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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DEFENSE TRADE NEWS
VOLUME 5, NUMBER 3, JULY/OCTOBER 1994
PUBLISHED BY THE BUREAU OF POLITICAL-MILITARY AFFAIRS

ARTICLES IN THIS ISSUE:
Policy
1.  U.S. Initiatives for Demining and Landmine Control -- Beyond the 
Export Moratorium
2.  Upgrading Soviet Systems:  the "MiG Policy" Question -- State 
Department to Consider American Participation in Indian MiG Upgrades
3.  Firearms Exports -- U.S., Other Governments Cooperate to Combat 
Diversions

Operations
4.  DTC's Customer Service Plan -- Commitment to Our Customers
5.  Blue Lantern on Guard -- A Primer on State's Program of End-Use and 
End-User Checks
6.  Indications of Suspicious Transactions -- A Checklist for Exporters
7.  Access Denied -- A Guide to Proscribed and Restricted Export 
Destinations
8.  Redefining "U.S. Person" -- Regulatory Revision Clarifies Licensing 
Eligibility 
9.  Firearms Exports:  Enhanced Procedures -- Regulatory Changes on 
Import Certification and Assault Weapons
10.  Licensing Cyberspace, Part II -- New Procedures for Encryption 
Exports
11.  Agreement Notes, Part I:  Using the Hardware Exemption -- A New 
Alternative to Licenses for Agreement-Related Hardware
12.  ITAR Exemption Crib Sheet -- Fine Print in the International 
Traffic in Arms Regulations

Departments
13.  Country Policy Briefs
14.  Personnel Updates
15.  Defense Trade Advisory Group Developments
16.  Commodity Jurisdiction Determinations
17.  Systems Update
18.  Licensing Officer Assignments19.  Feedback, ELLIE, and Training 
Forms


Editor's Note
This issue of Defense Trade News and Export Policy Bulletin focuses on 
compliance issues, including industry's role in assuring that defense 
trade is conducted in accordance with the law and in furtherance of U.S. 
foreign policy and national security.  

Feedback from the first issues of the revamped Defense Trade News and 
Export Policy Bulletin suggests that a substantial majority of readers 
welcome our increased emphasis on policy material, although there are a 
few demurrals.  Comments run the gamut from "This bulletin is one of the 
most informative, well-written government publications I read; it does a 
good job of updating exporters on current U.S. policy" to "Please 
maintain the high standards of this publication and do not pollute it 
with political comments."  We plan to continue to publish both policy 
background articles and detailed operational material.  Your feedback 
does matter to us, so let us hear from you.

DTC Registrants -- New Address? New Boss? Let Us Know
Of course, all subscribers need to notify us of a change of address to 
continue to receive the magazine.  But for those recipients of Defense 
Trade News registered with the Department of State as manufacturers or 
exporters, there is another important reason to keep in touch -- 
registrants are required by law to notify State's Office of Defense 
Trade Controls of any change of address or change in the name of the 
registrant entered in Block 14 of Registration Form DSP-9.  For details, 
consult ITAR  $122.4 or contact the Registration Staff at (703) 875-
5663.


ARTICLE 1:


U.S. Initiatives for Demining and Landmine Control
Beyond the Export Moratorium

This item is reprinted from the U.S. Department of State Dispatch.
Anti-personnel landmines are the weapon of choice for many government 
and insurgent groups. They are cheap, easy to manufacture and use, 
difficult to detect, and expensive and dangerous to remove. Usually, 
landmines are not removed after armed conflict ends. They are left for 
populations and, more recently, peacekeepers to deal with. 

While the U.S. military employs landmines responsibly and in accordance 
with international law, others often use them in unconventional and 
indiscriminate ways against civilian populations to generate fear, 
inhibit refugee repatriation, disrupt economic reconstruction, and 
generally create chaos in fragile governments.

Addressing the horrible toll in innocent civilian casualties caused by 
the irresponsible and indiscriminate use of anti-personnel landmines is 
a high priority of the Administration. Given the immediacy and the 
complexity of the problem, the U.S. has developed a comprehensive, four-
track strategy.

Demining Initiatives. The U.S. currently assists demining programs in 
Cambodia, Afghanistan, Nicaragua, and Mozambique. These follow five 
steps: landmine assessment, training in mine awareness, education and 
training in mine clearance, transition of responsibility for the program 
to the host government or other designated entity (e.g., an 
international organization or a private non-governmental organization), 
and follow-on assistance. 

Using this general plan, the Administration is initiating this year 
support of demining efforts in Eritrea, Ethiopia, Honduras, and Costa 
Rica. There are significant landmine problems in Angola, Somalia, 
Rwanda, and Liberia as well, but unrest in those countries has prevented 
the implementation of U.S. assistance. 

By the end of 1994, the U.S. aims to have programs in at least nine 
countries where landmines are a serious problem. The Administration 
hopes to expand the program to other countries; it has requested 
additional funding for FY 1995, particularly for research and 
development of technologies to assist affected nations to detect and 
clear landmines.

Efforts To Strengthen the Convention on Conventional Weapons 
(particularly Protocol II which governs the use of landmines). The 
convention has been transmitted to the Senate for advice and consent to 
ratification. The U.S. is pressing for substantial improvements to the 
landmine protocol, such as making it applicable to internal conflicts, 
requiring all mines to have a substantial metallic content, requiring 
certain mines to be self-deactivating, and establishing verification 
procedures.

Moratoria on Landmine Transfers. In October 1992, the U.S. adopted a 
unilateral export moratorium on antipersonnel landmines.  This 
moratorium was extended in 1993 for three years. In 1993, the UN General 
Assembly unanimously adopted a U.S. resolution calling for moratoria on 
exports of landmines that pose a grave risk to civilians. The U.S. is 
strongly urging key countries to adhere to moratoria. To date, eight 
other countries formally have declared moratoria of their own; several 
have export controls in place.

Establishment of a More Permanent International Control Mechanism. The 
export moratoria are only temporary measures. The U.S. is engaged in a 
fast-track policy review to develop a proposal for a more permanent 
multilateral anti-personnel landmine control regime. It is taking a 
rigorous, systematic look at a broad range of options. The 
Administration is dedicated to building the international consensus 
necessary to bring about an effective control regime in the shortest 
possible time.

For further information see Hidden Killers:  The Global Problem With 
Uncleared Landmines, U.S. Department of State, July 1993, available from 
the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs at (202) 647-6968. 

(###)


Antipersonnel Landmine Facts
-- There are more than 85 million uncleared landmines in 62 countries 
around the world.  More than 65 million mines were laid in the last 15 
years.
-- Landmines cause more than 150 deaths or injuries worldwide each week.  
Most of these are innocent civilian casualties.
-- The United Nations estimates that there are 9-10 million landmines in 
Afghanistan, 9 million in Angola, 4-7 million in Cambodia, 5-10 million 
in Iraq, 5-7 million in Kuwait, and 2-4 million in the former 
Yugoslavia.
-- It costs between $150 and $1,000 to remove one landmine.
-- The U.S. allocated more than $9 million to demining projects in FY 
1993; more than $12 million will be spent in FY 1994.
-- There are more than 30,000 amputees in Cambodia and more than 20,000 
in Angola, according to International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) 
estimates.  Most are victims of mines.
-- In 1991, the ICRC made almost 8000 artificial limbs and 11,000 
orthopedic appliances for mine victims in 14 countries. 
(###)


ARTICLE 2:

Upgrading Soviet Systems:  the "MiG Policy" Question
State Department to Consider American Participation in Indian MiG 
Upgrades

Towards Case-by-Case Review:  India
Recently, the State Department instituted a policy of considering, on a 
case-by-case basis, U.S. firms' applications for licences to participate 
in the Indian Government's program to upgrade its MiG-21 aircraft. 

