Defense Trade News, v.5 n.02  Return to: Index of Defense Trade News Archives || Electronic Research Collections Index || ERC Homepage


U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DEFENSE TRADE NEWS
VOLUME 5, NUMBER 2, APRIL 1994
PUBLISHED BY THE BUREAU OF POLITICAL-MILITARY AFFAIRS

ARTICLES IN THIS ISSUE:
Policy
1.  COCOM: An End and a Beginning -- End of the Cold War Brings Changes 
to Multilateral Export Controls
2.  Licensing Cyberspac -- Evolving Policies on Encryption Technologies
3.  Lean Times Ahead for FMF -- U.S. Government Budget for Foreign 
Military Financing Shrinks
4.  A New Chief for Defense Trade -- An Interview with Deputy Assistant 
Secretary Martha Caldwell Harris

Operations
5.  National Disclosure Policy -- A Primer on the Process
6.  Perestroika at PM-- A Guide to the Restructured Bureau of Political-
Military Affairs 
7.  ELSA Speeds Staffing -- State's Export License Staffing Analysis 
Network Cuts License Processing Time
8.  SARP Update -- State Appeals Review Process Gets Underway

Departments
9.  Country Policy Briefs
10  Defense Trade Advisory Group Developments
11.  U.S. Customs Report
12.  Suspensions, Debarments, Reinstatements
13.  Commodity Jurisdiction Determinations
14.  Feedback and Application Forms


Editor's Note
Welcome to the second issue of the revamped Defense Trade News and 
Export Policy Bulletin.  This issue's feature articles  highlight U.S. 
Government initiatives in response to two key trends in the export 
control environment -- the post-Cold War shift in focus from the Soviet 
threat to the dangers of regional arms proliferation, and the rapid 
technological and marketplace evolution in encryption, 
telecommunications, and computing.  The back of the book contains 
practical information for exporters.  Please send in your Feedback form 
to let us know how Defense Trade News and Export Policy Bulletin can 
better serve your needs. 

DTC Has Not Moved...
...but it does have a new address.  Due to security upgrades at the 
State Department Annex housing the Office of Defense Trade Controls,  
the public access and courier delivery address has changed from 1701 N. 
Fort Myer Drive to  1700 Lynn Street.  The mailing address is unchanged.  
See the inside rear cover of this issue for a list of addresses and 
phone/fax numbers. 


ARTICLE 1:

COCOM: An End and a Beginning
End of the Cold War Brings Changes to Multilateral Export Controls

On March 30, 1994, the White House released the following statement on 
export control reform.

Today the President announced another step in U.S. efforts to reform the 
export control system. From the outset, this Administration has been 
committed to combatting the proliferation of dangerous weapons and 
sensitive technologies, while at the same time ensuring that American 
workers and firms remain the most competitive in the world. 

Our policies seek to balance these goals. As global technology advances, 
export controls must be updated, in order to remain focused on those 
items that still make a difference to programs of proliferation concern. 
To promote U.S. economic growth, democratization abroad, and 
international stability, we actively seek expanded trade and technology 
exchange with nations, including former adversaries, that abide by 
global nonproliferation norms.

Export Liberalization
As of April 1, 1994, we will liberalize licensing requirements on the 
export of nearly all civilian telecommunications equipment and computers 
that operate up to 1000 MTOPS (million theoretical operations per 
second) to civil end-users in all current COCOM-controlled countries 
except North Korea.

This action is consistent with our national security requirements, 
because we are retaining individual licensing requirements for high-end 
computers and for transfers to military end-users. We are not changing 
our nonproliferation controls, which require a license for any export 
that would contribute to a program of proliferation concern.

Last year, the Commerce Department received approximately 25,000 export 
license applications. With these and other changes announced by this 
Administration, it is expected that the number will be cut by nearly 
half. When this Administration came into office, certain basic personal 
computers, such as IBM PCs and Apple Macintoshes, were still being 
controlled. Last September, we took the first step to liberalize 
licensing requirements for over $30 billion worth of computer exports.

National Security and Nonproliferation
Today's decision is compatible with our national security and 
nonproliferation objectives. By liberalizing licensing requirements on 
items that routinely are granted licenses, we will concentrate our 
export control efforts on denying technologies that still make a 
difference to the development of dangerous arms. Most of the items 
currently controlled by the United States will remain subject to 
licensing requirements, including dual use goods and technologies 
controlled due to their use in chemical, biological, nuclear, advanced 
conventional weapons and missile delivery systems.

