves logistical and administrative
support to our U.S. military personnel in El Salvador. I think
you may be able to get more information from the Defense
Department on the exact mission.
Q Do you rule out a U.S. military response against
the rebels?
A Pat, I'm not going to get into speculative and
hypothetical questions, whatever they are.
Q President Bush, by the weekend, has to provide a
report on whether or not the rebels are complying with -- are
likely to -- whether conditions are likely to favor a renewal of
complete restoration of full military aid. I'm wondering if
this will have any effect on that?
A It will certainly be taken into consideration.
Under the law that provides military aid to El Salvador in the
current fiscal year, we're required to make these periodic
reports to Congress on the conditions in El Salvador. The first
is due at the beginning of next week, and we won't have any more
detailed comment until that report is prepared and released.
Barry.
Q Just for the record, what is the role of the U.S.
military so far as the FMLN is concerned? You say the
helicopter was on a routine function, but it was assisting the
U.S. military. What is the U.S. military's function? Is it to
oppose the leftist in El Salvador?
A I don't have a precise mission statement. They're
generally down there, I think, as trainers for the Salvadoran
armed forces.
Q To help them beat the FMLN; right?
A Check with DoD -- with Defense -- to get a more
detailed expression of --
Q What I'm saying, your remarks separating the
helicopter from any activity against the FMLN, I understand.
But this helicopter is part of the U.S. military mission; and is
that U.S. military, indeed, to help the Salvadoran government
defeat these very guerrillas who attacked the plane?
Aren't they retaliating against a mission that --
A I don't have a full statement of what the precise
military mission is of the military trainers that are down
there. You can get that from the Defense Department, I think.
Let's not get too far from the point. The point is this
helicopter was flying in a zone which is not a zone of conflict.
It was shot down and claimed to have been shot down by people
who claimed that they're actually interested in peace.
Q Richard, my recollection is that there was a
Salvadoran helicopter shot down last week, but I think that was
by a missile, a surface-to-air missile. Have you been following
up that case?
A I don't have anymore on that particular case. I
remember it about as --
Q Have you asked for -- can you check to see if you
have asked the Soviets whether they supplied the launcher and,
if so, to whom?
A Yes. We have been watching and following up on
the question of the SA-14 missiles. The developments on that
are that the Nicaraguan army has announced the arrests of four
officers and 11 Salvadorans for providing surface-to-air
missiles to the FMLN. The announcement stated that six SA-14
launchers with 16 missiles and two SA-7 launchers with 12
missiles were stolen and sold to the FMLN.
The Nicaraguan army confirmed that the SA-14 launcher
found in El Salvador last year was part of a 1986 Soviet
shipment to Nicaragua and announced the formation of a Soviet
army commission to investigate the illegal transfers.
We find these arrests are an encouraging sign. We hope
they represent a real commitment on the part of the Nicaraguan
army to end illegal arms transfers and not just a response to
the incontrovertible evidence that they occurred.
Q Richard, coming back for just a second to the
current incident. I don't think your description of the events
on the ground indicated this, but was the U.S. aircraft armed?
And if so, were any weapons fired by U.S. personnel on the
aircraft, either at the ground or at any other -- was there any
exchange of fire as far as the U.S. knows?
A I think I'll have to refer you to the Defense
Department for that. I'm not aware of any, but I don't know if
that means there wasn't any or not.
Q Who says this is a zone of no conflict? Is this
an agreed-upon zone of no conflict between the two sides or is
this something we declare as a zone of no conflict?
A My people tell me it's an objective fact. It's
not a zone where conflict has been occurring.
Q Richard, where was it?
A I think as close as I can come to telling you
where it was is eastern Salvador. That's what I know.
Q That's a good place where there's lots of combat.
A Well, it sure is. But it was following a route
along the Pan American Highway. Again, some of the more
detailed information about the helicopter and the mission and
exactly what the helicopter was doing, you can probably get from
the Defense Department.
Q Can we go on.