Applications will be subject to rigorous inter-agency review to ensure 
approval is consistent with U.S. foreign policy, national security, 
technological security, and arms control and regional security 
interests.  Moreover, licenses will be considered only for exports of 
articles or services in support of upgrades determined to have defensive 
applications only. 

No decision has been made to apply this policy to upgrades in countries 
other than India, or to systems other than the MiG-21.  


ARTICLE 3:

Firearms Exports
U.S., Other Governments Cooperate to Combat Diversions

A Growing Trade in Firearms
Over the past year, State's Office of Defense Trade Controls (DTC) has 
experienced an increase in the number of applications for the export of 
firearms and ammunition.  Other firearms-exporting nations report the 
same trend.  A further increase is expected with the removal of certain 
countries (e.g., South Africa and former East Bloc nations) from the 
International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) list of prohibited 
destinations. 

The State Department has a responsibility to authorize exports of lethal 
equipment only to valid end-users, and must confirm that the export is 
not going to the international arms market or to end-users whose 
activities conflict with U.S. foreign policy or national security goals 
and world peace.

A factor complicating the regulation of the global firearms trade is 
that, unlike most items controlled under the U.S. Munitions List and 
comparable international control lists, firearms are frequently licensed 
for commercial resale. Thus actual end-users are not always identified. 

Inter-Governmental Cooperation 
An international consensus is emerging on the need for closer 
government-to-government cooperation to combat abuses in the global 
firearms trade.  Many governments are increasingly concerned over the 
quantity of arms entering their countries, with the possibility of 
diversion to terrorists, narco-traffickers, and other criminals.  The 
United States recently joined other governments in convening, in Bogota, 
Colombia, a conference on the control of arms and explosives, to explore 
means of combatting this problem.

The U.S. and other nations are studying several cooperative initiatives, 
including adoption of a standardized international import certificate 
for firearms, firearms components, and ammunition; development of a 
computerized system to track movements of firearms between countries; 
and imposition of limitations on large-scale international firearms 
transfers. 

Some governments have requested that the United States demand more 
extensive supporting documentation for firearms export license 
applications -- in particular, import authorization documents.  Almost 
all countries require government authorization of firearms imports.  
Some governments issue import permits specifying the type, quantity, or 
value of firearms being imported.  Others issue open import permits for 
an unspecified quantity of firearms and ammunition, valid for a specific 
time period.

Tighter U.S. Controls
In furtherance of U.S. foreign policy and national security goals, 
including support for international efforts to combat arms diversions, 
the State Department has tightened requirements on import documentation 
for firearms license applications (see page 14 for details).  
(###)


ARTICLE 4:

DTC's Customer Service Plan
Commitment to Our Customers

In accordance with the Administration's National Performance Review, all 
Federal agencies that provide significant services directly to the 
public are required to publish a customer service plan.  The plan below 
explains DTC's mission, services DTC provides, and DTC's commitment to 
quality. As a part of our continuing effort to provide quality service, 
DTC will periodically survey  the community it serves.

Our Mission
The Office of Defense Trade Controls, in accordance with Sections 38-40 
of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA or 22 U.S.C. 2778) and the 
International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), controls the permanent 
and temporary export and temporary import of defense articles and 
defense services by taking final action on license applications and 
other requests for approval for defense trade exports and retransfers, 
and handling matters related to defense trade compliance, enforcement 
and reporting.

Service to Customers
In order to promote world peace, further U.S. foreign policy and 
national security interests, and facilitate legitimate export of 
commodities and services covered by the U.S. Munitions List and to 
facilitate the best customer service possible DTC is committed to:

--  Providing timely, professional,knowledgeable, and courteous service 
to customers seeking guidance on registration, making applications for a 
defense export license or other approvals, requesting the status of 
specific licensing cases, or seeking guidance regarding compliance with 
export law and regulations.

--  Taking initial action on all license applications (approve, 
disapprove, return without action, or coordinate with other offices) 
within 10 working days of receipt.

--  Informing each registered individual and company with timely 
information on the status of their license application.  For persons who 
do not have electronic access to the DTC (system) timely telephone 
responses are provided.  Telephone inquiries are responded to by a 
responsible officer within 24 hours of receipt.

--  Providing timely and authoritative guidance to the U.S. defense 
industry regarding export policies, procedures, and practices, based on 
interpretation of the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), 
the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) and other pertinent laws, national 
interests, and multinational agreements or arrangements.  This includes 
the presentation of and participation in organized seminars, in-house 
training, and other public outreach efforts, such as the Defense Trade 
News.

--Enhancing automated data processing to facilitate the electronic 
handling of requests for licenses and other approvals and to increase 
responsiveness to U.S. government requests for assistance.

--  Ensuring proper compliance with U.S. regulations, effective 
investigative and prosecutorial enforcement actions, as well as 
administrative procedural follow-up against violators of the AECA and 
the ITAR.

--  Surveying customer satisfaction periodically to solicit suggestions 
for improving DTC services.

Commitment to Quality
The Office of Defense Trade Controls recognizes its responsibility to 
the American public and other governmental offices to provide the finest 
service possible at all times.  As part of DTC's quest for improvement, 
the office uses an analytical approach, with statistical methods and 
other problemsolving tools, to accomplish its licensing and compliance 
missions. 

(###)



ARTICLE 5:

Blue Lantern on Guard
A Primer on State's Program of End-Use and End-User Checks

The Office of Defense Trade Controls (DTC) is the Department of State 
unit charged with the administration and implementation of Section 38 of 
the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) and the International Traffic in Arms 
Regulations (ITAR). Violations of these laws and regulations are 
prejudicial to the national security, foreign policy, and commercial 
interests of the United States.  As recent history makes clear, illicit 
trade in defense technology, goods, and services can pose a major threat 
to the U.S. and friendly foreign countries.

As one means of regulating U. S. commercial defense exports, and 
encouraging compliance with the AECA and ITAR, DTC sometimes initiates 
pre- and post-licensing end-use checks, asking U.S. diplomatic posts to 
verify the bona fides of export transactions conducted under the State 
Department's licensing control. Since 1991, this program has been known 
as "Blue Lantern."

Global Reach
"Blue Lantern" is a global program, with no company, recipient country, 
or commodity category singled out for review. End-use checks have been 
conducted for a number of years, with several hundred now being 
conducted annually. Furthermore, DTC is constantly seeking ways to 
perform such checks in as timely and thorough a manner as possible. 

Designated personnel at U.S. diplomatic and consular posts are tasked to 
make end-use inquiries on behalf of the U.S. government. They usually 
work directly with the host government. Where possible and consistent 
with guidelines established by the host government, these U.S. officials 
also contact foreign private individuals and entities directly. 