The members of COCOM have agreed to end the Cold War regime effective 
tomorrow. The end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet 
Union and the Warsaw Pact led us and our allies to the view that 
COCOM'sstrategic rationale was no longer tenable.

In its stead, the COCOM members agreed to work together toward a new, 
more broadly-based arrangement designed to enhance transparency and 
restraint in transfers of conventional weapons and sophisticated 
technologies to countries whose behavior is cause for serious concern 
and to regions of potential instability. The new arrangement will thus 
have a completely different purpose than COCOM. It will seek to put in 
place multilateral approaches to controls aimed at the threats we face 
today. We hope that Russia will become a founding member of the new 
regime. We are working to achieve this.

While the specific procedures of the new regime are still being 
developed, COCOM member governments have agreed to maintain the 
capability after April 1 to control on a national basis, to any 
destination, items previously contained on the COCOM lists (industrial, 
military, and atomic energy) while new control lists and arrangements 
are being finalized.

As we look ahead, there is much work to be done with other governments. 
We must continue to work to establish a regime to control sensitive 
exports to countries of concern and to regions of potential instability. 
Here at home, we will work with the Congress to pass an Export 
Administration Act that brings the export control system in line with 
the new challenges we face to our national security and economic 
competitiveness.  

(###)


A Brief History of COCOM
45 Years of Multilateral Cooperation

The Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM) was 
established in 1949 to facilitate multilateral cooperation to control 
strategic goods and technology. Its 17 members were Australia, Belgium, 
Canada,  Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, the U.K. and the U.S. 

COCOM was not based on a treaty or executive agreement; it operated 
instead by informal agreement and according to the rule of unanimity. A 
COCOM secretariat was located in Paris, with member countries 
represented by permanent delegates.

Members cooperated in publishing national control lists of embargoed 
equipment (dual-use, atomic energy use, and direct military use) and 
enacting effective export control systems; considering proposed exports 
of specific embargoed items from member countries to proscribed 
countries; and harmonizing national licensing practices for strategic 
exports and coordinating export control enforcement activities.

In June 1992, COCOM members decided to establish a COCOM Cooperation 
Forum on Export Controls and to invite the former Soviet republics to 
participate.  The Forum's first meeting was held in Paris in November 
1992, with representatives from all Eastern European democracies, the 
Baltic states, and all but three of the former Soviet republics 
attending. It was concluded that trade in sensitive goods and 
technologies could be significantly liberalized, as the reforming 
countries introduced and developed adequate export controls.  COCOM 
members undertook to provide technical assistance to help establish 
control systems through both bilateral contacts and multilateral 
meetings. 

Today, Russia and other formerly proscribed countries are viewed not as 
potential adversaries but as potential allies in combatting the 
proliferation of sensitive technology. 
(###)


ARTICLE 2:

Licensing Cyberspace
Evolving Policies on Encryption Technology

On February 4 Dr. Martha Caldwell Harris, Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
State for Export Controls, made the following statement regarding new 
Administration policies on the export licensing of encryption 
technologies:

The Secretary of State is announcing today measures arising from the 
Administration's decision to reform export control procedures applicable 
to products incorporating encryption technology. These reforms are part 
of the Administration's effort to eliminate unnecessary controls and 
ensure efficient implementation.

The reforms will simplify encryption product export licensing and speed 
the review of encryption product exports, thus helping U.S. 
manufacturers to compete more effectively in the global market. While 
there will be no changes in the types of equipment controlled by the 
Munitions List, we are announcing measures to expedite licensing.

Presidential Initiative
Last year the President announced an initiative to encourage U.S. 
manufacturers and users of encryption to take advantage of a government 
technology (the key-escrow chip) that provides excellent security while 
ensuring that the Government has a means to decode the encryption when 
lawfully authorized, such as when executing a court-authorized warrant 
in connection with a criminal investigation.

At the time he announced this initiative, the President directed a 
comprehensive review of U.S. policy regarding domestic use and export of 
encryption technology. The reforms we are announcing today result from 
that review.

The President has determined that vital U.S. national security and law 
enforcement interests compel maintaining appropriate  control of 
encryption. Still, there is much that can be done to reform existing 
controls to ensure that they are efficiently implemented and to maintain 
U.S. leadership in the world market for encryption technology.