[The Baltics: USSR Military Seizes Property]
A Can we go on? The Baltics: The United States is
concerned about yesterday's seizure of Latvia's main printing
plant and of the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee
Building by Soviet Interior Ministry troops. These actions were
provocative and give rise to concern that the already tense
situation in the Baltic states may be exacerbated by actions not
conducive to a peaceful outcome.
The governments and peoples of Latvia and Lithuania
have responded with restraint and have relied solely on
non-violent protest in opposing these actions.
As the President said on December 10, we urge an end to
actions that might serve to obstruct or to delay the start of
constructive dialogue, which is needed to achieve a peaceful and
satisfactory solution, and to respond to the legitimate
aspirations of the Baltic peoples. Carol.
Q What's your understanding of what authority
prompted that crackdown? Did it come from Moscow? Did it come
from the Kremlin?
A At this point, we don't have a clear indication of
whether the actions were originated locally or at the
instruction of the Soviet government.
Let me say that regardless of who initiated these
actions, however, we do feel that the Soviet government has the
ultimate responsibility for the actions of its security units.
Q If you don't have a clear indication, do you at
least have some suggestion of where the authority came from?
A No.
Q Even though Shevardnadze is Foreign Minister in
name, are you still dealing with him on these issues? Or, who
is the power?
A I don't know if we've had any recent meetings with
him but we deal with the Foreign Ministry, including the person
at its head.
Q Isn't it a bit of a problem where the Foreign
Minister resigns warning of dictatorship and warning of exactly
this kind of action but he's still at his post and obviously not
in control, obviously in disagreement with the policy and he's
the only person you have to deal with?
A Well, I didn't say he was the only person we had
to deal with.
Q All right, then who else do you have?
A I said we deal with the Foreign Ministry of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and they represent their
government. We can deal with that.
Q But the Foreign Minister has resigned in clear
disagreement with these kinds of policies. So if you go to him,
he's bound to be sympathetic, presumably, but does he have any
pull? That's the question.
A Well, Alan, I can't answer that question for you.
That's a question of analyzing the internal Soviet political
situation that I can't do from here.
Q While we're on the Soviet Union, will the
Secretary be going to Moscow on his still amorphous itinerary?
A We'll do any questions you might have about the
trip later. But just for a sneak preview, I don't have anything
for you on the itinerary. (Laughter)
Q Would you elaborate on that later?
Q Is that sort of like the --
A Somalia?
Q No, no, we are not ready with that one yet.
You've been urging dialogue with the Baltics for months --
months if not years -- especially, I recall, trips to Moscow,
meetings between the Secretary and Mr. Gorbachev, a meeting with
the Lithuanian Prime Minister in Moscow, meetings in New York at
the CSCE, Foreign Ministers' meeting in Paris at the CSCE
Summit. You've been urging dialogue and dialogue and dialogue
and there's been no dialogue. Every sign of incipient dialogue
has been crushed. Aren't you a bit discouraged by all this?
A Alan, I think I've expressed today our concern and
the basis for our concern.
Q "Concern" -- is that the strongest word you have?
A It's the word I'm using today.
Q Somalia?
[Somalia: Update:]
A Somalia: The United States extends its sympathy
to the victims of this week's violence in Somalia. We appeal
urgently to all sides and forces to lay down their arms. We
join other friends of Somalia in calling for an immediate and
extended ceasefire which would create an atmosphere of
tranquillity necessary to begin the dialogue and political
reconciliation which the great majority of Somalis want, and
after years of bloodshed which is so badly needed.
The ceasefire would also allow the orderly departure of
foreigners intending to leave.
Q You're saying the United States has not been able
to evacuate any of those people?
A At this point, we have not been able to evacuate
people. The fighting is continuing in Mogadishu. There is
unfortunately no evidence that a ceasefire might be coming into
effect on the ground. We have issued a new travel advisory to
Americans and broadcast it over VOA. It says that people should
stay in touch with our Embassy and anybody who feels it's safe
to get to our Embassy should do so. But at this point we're
still working on evacuation plans and haven't been able to put
anything into effect given the security situation.
Q Richard, could you explain why the United States
has only called for a ceasefire after the President of the
country has been forced to flee? Fighting has gone on for at
least four weeks and dozens if not hundreds of people have been
killed there and that only today we are calling for a ceasefire?