Critical Criteria
DTC uses a number of criteria to identify licenses warranting an end-use 
or end-user check, and to determine whether a pre or post-licensing 
check is required.  Some of these criteria cannot be addressed here, but 
appended to this article is a list of factors that might cause DTC to 
initiate an end-use check.  While DTC's enforcement functions are 
performed by its Compliance Division (comprised of State and U.S. 
Customs personnel), "Blue Lantern" checks can be requested by either 
Compliance Specialists or Licensing Division officers. 

Although such verifications take time, the program is essential to 
safeguarding U.S. foreign policy and national security interests. It is 
DTC's policy not to notify companies whose applications are selected for 
end-use verification. 

Checks Before and After Export
A pre-licensing end-use check is an effort to determine the reliability 
of an overseas party or person as a suitable recipient of U.S. defense 
articles and services. The pre-license check also ensures that the 
overseas party listed on the license application has in fact ordered the 
commodity or service in question, that the proposed disposition of the 
commodity or service is consistent with that indicated on the license 
application, and that the ultimate consignee understands its 
responsibilities under the law in receiving U.S. defense exports.

A post-licensing verification is an effort to confirm that the commodity 
or service exported from the U.S. was, in fact, received by the ultimate 
consignee named on the export license, and that the goods or services 
are being used in accordance with the terms and provisions of that 
specific license.

Varying Scope
Depending upon the nature of the given export problem, the scope of an 
inquiry might range from simple oral or written contact seeking to 
verify the bona fides of a proposed transaction to physical inspection 
of the exported item. The applicant for a license or other State 
Department written approval of a proposed transaction is responsible for 
the accuracy and completeness of all information appearing on the 
application and in its supporting documentation. Applicants must 
ascertain and then identify the specific end-use and end-user on 
applications submitted to DTC.

Solid Results
End-use checks are a key component of the State Department's effort to 
prevent illegal defense exports and technology transfers.  The "Blue 
Lantern" program has been highly successful in this regard. It has 
uncovered flagrant violations of the AECA and the ITAR and prevented 
others before they could occur. 

Some cases have resulted in denial, suspension, or revocation of export 
licenses, and in the prosecution of individuals for violations of the 
AECA and the ITAR.

"Blue Lantern" has been lauded by other governments and by U.S. firms. 
Most participants in the defense export process are fully committed to 
the resolution of problems and doubts regarding the end use of defense 
articles, technical data, or defense services.

Warning Signs for Exporters
To aid applicants and exporters in performing this duty, DTC has 
developed standards to use when analyzing a proposed export transaction 
in order to identify a possibly high-risk export. If a proposed 
transaction appears risky, the applicant should be especially cautious 
and exert every effort to verify the information presented regarding 
end-user and end-use. 

The appended  list  of "warning flags" of suspicious transactions (an 
update of a similar list printed in past issues of this bulletin) is 
provided as a means of furthering public awareness. We recommend that 
firms use it as an aid in their own efforts to combat the illegal export 
of U.S. defense goods and technology. 

If your firm encounters any of these indications or any other suspicious 
circumstances, please contact the Compliance Division of the Office of 
Defense Trade Controls or the Special Agent in Charge at your local U.S. 
Customs District Office.   

(###)


ARTICLE 6:

Indications of Suspicious Transactions
A Checklist for Exporters

Customer Flags
Customer or purchasing agent is reluctant to provide foreign end-use or 
foreign end-user information.

Customer is willing to pay cash for a large value order or item.

Little or no customer business background is available.

Customer appears to lack familiarity with the commodity's performance 
and design characteristics or uses.

Customer or purchasing agent refuses installation or service contracts 
that are normally accepted in similar transactions.

End-User Flags
Requested equipment does not match the known requirements or inventory 
of foreign end-user.

Requests for spare parts exceed projected needs or are for systems not 
in the foreign end-user's inventory.

End-use involves private use of significant amounts or types of military 
hardware.

Performance/design requirements are incompatible with the foreign end-
user's resources or environment, or with the foreign consignee's line of 
business.

Stated end-use is incompatible with the customary or known applications 
for the equipment being purchased.

Stated end-use is incompatible with the foreign consignee's line of 
business.

Stated end-use is incompatible with the technical capability of the 
foreign end-user or consignee.

Foreign intermediate consignee's location or business is incompatible 
with purported foreign end-user's nature of business or location.

Information on foreign intermediate consignee or foreign end-user is 
suspicious or inadequate.

Parties respond evasively to questions regarding any of the above, as 
well as to whether equipment is for domestic use, export, or re-export.

Shipment Flags
The proposed export involves a private intermediary, particularly in 
sales involving major weapon systems.

Freight forwarders are designated as foreign consignees or end-users.

Transaction involves vague delivery dates or delivery locations 
inconsistent with the type of commodity or established practices.
Transaction involves suspiciously roundabout shipping routes.

Packaging or packing requirements are inconsistent with shipping mode or 
destination.

Post office box addresses are used for foreign consignee, intermediate 
consignee, or foreign end-user.  
(###)


ARTICLE 7:

Access Denied
A Guide to Proscribed and Restricted Export Destinations

As of June 26, 1994, exports of U.S. Munitions List items to the 
following countries were subject to other than ordinary U.S. export 
policy interests or concerns (often involving proscriptions or 
restrictions).  For details, consult the Federal Register notice cited.

Armenia
59 Federal Register 15624, April 4, 1994.

Angola
59 Federal Register 15624, April 4, 1994.

Azerbaijan 
59 Federal Register 15624, April 4, 1994.

Burma
58 Federal Register 33293, June 16, 1993
59 Federal Register 15624, April 4, 1994

Belarus
59 Federal Register 15624, April 4, 1994.

China
54 Federal Register 24539, June 7, 1989.
59 Federal Register 15624, April 4, 1994.

Cuba
59 Federal Register 15624, April 4, 1994.

Cyprus
57 Federal Register 60265, December 18, 1992.

Georgia
59 Federal Register 15624, April 4, 1994.

Guatemala
58 Federal Register 38597, July 19, 1993.

Haiti
56 Federal Register 50968, October 9, 1991
59 Federal Register 15624, April 4, 1994.

Iran
49 Federal Register 2836, January 23, 1984.
59 Federal Register 15624, April 4, 1994.

Iraq
55 Federal Register 31808, August 3, 1990.
55 Federal Register 37793, September 13, 1990.
59 Federal Register 15624, April 4, 1994.

Kazakhstan
59 Federal Register 15624, April 4, 1994.

Korea, Democratic People's Republic of ["North Korea"]
59 Federal Register 15624, April 4, 1994.

Kyrgyzstan
59 Federal Register 15624, April 4, 1994.

Liberia
57 Federal Register 60265, December 18, 1992.
59 Federal Register 15624, April 4, 1994.

Libya
59 Federal Register 15624, April 4, 1994.

Moldova
59 Federal Register 15624, April 4, 1994.

Mongolia
59 Federal Register 15624, April 4, 1994.

Nigeria
58 Federal Register 40845, July 30, 1993.

Peru
59 Federal Register 32481, June 23, 1994.