Immediate Action
Accordingly, the President has asked the Secretary of State to take 
immediate action to implement a number of procedural reforms. The 
reforms are:

-- License reform.  Under new licensing arrangements, encryption 
manufacturers will be able to ship their products from the United States 
directly to customers within approved regions without obtaining 
individual licenses for each end user. This will improve the ability of 
our manufacturers to provide expedited delivery of products, and to 
reduce shipping and tracking costs. It should also reduce the number of 
individual license requests, especially for small businesses that cannot 
afford international distributors.

-- Rapid review of export license applications. A significant number of 
encryption export license applications can be reviewed more quickly.  
For such exports, we have set a license turnaround goal of two working 
days.

-- Personal use exemption. We will no longer require that U. S . 
citizens obtain an export license prior to taking encryption products 
out of the U.S. temporarily for their own personal use. In the past, 
this requirement caused delays and inconvenience for business 
travellers.

-- Allowing exports of key-escrow encryption: After initial review, key-
escrow encryption products may now be exported to most end users. 
Additionally, key-escrow products will qualify for special licensing 
arrangements.

Cooperation with Industry
These reforms should have the effect of minimizing the impact of export 
controls on U.S. industry.  The Department of State will take all 
appropriate actions to ensure that these reforms are implemented as 
quickly as possible.  The Secretary of State asks that encryption 
product manufacturers evaluate the impact of these reforms over the next 
year and provide feedback both on how the reforms have worked out and on 
recommendations for additional procedural reforms.
(###)

ROBB Users -- Remember to Log Off
Users of DTC's Remote On-Line Bulletin Board (ROBB) should be sure to go 
through the full log-off procedure when done, not just "quit" the 
system.  Users who fail to go through the log-off sequence may be 
exposing some of their licensing data (specifically, case numbers) to 
other ROBB users who log on subsequently.  Questions on log-off 
procedures should be directed to DTC's Computer Support Staff a (703) 
875-6650. 



ARTICLE 3:

Lean Times Ahead for FMF
US Government Budget for Foreign Military Financing Shrinks

Broad Mandate
The U.S. has long used foreign assistance to promote political 
stability, democratization, and market economy throughout the world. The 
post-Cold War world system continues to provide numerous challenges in 
which foreign assistance can be a vital tool.

The President has defined six fundamental foreign policy goals against 
which decisions on the allocation of foreign assistance resources are to 
be measured:

--  Promoting U.S. Prosperity through Trade, Investment, and Employment
--  Building Democracy
--  Promoting Sustainable Development
--  Promoting Peace
--  Providing Humanitarian Assistance
--  Advancing Diplomacy

Shrinking Budgets...
Budgets for key foreign assistance programs -- Foreign Military 
Financing (FMF), Economic Support Fund (ESF), and International Military 
Education & Training (IMET) -- continue to decrease. The combined budget 
for FMF, ESF, and IMET has shrunk since Fiscal Year '91 by about one 
third, or $2.5 billion.

FMF in FY 94 sustained a 10% reduction from the previous budget, for a 
cut of nearly $1 billion since FY 91. There is no indication this trend 
will reverse in FY 95. Adding to the crunch is the rescission of nearly 
$550 million of previous years' uncommitted aid, including $91 million 
from FMF.

Plus Reduced Flexibility...
The decrease in the overall foreign assistance budget has not been 
matched by a decrease in Congressionally-mandated earmarks, with the 
result that earmarks accounted for 98% of grant FMF in FY 94.

Increased U.S. commitments to peacekeeping operations have also consumed 
a growing share of assistance funds, with correspondingly less available 
for discretionary spending. After earmarks, commitments, and treaty 
obligations are subtracted, $25 million remains in the budget to fund 
discretionary FMF programs worldwide.

...Equals Fewer Programs
As a result of funding cuts in FY 92-94, 45 country programs spanning 
every geographic region have been dropped.  FMF spending cuts have 
extended to counternarcotics programs, requiring reduction in assistance 
to South American and Caribbean nations cooperating with the U.S.  

The assistance budget cuts are also felt in the U.S. With the exception 
of some funds earmarked by Congress for expenditure in Israel, almost 
all FMF aid is spent in the U.S., to the benefit of American industry.

New Challenges, New Alternatives
Budgetary constraints have forced the U.S. to seek alternative and 
innovative ways to continue to assist friendly nations, notably the 
Excess Defense Article (EDA) program, under which U.S. forces' excess 
hardware is provided to allies and friends. Inevitably, however, some 
former recipients of U.S. foreign assistance will reach out to other 
suppliers, government or commercial, to fill the gap. 