A Well, two things, John. The level of violence has
risen dramatically in recent days. Second of all, we have
consistently called and supported a ceasefire. I did so, I
believe, yesterday.
Q You said yesterday that you supported a ceasefire
but you didn't call for one, and you haven't -- John is
absolutely right. You haven't called for one the whole time
this has been going on, Richard. It's a case of, really, what I
said yesterday. It seems from that point of view, from a lot of
people's point of view, you stood back and waited for Siad Barre
to be removed, a man that you no longer support, but you used to
support.
A You can put your own interpretation --
Q It's an admission by silence.
A -- on what you want to say. I don't think calling
for a ceasefire and supporting a ceasefire is that much
different.
Q Richard, in your suggestion that Americans try to
get to the Embassy if they can safely do so, does that mean you
still believe the Embassy is safe territory, that it's secure?
A Yes.
Q Are you saying also that there can't be an
evacuation until there is a ceasefire?
A No, I'm not saying that, George. I'm saying that
a ceasefire would certainly greatly facilitate the evacuation of
foreigners. We're obviously looking at various contingencies.
I don't have any specific evacuation plans for you at this
point.
Q Richard, could I just follow up on my question?
Do you have any assurances from the combatants, from any of the
forces, that the Embassy is secure? How do you know in this
situation that the Embassy is secure? Is there anybody guarding
it?
A The observation that the Embassy is basically
secure is based on the fact that there are people there who are
safe and who have been safe. We have had some contacts in
recent days with both the government and the opposition leaders.
We've talked to them about the safety of American citizens and
about our desire to see a ceasefire.
Q That could change at any moment, though. The
people in Kuwait were safe, too.
A So? It's a dangerous -- it's a difficult security
situation. We think right now the best place to be is at the
Embassy if people can get there. We see that the people who are
at the Embassy have been safe so far.
The fighting is obviously unpredicatable. It's
obviously a dangerous security situation, and we're looking at
the contingencies and making plans to evacuate people.
Q Can we move on to the Secretary's trip.
A We can go on to any questions you might have.
Q Tell us everything you know about the Secretary's
trip?
Q We know it starts on Sunday.
A He's going to the Gulf region and to Europe.
That's all I have.
Q In what order?
A I can't give you a full itinerary at this point.
Q Do you have a starting date or some of the various
stops that he's going to make?
A The starting date is Sunday, January 6.
Q And have you had any response or initial reaction
from the Iraqis so far to the President's proposal this morning?
A No. The proposal was made to the Iraqi Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, to Under Secretary Nizar Hamdoum, at noon
today Baghdad-time -- that's 4:00 a.m. our time -- by Charge Joe
Wilson. The meeting did take place at the Foreign Ministry. We
had no reaction at that time nor have we heard anything from the
Iraqis since then.
Q What was the atmosphere in that meeting? It was
described, at least in wire reports, that it was very cordial
and very positive.
A Wilson described the atmosphere as good. He may
have used "cordial and positive." I don't know. But we don't
have an Iraqi reaction to the proposal.
Q Can you tell us anything about the thinking behind
dropping back from President Bush's proposal to allow the Iraqis
to have a meeting with him to the current proposal which is to
foreclose a meeting with him and have a meeting simply with
Baker? I don't mean "simply with Baker." I mean at a different
level. It's obviously a different level.
A Well, you know what our original proposal was and
that was that Tariq Aziz should be able to come to Washington
and Secretary Baker should go to Baghdad. We've said we got no
meaningful response from the Iraqis on that proposal. They
hadn't expressed an interest, as Marlin said this morning, in
the meeting with Saddam Hussein.
The President wanted to go the extra mile and make a
proposal for some discussion, some contacts with the Iraqis, and
this is the proposal that he's now made.
Q Is the offer for a meeting between the Secretary
and Saddam Hussein and a visit by Tariq Aziz to President Bush
now totally off the table?
A I don't really know how to describe it, John.