Rwanda 
59 Federal Register 28583, June 2, 1994.

Russia
58 Federal Register 39280, July 22, 1993.

Somalia
57 Federal Register 59851, December 16, 1992.
59 Federal Register 15624, April 4, 1994.

South Africa 
58 Federal Register 39280, July 22, 1993.
59 Federal Register 31667, June 20, 1994.

Sudan
57 Federal Register 49741, November 3, 1992.
58 Federal Register 52523, October 8, 1993.
59 Federal Register 15624, April 4, 1994.

Syria 
59 Federal Register 15624, April 4, 1994.

Tajikistan
59 Federal Register 15624, April 4, 1994.

Turkmenistan
59 Federal Register 15624, April 4, 1994.

Ukraine
59 Federal Register 15624, April 4, 1994.

Uzbekistan
58 Federal Register 39280, July 22, 1993.

Vietnam
59 Federal Register 15624, April 4, 1994.

Yemen 
57 Federal Register 59852, December 16, 1992.

Former Yugoslavia  
56 Federal Register 33322, July 19, 1991.
59 Federal Register 15624, April 4, 1994.

Zaire
58 Federal Register 26024, April 29, 1993.
59 Federal Register 15624, April 4, 1994.

For more information on export restrictions to these countries, contact 
the Office of Export Control Policy.
(###)


ARTICLE 8:

Redefining "U.S. Person"
Regulatory Revision Clarifies Licensing Eligibility

On May 18, 1994, the definition of "U.S. Person" in the International 
Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) was broadened to include all Lawful 
Permanent Residents of the U.S. 

Fine Print
The July 22, 1993 ITAR revision aligned the ITAR definition of "U.S. 
Person" with the  Immigration and Naturalization Act (INA) definition of 
"Protected Individual."  The INA definition excluded 2 categories of 
Lawful Permanent Resident previously regarded as U.S. Persons under the 
ITAR -- aliens who had failed to apply for naturalization when eligible, 
and aliens who had applied  but had not been naturalized within 2 years 
of eligibility. Thus the July 22, 1993 ITAR revision considered Lawful 
Permanent Residents in those two categories "Foreign Persons." One 
effect was that companies  were required to obtain export licenses or 
approvals to transfer technical data or defense services to such 
employees.

The May 18, 1994 ITAR revision broadened the definition of U.S. Person 
to include Lawful Permanent Residents [as defined by 8 U.S.C. 
ll0l(a)(20)] and "Protected Individuals." The latter includes U.S. 
citizens and nationals, and aliens lawfully admitted as temporary 
residents [INA section 1160(a), 1161(a), or 1255a(a)(1)], as refugees 
[INA section 1157], or as asylees [INA section 1158].

Bottom Line
Effective May 18, 1994, companies do not need licenses or approvals to 
transfer data or services to Lawful Permanent Resident employees. 
(###)


ARTICLE 9:

Firearms Exports: Enhanced Procedures
Regulatory Changes on Import Certification and Assault Weapons

In line with the Administration's decision to tighten controls on 
firearms exports (see page 6), the Office of Defense Trade Controls has 
implemented the following requirements. These requirements apply to 
applications for DSP-5 (permanent export) licenses and for distribution 
agreements for the export of firearms and ammunition.

Documentary Requirements
--  A copy of a firm purchase order from the foreign end user specifying 
quantity, dollar value, and end use of the article must accompany each 
application.  U.S. company invoices/pro forma are not acceptable, and 
English translations must be provided for foreign-language documents.

--  A DSP-83 Nontransfer and Use Certificate must accompany any 
application for fifty or more handguns and/or rifles, or 100,000 or more 
rounds of ammunition.  The DSP-83 must bear original signatures of all 
foreign parties identified on the DSP-5 and the U.S. applicant.

--  Import authorization, comprised of  an import permit issued by the 
foreign government authorizing the import of specifieditems, must 
accompany each application.  An import authorization document normally 
contains an official signature, the government seal and the validity 
period for the transaction.  This is not to be confused with a business 
license issued by the foreign government to firearms dealers or with an 
authorization to own or carry a firearm.

Restricted Weapons
--  The export of assault weapons (as defined in recent legislation) 
that are prohibited firearms under U.S. law, will be denied for export 
to commercial end-users.  Assault weapons, combat shotguns and 
silencers/sound suppressors will only be considered for a foreign 
governmental entity or the national police.  Documentation to support 
such export must include a purchase order, an original signed DSP-83 and 
an import permit specifying the caliber of firearm and signed by an 
authorized government official.

--  Applications for firearms of .50 caliber, or other firearms 
qualifing as sniper rifles, will only be considered if they are 
accompanied by a purchase order, an original signed DSP-83 and an import 
permit specifying the caliber of firearm and signed by an authorized 
government official.  These firearms may be considered for sale to 
individual purchasers subject to the above documentary requirements as 
well as an end-use check.

For more details, contact the Licensing Division of the Office of 
Defense Trade Controls.
(###)


ARTICLE 10:

Licensing Cyberspace, Part II
New Procedures for Encryption Exports

The April issue of Defense Trade News and Export Policy Bulletin 
outlined the new Administration policy on the liberalization of 
encryption exports.  Herewith, is information on the regulatory changes 
effected to implement the new policies.

In April 1993, the President ordered a review of U.S. policy regarding 
the domestic use and export controls of encryption technology. That 
review concluded that vital U.S. interests -- national security, 
economic, and law enforcement -- compel the maintenance of  appropriate 
control of encryption. It also concluded that there are measures which 
can be taken to reform existing export controls to ensure that controls 
are not unduly burdensome to U.S. exporters. 

On February 4, 1994, the Department of State announced reforms to the 
export control procedures applicable to products incorporating 
encryption technology.  

Direct Distribution...
Previously, almost every encryption product required an individual 
export license; the only exception was for exports covered by a foreign 
distribution arrangement.  A new revision to the International Traffic 
in Arms Regulations (ITAR) provides a licensing procedure permitting 
direct overseas distribution by U.S. manufacturers without going through 
foreign distributors. 

Under this new arrangement (detailed in a new ITAR section, $124.15), 
U.S. manufacturers may ship encryption products covered by U.S. 
Munitions List Category XIII(b)(l) from the U.S. directly to customers 
in approved countries, without obtaining individual licenses for each 
end-user.  Manufacturers will retain the option of exporting to foreign 
distributors under distribution agreements.  

The new procedure is similar to existing distribution agreement 
procedures. An exporter must submit for approval by the Office of 
Defense Trade Controls a proposed arrangement which provides information 
on specific items to be shipped, countries of destination, and proposed 
end-users and end-uses.  Upon approval of the arrangement, the exporter 
will be permitted to ship the specified products directly to end-users 
in the approved countries under a single license.   

Part 123 -- Licenses for the Export of Defense Articles
1. The authority citation for 22 CFR Part 123 continues to read as 
follows:

Authority: Secs. 2 and 38, Pub. L. 90-629, 90 Stat. 744 (22 U.S.C. 2752, 
2778); E.O. 11958, 42 FR 4311, 3 CFR 1977 Comp. 79; 22 U.S.C. 2658.