(###)


ARTICLE 4:

A New Chief for Defense Trade
An Interview with Deputy Assistant Secretary Martha Caldwell Harris

Within the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, the senior official 
responsible for export control is Deputy Assistant Secretary Martha 
Caldwell Harris.  Since taking her Ph.D. in Political Science at the 
University of Wisconsin, Dr. Harris has held a number of academic and 
government positions "at the intersection of national security and 
international competitiveness."  She conducted a number of studies on 
strategic trade issues during more than seven years at the Congressional 
Office of Technology Assessment.  More recently, at the National 
Research Council, her work focused on issues in U.S. / Japan trade and 
technology transfer.  Dr. Harris spoke with Defense Trade News and 
Export Policy Bulletin about current trends in the export control 
environment.

Multi-Front Engagement
Dr. Harris listed four broad areas in which she is engaged: policy 
development on dual use and defense export controls; licensing and 
compliance issues; industry and public relations; and internal 
management.

Policy Development
Dr. Harris assumed her new duties at a time of rapid shifting in the 
export control environment due to the end of the Cold War and the 
imminent dissolution of the COCOM regime.  "Just in the last few months, 
the focus has changed.  Some ask why, with no unified threat, we even 
need export controls.  But we've gone from an East/West confrontation to 
a world with many proliferation threats and many sources of instability.

"There has been dramatic change in the past year," she added.  "The 
world is a more complicated place.  Information flows rapidly.  Even 
developing countries are increasingly able to afford high technologies 
which could improve their military capabilities."  

In developing U.S. aims for the post-Cold War export control 
environment, Dr. Harris emphasized the need to "develop an international 
security policy framework, then determine where our export control goals 
fit into the framework."

Licensing and Compliance
"You'd expect this to be fairly routine, right?"  Actually, noted Dr. 
Harris, while licensing procedures are generally straightforward, a 
small percentage of the 50,000+ cases which State processes each year do 
reach her desk. "The ones I see either present tough choices, or somehow 
push the envelope."  

Does that mean individual cases drive export policy?  "No.  Cases will 
not be emblematic of a whole new approach.  They don't create a policy 
framework.  Cases will, however, highlight the gaps in the policy 
framework" that need to be adjusted to the realities of actual commerce.

Dr. Harris added that PM is putting increasing effort into compliance 
issues, including investigation of tech transfer violations, but "we 
need better interaction with industry and other governments" to tighten 
enforcement.

Industry Relations
"We need to hear what industry has to say" about both policy and 
operational licensing issues, she emphasized.  Dr. Harris noted that she 
frequently hears laudatory comments from "companies on the front line" 
about State's Office of Defense Trade Controls and Office of Export 
Control Policy.  "Over time, a professional and cooperative relationship 
has developed, which I attribute in large part to the professionalism of 
the people at DTC."  

Does that mean State is improving?  "It's difficult to know how good a 
sample you're getting.  There's a lot of positive feedback from big 
companies, but I haven't had as much opportunity to hear from smaller 
companies, and we need to be sensitive to their needs."  Dr. Harris 
emphasized the need for companies to provide feedback on such matters as 
regulatory modifications.  "It has to be a two-way street." 
 
What of criticism that State has been slow to adjust the export control 
regime to the realities of technological development?  Is State building 
roadblocks on the information superhighway?  "In fact, we've liberalized 
quite a lot lately, particularly on dual use [equipment]," she said, 
referring to the Administration's liberalization of telecommunications 
and computer export standards.

"We hear broad complaints, but we need to hear specifics so we can 
examine our decisions.  For example, I hear criticism about the 
Commodity Jurisdiction procedure [being too restrictive],  but few 
concrete complaints about CJ rulings."  Moreover, "we have an active 
[interagency] process underway to eliminate some of these restrictions."

Dr. Harris acknowledged the existence of "irritants" in licensing 
operations and the policy development process.  "Companies are concerned 
not only with processing time, but also with the clarity of policy 
guidelines" they need to  judge whether to devote resources to potential 
export markets.

Dr. Harris rejected any notion that State is less sensitive to the needs 
of American industry than agencies focused on commercial matters.  While 
the Arms Export Control Act directs that licensing decisions are to be 
made on national security and foreign policy grounds, it does not 
prohibit taking into account economic or commercial interests in a 
reasonable manner.  "Prosperity is a factor in national security, and 
while we cannot allow commercial concerns to overpower the other 
interests we need to balance, neither should we ignore" the well-being 
of U.S. firms.  One sign of State's concern, she added, is the growing 
emphasis on commercial work at our embassies.