Marlin, I think, just gave the best explanation this morning
that I can give, and that is we had no indication that Saddam
Hussein was interested. So we've made another proposal, another
offer to have a meeting in Switzerland.
Q Richard, it's a truism to say that Iraq is a
one-party state and Saddam Hussein is in charge and also that
Tariq Aziz is a member of an ethnic minority, is not seen as a
particularly powerful figure with decision-making authority in
that country.
Is the withdrawal of the offer to meet with Saddam
Hussein and the substitution of a meeting with Tariq Aziz not
going the extra half mile, at the most?
A Alan, I just don't accept your characterization of
the situation here. We made one proposal, which was very
generous. We offered dates when Secretary Baker could have
traveled to Baghdad to meet with Saddam Hussein. At this point,
we proposed another meeting with their Foreign Minister, and we
hope they take us up on that offer.
Q But surely you agree that Saddam Hussein is the man
who makes all the decisions in Iraq; and surely if you want that
kind of decision, you have to go and see him?
A At this point, as Marlin said this morning, we
have no indication that Saddam Hussein is interested. We
proposed to meet with their Foreign Minister.
Q We're saying today that we're willing to meet in
Geneva on the 9th. Saddam has said he will meet Baker on the
12th. We're talking about a difference of three days here that
would allow us to meet with the head man. What is so critical
about these three days, that we will meet him on the 9th but we
won't meet him on the 12th?
A The date of the 12th, I think, has been repeatedly
explained by us as being much too close to the U.N. deadline.
Obviously, we don't think that the dates of the 7th to the 9th
are affected by that.
Q The 9th is also very close to the deadline and
there's only three days separating them and Saddam is the man
who makes the decisions. It's an opportunity for Baker, as the
President said, to look Saddam in the eye to make sure he
doesn't misunderstand.
How do you explain to the American public that three
days is so critical at this point?
A Pat, the rejection of the idea that he should go
to Baghdad on January 12 was something that we explained, again,
repeatedly as being much too close to the U.N. deadline for us
to go. We obviously don't think that the 7th to the 9th for a
meeting in Switzerland is affected by that consideration, and
therefore we're interested in having this meeting and we made
this proposal.
Q Richard, are you ruling out that Baker will not go
to Baghdad, perhaps spontaneously, since he's already going to
be in the Gulf either on the 10th or the 11th or the 12th?
A I guess I'd have to say I'm just not in a position
to rule anything in or rule anything out. Things happen.
Q So it's possible either for the Iraqis to come
back and say, "We accept this meeting but we'd also like the
Secretary to come the next day to Baghdad." Is that --
A Why don't we say it's hypothetical, because it is.
Q Is that something that's been discussed by this
Administration as a possibility?
A Our proposal to the Iraqis was for a meeting of
Foreign Ministers in Switzerland between the 7th and the 9th.
Q And you are firmly ruling out Baker going to
Baghdad on the 12th?
A No. I said that's firmly hypothetical.
Q Richard, does the U.S. Government have any
explanation on President Bush's announcement for this new
proposal -- setting a date for Iraqi reply by the 5th? Because
at the end of last year, Secretary Baker told us that he is
ready to go anywhere at a moment's notice. So the Iraqis can
reply by midnight of the 6th, if the Secretary is --
A The need for a reply by January 5 is something
that I'm sure you can all understand; and that is, that we can't
put a trip together unless we know what date he's got to be in
Switzerland for this meeting.
Q But as everyone is asking you, the Secretary will
be there already in the area and that includes this timeframe.
So he must be ready by a moment's notice.
A I guess I don't quite understand what you're
asking. I said I'm not going to deal with hypotheticals about
things --
Q I guess I'm asking you why you have to set a
deadline for Iraq's answer to the new proposal?
A Because we have to set up a trip with our
coalition partners. We're not just going to go to Geneva and
sit there for three days. We have to schedule the meeting and
we have to schedule other meetings around it. It's a practical
consideration.
Q Richard, does the United States view this
invitation to attend this meeting as the beginning of a dialogue
with Iraq, as a single event, a single meeting, or as an
exploratory meeting at which future schedules might be discussed
or some other option? How does the U.S. view this meeting --
the beginning of something longer?