2. Section 123.16(b)(1) is revised to read as follows:

     (1) District Directors of Customs shall permit the export without a 
license of defense hardware being exported in furtherance of a 
manufacturing license agreement, technical assistance agreement, 
distribution agreement or an arrangement for distribution of items 
identified in Category XIII(b)(l), approved in accordance with Part 124, 
provided that:

          (i) The defense hardware to be exported support the activity 
and must be identified by item, quantity and value in the agreement or 
arrangement; and

          (ii) Any provisos or limitations placed on the authorized 
agreement or arrangement are adhered to; and

          (iii) The exporter certifies on the Shipper's Export 
Declaration that the export is exempt from the licensing requirements of 
this subchapter. This is done by writing "22 CFR $123.16(b)(1) and the 
agreement or arrangement (identify/state number) applicable;" and

          (iv) The total value of all shipments does not exceed the 
value authorized in the agreement or arrangernent.

          (v) In the case of a distribution agreement, export must be 
made directly to the approved foreign distributor.


PART 124 - Agreements, Offshore Procurement, and other Defense Services
3. The authority citation for 22 CFR Part 124 continues to read as 
follows:

Authority: Secs. 2, 38, and 71, Pub. L. 90-629, 90 Stat. 744 (22 U.S.C. 
2752, 2778, 2797); E.O. 11958, 42 FR 4311, 3 CFR 1977 Comp. p. 79; 22 
U.S.C. 2658.

4. Section 124.15 is added to read as follows:

Section 124.15 Arrangements for U.S. Encryption [Category XIII(b)(l)] 

Distribution by Manufacturers

(a) Arrangements for the export of unclassified defense articles 
identified in Category XIII(b)(l) must be approved by the Office of 
Defense Trade Controls before they enter into force. Such arrangements 
will be limited to unclassified defense articles identified in Category 
XIII(b)(l) and must contain conditions for special distribution, end-use 
and reporting. Licenses for export pursuant to such arrangements must be 
obtained prior to export of the defense article unless an exemption 
under $123.16(b)(1) of this subchapter is applicable.

(b) Required Information. Proposed arrangements shall be submitted to 
the Office of Defense Trade Controls for review and approval. The 
following information must be included in all such arrangement 
proposals:

(1) A description of the U.S. Munitions List articles involved. This 
shall include when applicable the Federal Stock Number, nameplate data, 
and any control numbers under which the articles were developed or 
procured by the U.S. Government;

(2) A detailed statement of the terms and conditions under which the 
articles will be exported and distributed;

(3) The duration of the proposed arrangement; and

(4) Specific identification of the country or countries that comprise 
the distribution territory. A Nontransfer and Use Certificate (DSP-83) 
will be required, in accordance with $123.10.

(c) Required Statements. The following statements must be included in 
all arrangements:

(1) "This arrangement shall not enter into force, and shall not be 
amended or extended, without the prior written approval of the 
Department of State of the U.S. Government."

(2) "This arrangement is subject to all United States laws and 
regulations relating to exports and to all administrative acts of the 
U.S. Government pursuant to such laws and regulations."

(3) "The arrangement shall not affect the performance of any obligations 
created by prior contracts or subcontracts which the applicant may have 
individually or collectively with the U.S. Government."

(4) "No liability will be incurred by or attributed to the U.S. 
Government in connection with any possible infringement of privately 
owned patent or proprietary rights, either domestic or foreign, by 
reason of the U.S. Government's approval of this arrangement."

(5) "No export, sale, transfer, or other disposition of the U.S. 
Munitions List articles covered by this arrangement is authorized to any 
country outside the distribution territory without the prior written 
approval of the Office of Defense Trade Controls of the U.S.  Department 
of State."

(6) "The applicant agrees that a semi-annual report of sales or other 
transfers pursuant to this arrangement of the licensed articles, by 
quantity, type, U.S. dollar value, and purchaser or recipient shall be 
provided by (applicant) to the Department of State." Such reports may 
cover calendar or fiscal years. Reporting shall continue until such time 
as all articles authorized under the arrangernent or a permanent 
unclassified license (DSP-5) authorized in support of the arrangement 
have been reported. Reports shall be deemed proprietary information by 
the Department of State and will not be disclosed to unauthorized 
persons. (See Section 126.10(b) of this subchapter).

(7) The applicant agrees to notify (identify foreign end user) of any 
end use or retransfer restrictions and (identify foreign end user) 
agrees to incorporate the following statement as an integral provision 
of a contract, invoice or other appropriate document when the articles 
covered by this arrangement are sold or otherwise transferred:

"These commodities are authorized for export by the U.S. Government only 
to (identify country of ultimate destination). They may not be resold, 
diverted, transferred, transshipped, or otherwise disposed of in any 
other country, either in their original form or after being incorporated 
through an intermediate process into other end-items, without the prior 
written approval of the U.S. Department of State."

(8) "All provisions in this arrangement which refer to the United States 
Government and the Department of State will remain binding on the 
applicant after the termination of the arrangement."

(d) The license will be valid for four years and quantities and values 
should reflect those for this time period. No application will be 
accepted for any export for which Congressional notification is 
required.

The application shall be filled out in accordance with the instructions; 
however, in this instance, foreign end-user, foreign consignee, and 
foreign intermediate consignees need not be identified. In each block 
state: "The foreign person in this block will be reported in accordance 
with $124.15 of the ITAR." The provisions of $126.13(b) with regards to 
foreign consignee and foreign intermediate consignee need not be 
complied with at the time the DSP-5 is transmitted but will be reported 
semi-annually.

(e) Transmittal Letter. Requests for approval of the arrangement must be 
made by letter. The original letter and seven copies of the proposed 
arrangement shall be subrnitted to the Office of Defense Trade Controls. 
The letter shall contain the following:

(1) A statement giving the applicant's Defense Trade Controls 
registration number.

(2) A statement identifying the country or countries to comprise the 
distribution territory.

(3) A statement identifying the defense articles to be distributed under 
the arrangement.

(4) A statement identifying any U.S. Government contract under which the 
equipment may have been generated, improved, developed or supplied to 
the U.S. Government, and whether the equipment was derived from any bid 
or other proposal to the U.S. Government.

(5) A statement that no classified defense articles or classified 
technical data are involved.

(6) A statement identifying any patent application which discloses any 
of the subject matter of the equipment or related technical data covered 
by an invention secrecy order issued by the U.S. Patent and Trademark 
Office.

(7) A statement that the applicant will not permit any exports to take 
place until the arrangement and the export license have been approved by 
the Department of State. 

Questions, comments, and suggestions on these new procedures should be 
directed to the Licensing Division of the Office of Defense Trade 
Controls.
(###)


ARTICLE 11:

Agreement Notes, Part I: Using the Hardware Exemption
A New Alternative to Licenses for Agreement-Related Hardware

The July 22, 1993 revision of the International Traffic in Arms 
Regulations (ITAR) created a new exemption [22 CFR $ 123.16(b)(1)] which 
permits U.S. firms to ship hardware against a Manufacturing License, 
Technical Assistance, or Distribution Agreement without obtaining a 
separate license. For companies which wish to use the exemption, there 
are a few points to keep in mind.

Detailed Information
First, the information to be incorporated into an Agreement is the same 
as that required for a DSP-5 license application -- e.g., item 
nomenclature, commodity, cost, quantity, freight forwarders. 