And how does Dr. Harris rate the Defense Trade Advisory Group, the 
Department's official link to the defense industry? "DTAG is very 
active.  I've worked with advisory groups at several other agencies, and 
DTAG is a good example of how the relationship should work.  I would 
like to see more frequent interaction [than the semiannual plenary]  -- 
more frequent meetings, to break down big questions into manageable 
problems and come up with solutions.

"DTAG is also helpful in clarifying to the public that State's not just 
limiting defense exports; we're also working to facilitate legitimate 
sales.  We recognize the importance of arms exports for legitimate 
goals, such as improving interoperability with allied forces and 
supporting regional stability."

Internal Management
In keeping with the National Performance Review, State is working to 
make the export control process "more customer-friendly and efficient," 
Dr. Harris noted. One result has been the reinvention of the former 
Office of Defense Trade Policy as the Office of Export Control Policy, 
which absorbed COCOM staff formerly assigned to the Bureau of Economic 
and Business Affairs.  

"Before, the COCOM staff, working in a dual-use context, had little to 
do with PM.  That might have made sense in the old world; after all, we 
weren't selling arms to COCOM-proscribed countries.  Now we have brought 
together the expertise to work military and dual use issues in a more 
integrated way."

(###)


ARTICLE 5:

National Disclosure Policy
A Primer on the Process

Many people have observed that the process surrounding the National 
Disclosure Policy (NDP) and the actions of the National Disclosure 
Policy Committee (NDPC) appear opaque and rather mysterious. This 
article is meant to make both the policy and the process more 
understandable. 

What is the NDP?
The NDP establishes a framework for approval or denial of proposed 
disclosures of classified information to foreign governments and some 
international organizations. Information controlled under NDP includes 
eight categories of information on subjects as diverse as military 
intelligence, military organization, and training, as well as 
information required for operation and maintenance of  military 
materials and munitions sold to foreign countries.

The NDP establishes specific criteria and conditions which must be 
satisfied before a decision is made to release classified military 
information to foreign governments.  These criteria and conditions 
satisfy, in part, the security requirements of the Arms Export Control 
Act and Executive Order 12356.  Approval or denial is based on a 
determination of whether these specific criteria and conditions are 
satisfied.

The Secretaries of the military departments have generally been 
delegated authority to render decisions, with respect to disclosure of 
information controlled by their departments, to the governments of 
countries with which the United States has mutual defense arrangements. 
In cases where authority has not been delegated, an exception to NDP is 
needed.  Requests for exception are considered by the National 
Disclosure Policy Committee.

What is the NDP Committee?
The NDPC is chaired by a Defense Department representative and includes 
representatives of each military service, the State Department, and 
other agencies.  A small secretariat is based at the Pentagon. 

The Exception Process
Often U.S. firms encounter the NDP when an export license application 
dealing with the release of a classified defense article is denied on 
NDP grounds.  

A request for exception to NDP must be sponsored by an NDPC member, 
normally the cognizant military service -- that is, the service which 
operates or "owns" the system. For example, the Air Force would normally 
sponsor the F-16, the Navy the F/A-18, and the Army the Apache 
helicopter. State or other NDPC members may sponsor a request for 
exception, but this is generally impractical as only the cognizant 
service will have the technical expertise to make a credible case. Once 
a member agrees to sponsor a request for exception, the sponsor submits 
the request to the secretariat, which staffs the proposal to the NDPC 
members. Members normally must vote within 10 working days, or justify 
the delay. 

Exception Criteria
NDPC members determining whether to sponsor or approve an exception 
judge requests according to the following criteria:

-- The proposed disclosure must support U.S. foreign policy objectives 
toward both the recipient country and the region.

-- The proposed disclosure must have no unacceptable military security 
implications. The key consideration is the impact a compromise or 
diversion of the system or technology would have on the operational 
capability of U.S. and allied forces. This determination takes into 
account system capability and vulnerability, foreign availability of the 
same or similar systems and technology, and the susceptibility of the 
system to exploitation.

-- The recipient must have the capability and intent to protect the 
system.  The U.S. Government determines capability through on-site 
security visits, intelligence risk assessments, and other means.  Intent 
is established by the negotiation of detailed security agreements with 
recipient governments. If there is no security agreement, a program-
specific security arrangement may be negotiated.

-- The proposed disclosure must result in clearly-defined political, 
military or other national security benefit to the U. S. 
Economic/commercial benefits to the U.S. are not currently exception 
criteria.