A We view this as the way we've expressed it before
and the way Marlin expressed it again this morning. It's a
meeting to go the extra mile, to take the opportunity to make
sure that they understand the U.S. position, the international
position, and the views of the international community and the
coalition.
Q Richard, on the question that was asked earlier
here, you said that you have an indication that Saddam Hussein is
not interested in a meeting. Does the fact that Baker is
proposing to meet Aziz indicate that Aziz would like to see
Baker?
A Their response would indicate whether he's
interested in meeting with Baker or not.
Q You say that one is not interested. You offered
the other. Do you have any indication that Aziz is interested
in such a meeting?
A We don't have a response yet from the Iraqis.
Q Can I ask another one, please, on going the extra
mile? I'm not questioning that. In the statement, you say that
the United States would like to go the extra mile but, here, it
says "no negotiations, no compromises, no attempts at
face-saving, no rewards for aggression."
If you're offering to go the extra mile, why actually
add these "no's" in there?
A Because we want to make clear what the position is
and what our intention is in the meeting so that there can't be
any misunderstanding on the basis of which the meeting is
established. That is the position of the United States. That
is the position of the international community, and that is the
position expressed in the United Nations resolutions.
Q Richard, does the United States still support an
approach by the EC, if they choose to make one, to Baghdad on
this issue, or is this an attempt to foreclose that?
A Our position on meetings by the EC remains what I
said it was yesterday. That is that we don't discourage
meetings; we think that meetings should convey a uniform and
consistent message to Baghdad, and that has full compliance with
the U.N.
Q Could we have a filing break?
A Sure.
Q What is Baker prepared to talk to Aziz about,
apart from the known U.S. demand for a total withdrawal by
January 15 and restoration of Kuwaiti sovereignty? If the
Iraqis bring up the Palestinian issue, for instance, which is
not unlikely since they bring it up in every public statement,
will Baker be ready to talk to them about that?
A Barry, at this point I'm not going to speculate on
the exact contents of a meeting which hasn't been scheduled yet.
Q It's not speculation I'm asking for. You either
-- there are a lot of things you can say without using the word
"speculate." You know as well as I do that the Palestinian
issue is running a close second to the Iraqi withdrawal from
Kuwait as the topic of discourse. U.S. officials usually have
an answer to that. I'm just asking if Baker is ready to talk to
him; and if so, what would he tell him?
A Our position on Palestinian issues is very well
known. I'm sure the Secretary would be happy to say it to
anybody who asked. But also our very firm position that there
be no linkage with the Iraqi aggression in Kuwait with any other
issue is also very firmly known.
Q Well, Richard, let me try it another way. Do the
aims of the talks that the Secretary would hold with Tariq Aziz
remain the same as those which he proposed to hold with Saddam
Hussein? That is, simply to reiterate the U.S. position on this
or is the Secretary going there with a somewhat broader mandate
or more flexible mandate at this point?
A The aims of the talks, as expressed this morning
in a statement by the President and the statements by Marlin
Fitzwater, and I think in the little bit that I've said about
it, are clearly stated and they are, I think, very clearly the
same aims that we had when we originally proposed the series of
meetings with the Iraqis.
Q Is the United States ruling out any meeting
between President Bush and Saddam Hussein?
A That's completely hypothetical at this point. I
can't deal with that.
Q Does President Bush -- does the United States
Administration still want to look Saddam Hussein in the eye, as
President Bush has said in the past?
A Again, Ralph, that's another way of asking the
same question. We've expressed our view that the importance of
these meetings is so that we can convey very clearly to the
Iraqi government our commitment, the commitment of the
international community, and our willingness to use force if
that proves necessary.
Q You keep saying that certain things don't change;
policies don't change; positions don't change, and so on. One
of the reasons for asking that question is to determine whether
anything has changed and it's important to know whether the
United States still wants to have a meeting with Saddam Hussein,
regardless of whether if the Iraqis don't want to have one.
That's up to them, obviously, to decide. But does the United
States still want to have one?