The level of detail is also the same; reference  to "detailed parts" or 
"finished parts" is insufficient. End items must be specified by name, 
national stock number (if applicable), value and quantity -- unless they 
are truly minor, such as nuts and bolts. Likewise, the certification 
required by 22 CFR $ 126.13 must detail any freight forwarders.

Coherent Format
Second, the information must be incorporated into a single section of, 
or referenced addendum to, the Agreement. The information on the 
shipment(s) should be provided on consecutive pages; scattering the 
information throughout the Agreement will not do, and will only slow 
processing.

Consistency 
Third, the information on shipments must not differ from that detailed 
in the Agreement. Quantities, part numbers, value, and other changes 
must be provided in amendments to the Agreement before the exemption can 
be used. 

It is important to note that once a company has begun shipments using 
the exemption, all subsequent shipments in support of the Agreement must 
use the exemption and not separate licenses.

No Commerce-Controlled Material
Finally, the items applicants can export using this exemption are only 
those defense articles on the U.S. Munitions List. Commerce-controlled 
items cannot be included in shipments made under an Agreement.

Don't Get Discouraged
The purpose of this article is not to discourage use of the hardware 
exemption. The exemption is ideally suited for shipments of tools to 
start-up an operation under a Manufacturing Agreement, provide a defense 
article for testing, and other such one-time activities.  In those 
cases, the information required is readily obtainable and the shipments 
occur almost immediately upon approval of an Agreement.

In the case of a multi-year Agreement, however, it will be difficult to 
anticipate the level of detail required to take advantage of the 
exemption. Changes to accommodate unanticipated shipments will require 
submission of amendments, which may be more time-consuming than using 
separate licenses from the onset.  This is especially true for companies 
using the ELLIE system to submit license applications electronically.

Let DTC Help
In-depth procedures for the use of the exemption are being developed. In 
the interim, applicants should consult the Agreements Officers in the 
Licensing Division of the  Office of Defense Trade Controls before 
submitting applications using the hardware exemption.  
(###)


ARTICLE 12:

ITAR Exemption Crib Sheet
A Guide to the Fine Print in the International Traffic in Arms 
Regulations

Herewith, an index of exemptions to the standard licensing procedures in 
the International Traffic in Arms Regulations.  Exemptions in italics 
were introduced or modified in the ITAR revision of July, 1993.

These exemptions do not apply to destinations proscribed under $126.1 of 
the ITAR, exports for which Congressional notification is required, and 
Missile Technology Control Regime articles.  These exemptions may not be 
used by persons who are generally ineligible as described in $120.1(c) 
of the ITAR. 

Country-Related                                ITAR Part
Shipments between U.S. possessions             123.12
Domestic air shipments via foreign countries   123.13
Canada (126.5)                                 123.16(b)(8)
U.S. subsidiaries abroad                       123.16(b)(9)
Canadian/Mexican border                        123.19
Canadian exemptions                            126.5

Hardware                                       ITAR Part
Temporary imports                              123.4
Re-exports/retransfers                         123.9
Movements of vessels or aircraft outside U.S.  123.11
Defense articles in support of Agreements      123.16(b)(1)
Components & parts valued under $500           123.16(b)(2)
Packing cases                                  123.16(b)(3)
Models & mockups                               123.16(b)(4)
Temporary exports to public trade shows        123.16(b)(5)
Firearms & ammunition for personal use (123.17)123.16(b)(6)
Firearms for personal use of U.S. Forces (123.18)123.16(b)(7)

Technical Data                                 ITAR Part
Basic operation & maintenance training         124.3
Technical data, including classified data      125.4(b)(1)
Technical data for approved MLA/TAA            125.4(b)(2)
Contracts between exporter and U.S.G. agencies 125.4(b)(3)
Copies previously authorized to same recipient 125.4(b)(4)
Basic operations, maintenance & training information 125.4(b)(5)
Firearms & ammo not in excess of caliber .50   125.4(b)(6)
Original source of import                      125.4(b)(7)
Unclassified technical data directly related to 
   previously-authorized classified tech data  125.4(b)(8)
Personal use of U.S. person employed abroad    125.4(b)(9)
U.S. institutions of higher learning           125.4(b)(10)
Pursuant to arrangements with DoD, DOE, or NASA 125.4(b)(11)
Exempt under $126                              125.4(b)(12)
Approved for public release                    125.4(b)(13)

Other                                          ITAR Part
Training & military service                    124.2
Plant visits                                   125.5
Shipments by or for U.S. Government agencies   126.4
Foreign-owned military aircraft & naval vessels126.6
Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Program           126.6  
(###)


ARTICLE 13:

Country Policy Briefs

Peru
Effective June 8, 1994, it is the policy of the U.S. Government to deny 
all requests for licenses and other approvals to export or otherwise 
transfer lethal items to Peru.  Other defense articles and services for 
Peru will be reviewed on a case-by-case basis [Vol.59, Federal Register, 
page 32481 (June 23, 1994)]. 

Rwanda
On May 26, 1994, the President prohibited the sale or supply to Rwanda 
from the territory of the United States by any person, or by any U.S. 
person in any foreign country or other location, or using any U.S.-
supplied vessel or aircraft, of arms and related material of all types.  
This includes weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, 
paramilitary police equipment, and spare parts regardless of origin.  

This prohibition does not apply to activities related to the United 
Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda or the United Nations  Observer 
Mission Uganda-Rwanda [Vol. 59, Federal Register, page 28583 (June 2, 
1994)].

South Africa
Effective June 8, 1994, it is the policy of the U.S. Government to 
review, on a case-by-case basis, all requests for licenses and approvals 
authorizing the export or other transfer to South Africa of items on the 
U.S. Munitions List.  This includes manufacturing licenses, technical 
assistance agreements, technical data, and commercial military exports.  

This policy implements United Nations Security Council Resolution 919, 
which terminated the mandatory U.N. Security Council arms embargo on 
South Africa imposed in 1977.  The termination of the embargo followed 
the first all-race multiparty election and the establishment of a 
democratic South African government [Vol. 59, Federal Register, page 
31667 (June 20, 1994)].

Munitions Exports Involving

Armaments Corporation of South Africa, Ltd. (ARMSCOR) and Related 
Entities and Individuals 

Effective June 8, 1994, it is the policy of the Department of State to 
deny all export license applications and other requests for approval 
involving, directly or indirectly:  the Armaments Corporation of South 
Africa, Ltd. (a.k.a. ARMSCOR), an agency of the South African 
Government; the Denel Group (Pty.) Ltd. (a.k.a. Denel), a wholly-owned 
company of the South African Government; Kentron (Pty.) Ltd. (Kentron); 
Fuchs Electronics (Pty.) Ltd. (Fuchs); William Randy Metelerkamp; Vern 
Davis; Brian Scott (a.k.a. "Graham Craighness"); Bert Quinn; Johan 
Lombard; Jaco Budricks; Gerrit Pretorius (a.k.a. "Bull"); and any 
divisions, subsidiaries, associated companies, affiliated persons, or 
successor entities [Vol. 59, Federal Register, page 33811 (June 30, 
1994)]. 