-- The disclosure must be limited to the minimum information necessary 
to satisfy the U.S. Government goals outlined above. Information must 
not be divulged that would  assist the recipient in the design and 
development of an indigenous system -- unless, of course, that is the 
U.S. Government's intention in permitting the disclosure, e.g., to 
enhance an ally's defense industrial base.

Determination and Appeal 
If NDPC members split on whether to permit a disclosure, the Committee 
chairman renders  a "Chairman's Decision." Dissenting NDPC members can 
appeal this ruling to the Secretary of Defense.

If the NDPC achieves unanimity -- or if there is a disagreement, but the 
members in the minority choose not to appeal -- the Chairman releases a 
formal "Record of Action" on the determination.  Decisions rendered by 
the Secretary of Defense or his deputy are recorded in the same manner.

Efforts to Improve the System
The NDP process is important to the protection of U.S. classified 
material. State and DoD recognize, however, that industry has 
experienced difficulties with this process. All agencies involved are 
working to improve the NDP process.

Suggestions or questions on National Disclosure Policy should be 
directed to the Office of Export Control Policy. 
(###)


ARTICLE 6:

Perestroika at PM
A Guide to the Restructured Bureau of Political-Military Affairs 

This snapshot guide to the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (PM, in 
State Departmentese) is aimed at business people and others who work 
with PM offices but may not be familiar with the Bureau's overall 
structure and responsibilities.

The Bureau of Political-Military Affairs recently underwent a 
reorganization aimed at improving policy and operational efficiency, 
absorbing some elements previously attached to other State bureaus. 

Some PM offices were given modified responsibilities, and most were 
given new names reflective of these evolving missions.  For example, the 
former Office of Defense Trade Policy became the Office of Export 
Control Policy, following augmentation with officers transferred from 
the Bureau of Economic & Business Affairs. 

Mission
The Bureau furthers U.S. national security objectives by stabilizing 
regional military balances through negotiation and security assistance; 
negotiating reductions in global inventories of weapons of mass 
destruction and curbing their proliferation; maintaining global access 
for U.S. military forces; inhibiting adversaries' access to militarily 
significant technologies; and promoting responsible U.S. defense trade.

Organization
PM's 270 Foreign Service, Civil Service, and  military personnel are 
supervised by four Deputy Assistant Secretaries, who -- together with 
several Ambassadors-at-Large -- report to Assistant Secretary of State 
for Political-Military Affairs Robert L. Gallucci. The Bureau's work is 
divided into four functions:

     Arms Control
The Ambassador for Safe and Secure Dismantlement leads the State 
Department effort  in negotiating and implementing agreements for 
assistance to Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan for the safe and 
secure dismantlement of nuclear weapons.

The Office of Strategic Policy and Negotiations supports the development 
of U.S. policy on Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty negotiations; safe and 
secure dismantlement; strategic arms negotiations; ballistic missile 
defense policy; arms control and security negotiations in Europe; and 
multilateral arms control.

The Office of Arms Control Implementation provides political-military 
technical expertise related to compliance with and implementation of 
arms control agreements.

The Nuclear Risk Reduction Center (NRRC) operates 24-hour government-to-
government communications links ("hotlines") in support of arms control 
and security agreements with former Soviet republics and member states 
of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

     Export Controls
The Office of Defense Trade Controls, the Bureau's largest element, 
issues export licenses to U.S. firms and enforces compliance  with the 
Arms Export Control Act and the International Traffic in Arms 
Regulations.

The Office of Export Control Policy sets policy guidelines for 
commercial defense trade and high technology exports, and provides 
guidance to embassies on assistance to U.S. defense industry marketing 
efforts overseas. 

     Nonproliferation
The U.S. Representative to the International Atomic Energy Agency serves 
as Ambassador to this multilateral organization, tasked with 
strengthening the international nuclear nonproliferation regime and 
advancing peaceful nuclear cooperation. 

The Office of the  Senior Coordinator directs the development of U.S. 
policies and activities in two areas -- establishing centers in the 
former Soviet Union to engage scientists and engineers in peaceful 
science and technology activities, and coordinating U.S. Government 
technical assistance to former Soviet, Eastern European, and Central 
European countries to improve the safety of nuclear power reactors.

The dual mission of the Office of Nuclear Energy Affairs is to 
strengthen the international nuclear nonproliferation regime, while 
advancing peaceful nuclear cooperation with those states which have 
accepted binding international commitments to nuclear nonproliferation.

The Office of Regional Nonproliferation works to prevent and reverse the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of 
delivery.  Among its activities, the office provides operational and 
intelligence support to the U.N. Special Commission on Iraq and the 
International Atomic Energy Agency.