A Obviously, we made a proposal that there be one.
There was no interest expressed in that proposal. So at this
point we have made another proposal.
Q To say there was no interest, I'd say, is a bit of
an exaggeration because they came back and they accepted the
proposal and then they offered a date.
Q Within President Bush's parameters.
A As we've said before, we found that date was not
acceptable to us. They were unwilling to consider another time.
They never made any other proposal that would have been in line
with what we could accommodate. We've noted, as we've noted in
our public statements, that Saddam Hussein had very frequent
meetings with a variety of other people and somehow couldn't
find serious enough interest in our proposal to settle a meeting
that was in a timeframe that we could make.
Q So three days earlier, we're willing to do it.
That's bizarre. We threaten to go to war for three days?
A You have to explain your question a little more,
John?
Q If we're willing to meet him January 9 and we
weren't willing to meet him January 12, the consequences of
meeting or not meeting may be conflict. I still don't feel
you've adequately explained yourself as to what the big
difference is between three days. In fact, you haven't
explained yourself. You've just said, well, it's a different
set of circumstances.
A I'd hate to say it but it is a different proposal,
John. We made a proposal that was open, that was flexible, and
that was generous. We proposed 15 different dates for a meeting
with Saddam Hussein. The Iraqis did not pick up on that proposal
despite the fact that they repeatedly found the time and very
often at very short notice to meet with a whole variety of other
people coming through.
Since the Iraqis expressed no serious interest in that
proposal, we have made another proposal and that new proposal is
to meet in Switzerland between January 7 and January 9.
Q Under that new proposal, the State Department
cannot rule out a meeting afterward between Baker and Saddam
Hussein in Baghdad. The ruling out of the 12th no longer
applies; am I correct?
A No. The ruling out of the 12th does apply. Did
you ask the 12th or some other --
Q I asked you and you said --
A I thought you were asking some other date. OK.
Let me correct that. The ruling out of the 12th still applies.
The same considerations apply to January 12 in Baghdad.
Q But even to narrow John's good question --
A As far as some other speculation on dates in
between and things like that, I think that's only hypothetical
at this point.
Q He's willing to see Tariq Aziz between the 7th and
the 9th, and the 9th is almost the 10th already in Iraq, and
he's prepared to go on from there to Baghdad but he's got to get
there by the 11th. Is that what this is all hanging on?
A Barry, I didn't --
Q I'm not trying to burlesque it but it's getting
very --
A Well, I think you are. I did not say that he was
prepared to go from there to Baghdad.
Q No, no. You said you can't rule it out.
A I did not offer any proposals for the Secretary to
go on from there to Baghdad. I said you're asking me
hypothetical questions of what might happen after a Tariq Aziz
meeting if a Tariq Aziz meeting is accepted by the Iraqis. And
at this point, I'm not prepared to deal with such speculation.
Q Richard, I'm not obviously on the offensive
against you. You have to stand up and defend a policy that
first offers the guy a meeting any time to the 15th; then he
says the 12th, and the Government says the 12th is too close to
the 15th. Then you come back and say, how about the 7th to the
9th, and then you're asked, how about going onto Baghdad and the
Government spokesman says, "We can't rule out going onto Baghdad
after the 9th." It's just mind-boggling -- and then he
has to get there. The only conclusion I can draw is that what's
possible and ruled out is a meeting on the 10th or the 11th,
which is John McWethy's point.
A Barry, I think you're reading too much into my
saying that you can't rule out, or my refusal to deal with
questions that are obviously hypothetical and speculative. We
don't do that from here. I'm not going to start today just
because it's fun. It's just not something that we're going to
do.
Q You often cast it in terms such as "highly
unlikely," so on and so forth. You're not casting it in any
terms. You're leaving it out in the "either" for us.
A Well, I'll see if there's anything more than
"either" that we're prepared to provide at this point.
Q Richard, it's been said that the 15th is not --
it's a deadline after which force is authorized but it's not a
deadline for force to be used. Why would it not be possible to
carry on talking after the 15th, presuming that hostilities
haven't broken out?