This action also precludes the use in connection with such entities of 
any exemptions from license or other approval included in the 
International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR).

On October 31, 1991, a federal grand jury in the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania returned an indictment charging the above cited persons, 
except Denel, with conspiracy to violate and with violation of the Arms 
Export Control Act (AECA). The Department of State therefore has 
reasonable cause to believe that during the period 1978 through 1989, 
ARMSCOR and the other cited entities engaged in an ongoing conspiracy to 
export, and did export, defense articles and defense services to the 
Republic of South Africa and to Iraq without the requisite Department of 
State licenses or approvals. 

From 1978 through 1989, what is now Denel was an integral part of 
ARMSCOR. Denel reportedly came into being in 1992, in the separation and 
restructuring of ARMSCOR. Denel is a wholly owned company of the South 
African Government, operating as a commercial organization. Inasmuch as 
it is a successor to ARMSCOR, Denel is also liable for AECA- and ITAR-
related violations.

Exceptions may be made to this policy on a case-by-case basis. However, 
exceptions would be granted only after a full review of all 
circumstances, with particular attention to the following factors: 
whether an exception is warranted by overriding foreign policy or 
national security interests; whether an exception would further law 
enforcement concerns; and whether other compelling circumstances exist 
which are consistent with the foreign policy or national security 
interests of the United States, and which do not conflict with law 
enforcement concerns.

For further information, contact the Compliance Division of the Office 
of Defense Trade Controls. 

(###)

Subsidiaries -- Don't Forget Your Parents
Subsidiaries sometimes submit applications to the Office of Defense 
Trade Controls (DTC) using a parent company's registration code but not 
the parent company's name. This delays processing while DTC verifies the 
subsidiary's status. To avoid this problem, subsidiaries should identify 
the parent company in the Applicant box of applications, e.g.:

ABC Company 
A Subsidiary of XYZ, Inc.
1234 Elm Street
Anytown, CA 99999 


ARTICLE 14:

Personnel Updates

In Memoriam

Clyde Bryant (1926-1994)

Clyde G. Bryant Jr., chief of the Compliance and Enforcement Branch of 
the Office of Defense Trade Controls, died June 10 after a heart attack.  
Survivors include his wife Elizabeth, three children, and a grandchild.  

A native of Birmingham, Alabama and a graduate of Birmingham-Southern 
College, Mr. Bryant began his State Department career in 1958 as an 
economist in the Bureau of Administration.  In 1967 he transfered to 
State's  Office of Munitions Control, the forerunner of the Office of 
Defense Trade Controls.  Mr. Bryant earned a reputation in law 
enforcement, legal, and government  circles for extraordinary legal 
expertise and tenacity in the pursuit of wrongdoers.  Administration, 
Congressional, diplomatic, and corporate leaders have praised his 
lifetime contribution to U.S. national security. To honor his memory, 
the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs has created an annual award, 
the Clyde G. Bryant Jr. Award, for excellence and achievement 
demonstrated in the performance by an employee in the Office of Defense 
Trade Controls.  

Those who worked with Clyde Bryant know that his professionalism, 
devotion to duty and country, and concern for the rights of the accused 
were manifestations of a warm and compassionate spirit.  He will be 
sorely missed by family, friends, colleagues, and country.

     In

Karen Hopkinson has been detailed to the Office of Defense Trade 
Controls as the first National Security Agency representative for 
encryption technology issues.  She has worked at NSA since 1982, in the 
areas of encryption, data security, and technology transfer.
Major John M. Lucas, US Army, reported to DTC July 29.  MAJ Lucas 
recently served as  Material Officer 191st Ord Bn in Miesau, Germany.  
He currently serves as a Defense Trade Analyst.

     Out
Foreign Service Officer Philip S. Kosnett completed a one-year tour as 
Special Assistant to the Director of the Office of Defense Trade 
Controls and Executive Editor of Defense Trade News and Export Policy 
Bulletin. He has assumed new duties in the Office of the Secretary of 
State.

Compliance Officer Robert Huffman departed DTC for law school at the 
University of Virginia.

Navy LCDR Paul James completed a two-year exchange tour as an agreements 
officer in DTC and was reassigned as Executive Officer of the destroyer 
USS Cushing, based at Pearl Harbor.

USAF Major Gary Oncale completed a two-year exchange tour at DTC, where 
he ran the Commodity Jurisdiction program.  He will retire from the Air 
Force in August.
(###)

DTC Has Not Moved...
...but it does have a new address.  Due to security upgrades at the 
State Department Annex housing the Office of Defense Trade Controls,  
the public access and courier delivery address has changed from 1701 N. 
Fort Myer Drive to  1700 Lynn Street.  The mailing address is unchanged.  
See the inside rear cover of this issue for a list of addresses and 
phone/fax numbers.


ARTICLE 15:

DTAG Developments

The Defense Trade Advisory Group was established in 1992 to advise the 
Bureau of Political-Military Affairs on the support and regulation of 
defense trade.  Members for the 1994-96 term:

Policy Working Group
Chairman -- William Schneider, Jr.
International Planning Services

Vice-Chair -- Ramona Hazera
Northrop -Grumman

Burton P.C. Bacheller
McDonnell-Douglas Corporation

Samuel Baker
American Defense Preparedness Association

Dr. James Blackwell
Science Applications International

Edward C. Bursk, Jr.
Raytheon Overseas Limited

Tyrus Cobb
Business Executives for National Security, Inc.

Vincent DeCain
The NOMOS Corporation

Jacob Goodwin
Bulova Technologies, Inc.

Ruth L. Greenstein
Institute for Defense Analyses

Joel L. Johnson
Aerospace Industries Association

Norman Jorstad
Institute for Defense Analyses

Dr. Robert Martin
Motorola Military & Aerospace Electronics

Boyd J. McKelvain
General Electric Company

Michael M. McMillan
E-Systems

Jack N. Merritt (Gen., USA, Retired)
Association of the U.S. Army

Willard H. Mitchell
Teledyne Industries International

James R. Nelson
Martin Marietta Corporation

Dr. Janne E. Nolan
The Brookings Institution

Edward O'Connor
GMA, Inc.

Alan Platt
Gibson, Dunn, and Crutcher

Bob Ramsey
Lockheed Corporation

Henry Sechler
General Dynamics Corporation

Ronald M. Singer
GE Aircraft Engines

Dr. Willis D. Smith
The Boeing Company

Anna A. Stout
American League for Exports and Security Assistance, Inc.

Maxwell R. Thurman (Gen., USA, Retired)
Association of the U.S. Army

Donald A. Weadon, Jr.
Dickstein, Shapiro, and Morin

Regulatory Working Group
Chairman -- Jerome E. Eiler
Northrop - Grumman

Giovanna M. Cinelli
Gardner, Carton & Douglas

Richard Colton
Science Applications International

Debi Davis
Martin Marietta Corporation

Patrick J. Donovan
Honeywell, Inc.

Richard C. Gogolkiewicz
General Dynamics Corporation

Robert Lee
Varian Associates, Inc.