The mission of the Office of Chemical, Biological, and Missile 
Nonproliferation is to fight the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction and the systems capable of delivering them.  It leads U.S. 
efforts in such multilateral fora as the Missile Technology Control 
Regime, and works with the Office of Defense Trade Controls to regulate 
trade in missile technology.

     Regional Security
The Ambassador-at-Large for Burdensharing works to ensure a more 
balanced sharing of defense costs by U.S. allies.

The Office of Defense Relations and Security Assistance manages 
bilateral political-military relations and negotiates agreements on 
access, prepositioning, and basing of U.S. forces overseas.  The office 
also manages State's statutory responsibilities for security assistance 
programs and Foreign Military Sales (FMS) arms transfers.

The Office of International Security and Peacekeeping Operations serves 
as State's primary operational point of liaison with the Defense 
Department, the National Security Council, and U.S. embassies during 
crises, military exercises, and operations abroad.  The office provides 
coordination and support for a growing number of humanitarian assistance 
programs, such as airdrops to Bosnia.

The Office of Policy and Plans conducts long-range policy planning with 
an emphasis on the scope of our future security commitments, prepares 
crisis response options, and supports development of the policy 
framework for peacekeeping, regional arms control, and confidence-
building initiatives.

Administration, Liaison, Detachments
The Bureau includes an administrative unit known as the Office of the 
Executive Director and a small Congressional/Public Affairs staff. Also 
carried on the Bureau's rolls are State officers serving rotational 
tours outside the Department -- as State-Defense Exchange Officers at 
the Pentagon, and Political Advisors on the staffs of senior U.S. 
military commanders. 

(###)


ARTICLE 7:

ELSA Speeds Staffing
State's Export License Staffing Analysis Network Cuts License Processing 
Time 

In recent years the Office of Defense Trade Controls (DTC) has developed 
several automated systems to speed license processing and provide more 
timely information to the public. These include the in-house information 
management system known as DETAS, the automated telephone inquiry system 
ALISS, the electronic bulletin board ROBB, and the new electronic 
licensing application system ELLIE. 

March 1994 saw the introduction of State's latest export licensing 
support system -- ELSA, the Export License Staffing Analysisnetwork.  
ELSA is a PC-based net which links DTC to the State Department regional 
bureaus and functional bureaus which review many license applications on 
foreign policy grounds. 
 
Before ELSA, DTC staffed applications to other State offices by 
forwarding hard copies of applications via inter-office mail.  With 
quick electronic communication via ELSA, the Department hopes to achieve 
quicker turnaround on staffed cases while reducing instances of strayed 
documents and human processing error. 

Unlike ALISS, ROBB, and ELLIE, ELSA won't  communicate directly with 
U.S. industry.  But she will be serving it. 

(###)


ARTICLE 8:

SARP Update
State Appeals Review Process Gets Underway

The Office of Defense Trade Controls has  begun the State Appeals Review 
Process (SARP) described in the January 1994 issue of Defense Trade 
News.  Procedures and guidelines are being fine-tuned as we proceed.

No Detour Around the Day-in-Court
Applications for which the Department of Defense has recommended denial 
based on national security concerns will not be eligible for the SARP if 
an applicant has been offered, and has declined, a DoD Day-in-Court 
hearing.  An applicant who has made his case at a Day-in-Court without 
obtaining a reversal of the DoD position may request a SARP hearing, but 
only if the applicant has substantial new information to introduce.  In 
such cases, DTC will invite DoD to participate.

Questions and suggestions on the State Appeals Review Process should be 
directed to the Licensing Division of the Office of Defense Trade 
Controls. 

(###)


ARTICLE 9:

Country Policy Briefs

Central and Eastern Europe
On January 5, 1994, President Clinton announced his finding that the 
furnishing of defense articles and services to the governments of the 
Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic will strengthen the security of 
the U.S. and promote world peace.  On March 22, the President announced 
the same finding regarding the governments of Albania,  Bulgaria, 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Romania.  The State Department will 
henceforth consider applications for the export of U.S. Munitions List 
articles and services to these governments on a case-by-case basis.

Vietnam
On February 4, 1994, President Clinton announced that the trade embargo 
imposed with respect to Vietnam in 1975 is being removed.  This action, 
however, did not extend to trade in U.S. Munitions List articles.  The 
State Department continues to return without action all applications for 
licences to export USML hardware, technical data, or services to 
Vietnam.