A Again, that's a very hypothetical and speculative
meeting of some carry-on to a meeting that has not yet been set.
Q Well, let me put it another way. Does dialogue
become impossible after the 15th?
A The proposals we have made are for meetings from
January 7 to 9 in Switzerland. I don't have any new proposals
or extended proposals beyond that to give you, a mere five or
six hours after those proposals were made and before the Iraqis
have any response to us.
Q Richard, I wonder if you could tell us whether
American officials have met with Iraqi Ambassador Adnan Barzan
al-Takriti in Switzerland at any point during this crisis? And
if you don't know, could you take the question?
There are reports in two Parisian publications today
that the Americans have, in fact, been carrying out secret
negotiations with Iraq through this Ambassador and that there's
been an Iraqi proposal put on the table for being willing to
withdraw from Kuwait under certain circumstances. Do you have
any comment on those reports?
A We have seen those reports. I have looked into
them. We have not received any word that the Iraqis have made
such an offer.
As you know, the U.N. resolutions are clear: Iraq must
withdraw unconditionally from Kuwait. We have made a public
offer of meetings with the Iraqis, and we are not engaged in any
secret negotiations.
Q Have there been such meetings?
A I don't know if we've met this guy or not in the
course of diplomatic contacts.
Q Wait a minute. You've looked into it and you
don't know?
A I didn't ask the specific question if we had, at
some point in our diplomacy, in our usual conduct of diplomacy,
encountered the Iraqi Ambassador in Geneva. I looked into the
question of whether there were any secret talks or if we had
heard of any of these offers that have supposedly been reported.
Q Since you looked into those reports, another
aspect of them is that French President Francois Mitterrand
received a written communication from Saddam Hussein which
discusses terms -- allegedly discusses terms for withdrawal from
Kuwait.
Has the United States learned anything from its French
ally in the coalition that would bolster or support that report?
A We have not received any word that the Iraqis have
made such an offer.
Q To the United States or to any other --
A To the United States, to France, or to anyone
else.
Q But, Richard, are you going to take the question
about meetings with the Iraqi Ambassador, Mr. al-Takriti?
A I'll see if we have anything to say on that.
Q If you don't have anything to say about it, what
it leaves open is that you've looked into the reports but you
haven't denied or --
A Ralph, the reports, as I understood them from
reading the press reports on these press reports -- on these
reports -- said that Mitterrand received a letter, that Iraq had
made an offer and that there were secret negotiations going on.
Q And that U.S. officials had acted as
intermediaries -- the same report, the same Reuters story?
A That we were involved in some sort of secret
negotiations.
Q With the specific --
A I asked those three questions. I didn't ask the
specific hook at the end, "Well, about this guy in Geneva?"
That's the one that I will ask and see if we have anything for
you.
Q One more question on the Gulf. Another aspect.
There was a question I asked a long time ago on what the
definition of the State Department was with regard to the
compliance -- Iraqi compliance of the U.N. resolutions. I don't
think the State Department has come up with a clear definition
of what it means by "compliance."
A I don't think it's ever been unclear. The United
Nations resolutions called for the complete Iraqi withdrawal
from Kuwait, unconditional withdrawal, the restoration of the
Kuwaiti government, and a few other things.
Q Provided that Iraq has come out with saying "yes,"
we are ready to see you somewhere between the 7th and 9th in
Switzerland. Physically, it's not likely that Iraqi troops can
pull out of Kuwait by the 15th. If the Iraqis say we are ready
to pull out, is this promise enough for the United States?
A I don't know what you are asking. Promise enough
for what? What we want is total and complete and unconditional
Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait.
Q By the 15th?
A By the 15th.
Q Richard, can you explain why the 12th is too close
to the 15th? You have 72 hours.
A Owen, I think the best thing for me to do is to
get you the extensive transcripts of people who have explained
that question over the course of the last four weeks, three
weeks.
Q You haven't really explained it. You said it's
too close. But too close to what purpose?
A You may not think the explanation is adequate but
we've provided, I think, a clear and consistent explanation.
Q Thank you.
(Press briefing concluded at 1:28 p.m.)(###)