Judith Morehouse
The Boeing Company

Joyce E. Poetzl
McDonnell Douglas

Stuart M. Quigg
Q International

Victoria E. Ralston
Lockheed Corporation

George V. Rao
Allied Signal Aerospace Company

Thomas W. Reed
Rockwell International Corporation

Richard F. Sandifer, Jr.
Ingalls Shipbuilding

Kevin Shannon
Electronic Industries Association

Stephen D. Story
Federal Express Technical Working Group

Technical Working Group
Chairman --David M. (Mike) Richey
Litton Industries 

Philip C. Gast
Burdeshaw Associates, Limited

Harry Halamandaris
Teledyne Industries, Inc.

John J. Kopecky
Pratt & Whitney

James Matchett
GE Aircraft Engines

Douglas E. McCormac
TRW Components International Inc.

Robert E. Oliver
Delco Electronics

Dr. J.H. Yang
Westinghouse Electric Corporation

The next DTAG plenary meeting is scheduled for Thursday, October 6, 
1994.  Consult the June 30, 1994 Federal Register notice for more 
details.

DTAG-related questions can be directed to Linda Lum of the DTAG 
Secretariat at  (202) 647-4231.  
(###)


ARTICLE 16:
Commodity Jurisdiction Determinations [See paper copy for this section.  
Electronic conversion not possible.]


ARTICLE 17:

Systems Update

Log Onto ROBB -- State's Bulletin Board for Exporters

The Remote On-line Bulletin Board, ROBB, is available to all companies 
registered with the Office of Defense Trade Controls (DTC) as arms 
manufacturers or exporters.  Via ROBB, registrants can receive details 
on the status of open cases and cases issued within the past month. ROBB 
is also used to disseminate breaking policy news, such as modifications 
to the list of proscribed destinations.  

ROBB is accessible 22 hours daily, every day.  It is down from 7 to 9 
a.m., when its database is updated. DTC imposes no user fee for ROBB or 
any other system.   

To access ROBB, you must have an IBM-compatible PC, a 2400 BPS Hayes-
compatible asynchronous modem, and the PC communications software VsCom. 
VsCom can be purchased from M/H Group, 300 West Adams Street, Chicago, 
IL 60606  [tel (312) 443-1222, fax (312) 443-1377]. Its "Part Number"is 
VSTI. 

To sign up, contact DTC's Computer Support Staff by fax [(703) 875-5663] 
or mail, providing your company name, DTC registration number, a point 
of contact and phone number.  DTC will issue a ROBB user ID number and 
password.   

A User's Guide to ROBB
The following screen-by-screen description details ROBB's functions.  
Each screen is identified in the upper-left corner and functional 
guidance is provided at the bottom. 

Some of the functional guidance is unique to a specific screen, but the 
following commands apply to all screens:  function key "F10" permits you 
to "escape" (return to the previous screen and  ultimately log-off); 
"F5" lets you scroll down to the next screen; "F4" scrolls back.  Use 
the "Tab" key to move the cursor and hit "Enter" (or "Return" on some 
keyboards) to carry out commands. 

Screen 1  -- Welcome to ROBB   
Upon connecting and entering the correct log-on ID and password, you are 
invited to press "F1" to view licenses.    

Screen 2  -- List of Licenses
Screen 2 shows your company's open cases and all cases closed within the 
past month.  Columns 2, 8, and 9 provide case numbers, the initials of 
the licensing officers handling each case, and each case's status.  
Columns 1 and 3-7 provide information submitted on the original license 
application.

Column 1 displays the license type: 05 for DSP-5, 61 for DSP-61, 73 for  
DSP-73, 85 for DSP-85, AG for Agreement, GC for General Correspondence 
(advisory opinions), and CJ for Commodity Jurisdiction.  Column 2 
provides the license numbers DTC has assigned to the applications.  
Column 3 notes the type of registration: "M" for manufacturer or 
exporter, "F" for foreign embassy, and "G" for U.S. Government.  
The last four digits of your firm's DTC registration code appear in 
column 4. Column 5 gives the date the license application was prepared.  
The application value appears in column 6.  Column 7 lists the country 
of ultimate destination (using two-letter country codes referenced in 
ITAR Appendix C).

Column 8 shows the initials of the licensing officer handling each case. 
Column 9 displays case status:  "X" for Pending, "A" for Approved, "P" 
for Approved with Provisos, "D" for Denied, "R" for Returned Without 
Action, "W" for Withdrawn.

If your list of licenses exceeds one screen, "F5" will move you to the 
next screen; hitting "F5" and the "Shift" key together moves you to the 
last screen.  If you want more information on a case than Screen 2 
provides, move the cursor to that case and press "Enter."    

Screen 3 -- Case Chronology
The top of this screen provides much the same information as  Screen 2, 
but in a different format. The bottom shows case chronology: the date 
the application was prepared, the date DTC received it, whether it was 
staffed, the date it was notified to Congress (if applicable), the date 
it was signed by the licensing officer, and the date of final action 
(when DTC mailed it back to the applicant).    

To move from one case chronology to another, press "F5" to scan the 
licenses in the order they were listed on Screen 2, or return to Screen 
2 by hitting "F10" and then move the cursor to the next case of 
interest.  If the chronology indicates the case was staffed, press "F7" 
to get the staffing screen.

Screen 4 -- Staffing Information 
DTC "staffs" about 25% of cases to other offices or agencies for policy 
or technical review.  Screen 4  shows the date the case was staffed and 
the date each recipient made its recommendation to DTC.  If the case was 
restaffed, "F3" will supply restaffing info.    

Cases are often staffed to DTC's Compliance Division (CAD). Cases are 
staffed within the Political-Military Affairs Bureau to the Office of 
Export Control Policy (EXP); the Office of Defense Relations and 
Security Assistance (DRSA); and the Office of Chemical, Biological, and 
Missile Nonproliferation (CBM).  

DTC staffs to State's Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL, 
formerly HA); Bureau of Oceans, Environmental, and Scientific Affairs 
(OES), and regional bureaus: African Affairs (AF); Inter-American 
Affairs (ARA); East Asian and Pacific Affairs (EAP); European and 
Canadian Affairs (EUR); Near Eastern Affairs (NEA); and South Asian 
Affairs (SA).

DTC also refers cases to the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA); 
the Department of Defense (DoD); the Department of Energy (DOE), and 
NASA.

Screen 5 -- Query Options
Access Screen 5 by pressing "F9" while in Screen 2.  Use Screen 5 to 
perform queries against your company's ROBB database by license type, 
license number, date received, date prepared, country of destination, 
final action, date of final action, and license value.  To do a query of 
your company's applications for a specific country, for example, enter 
the country code and press "Enter."  

Use two-digit dates (e.g., January 4, 1991 is 01/04/91).  Use the colon 
to search a range (e.g., to search December 1, 1990 through January 4, 
1991, enter 12/01/90:01/04/91).  Use a semi-colon to check two dates but 
not the intervening period (e.g., 12/01/90;01/04/91 will check December 
1 and January 4, but not the dates in between). To get details of the 
many queries which can be run using Screen 5, press "F8" for "Help."

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ARTICLES 18 AND 19:

SEE PAPER COPY FOR SECTION ON:  Licensing Officer Assignments and 
Feedback, ELLIE, and Training Forms

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[END OF DEFENSE TRADE NEWS, VOL 5, NO 3]

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