Former Yugoslavia
On July 11, 1991, the United States declared an embargo on exports of 
U.S. Munitions List articles and services to the former Yugoslavia, 
suspending all existing licenses.  This embargo remains in force, 
applying to Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia, Serbia-Montenegro, and Slovenia. 

(###)

Subsidiaries -- 
Don't Forget Your Parents
Subsidiaries sometimes submit applications to the Office of Defense 
Trade Controls (DTC) using a parent company's registration code but not 
the parent company's name. This delays processing while DTC verifies the 
subsidiary's status. To avoid this problem, subsidiaries should identify 
the parent company in the Applicant box of applications, e.g.:

ABC Company 
A Subsidiary of XYZ, Inc.
1234 Elm Street
Anytown, CA 99999
(###)



ARTICLE 10:

DTAG Developments

The Defense Trade Advisory Group (DTAG) convened its semi-annual plenary 
session on March 17, 1994  at the Department of State.  Highlights from 
the session:

The Policy Framework
In his opening address, Assistant Secretary for Political-Military 
Affairs Robert L. Gallucci outlined the broad foreign policy context for 
U.S. export controls:

--  Supporting reform in Russia is a top U.S. priority. 

--The success of the Middle East peace process will determine whether 
the region will be stable and whether certain nations will be a threat 
to their neighbors and to the U.S. 

-- North Korea's attempts to acquire nuclear capability threaten the 
entire Pacific region. 

-- While China is potentially a lucrative market, it is also a major 
arms supplier and presents human rights concerns. 

-- The Partnership for Peace provides flexibility to meet Europe's long-
term security needs, preserving the traditional U.S.-NATO military 
alliances while allowing us to broaden security ties with other European 
countries.


Presidential Directives
Mr. Gallucci described four Presidential Decision Directives (PDDs) 
shaping policy on arms transfers and export controls. PDD-8 calls for 
strengthening nonproliferation regimes. PDD-23 announces a liberalized 
remote sensing satellite policy.  PDD-27 maintains State's role in 
controlling encryption exports to safeguard national security, while 
streamlining encryption licensing. Finally, the Administration is 
preparing PDD-41 on U.S. conventional arms transfer policy. Goals 
include enhancing transparency, encouraging restraint in conventional 
arms sales, and supporting defense conversion. 

Balancing Exports & Nonproliferation
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Export Controls Martha Harris opened her 
keynote address by saying the President has placed the nonproliferation 
of weapons of mass destruction and advanced conventional weapons on the 
international security agenda. The Administration is striving to reduce 
the supply of these arms to countries of concern  such as North Korea, 
Iran, Iraq, and Libya.

Dr. Harris reiterated State's commitment to support U.S. firms facing 
hardship in the shrinking global defense market, stating that  State 
will take economic considerations into account in licensing decisions. 
She described PM initiatives to better assist industry, including the 
centralization of dual-use and defense export control policy management 
in the Office of Export Control Policy; the implementation by the Office 
of Defense Trade Controls of expedited license review, electronic 
license application, and the State Appeals Review Process;  and the 
continuing revision of the International Traffic in Arms Regulations. 

Country Policies
Dr. Harris noted continuing concern over China's commitment to human 
rights and non-proliferation.  Taking questions, she said that proposed 
recipients' human rights records are factored into licensing decisions; 
that the U.S. is working to limit the spread of weapons of mass 
destruction in South Asia; and that the U.S. hoped that free and fair 
elections  in South Africa would allow the U.N. embargo to be lifted.

Working Group Reports
DTAG officers outlined their accomplishments since the October 1993 
plenary and their projects for 1994. In 1993 the Policy Working Group 
submitted recommendations on U.S. conventional arms transfer policy and 
U.S. arms transfer policy towards Taiwan, and proposed  State/DOD 
collaboration on preparation of a comprehensive foreign availability 
database and identification of technological means to mitigate the 
consequences of unauthorized transfers. 

New issues for the Policy Working Group include U.S. arms transfer 
policy towards Latin America  and South Africa; consideration of 
cooperative theater missile defense development, production, and 
deployment as a policy instrument; amendment of unfair tax treatment of 
defense exports; participation by U.S. firms in Soviet bloc equipment 
upgrades; and clarification of U.S. policies on arms transfers to 
multilateral entities.

The Regulatory Working Group has submitted recommendations on the State 
Appeals Review Process, Commodity Jurisdiction issues, and third country 
transfers.  It has task forces devoted to the Missile Technology Control 
Regime, licensing automation, review of the International Traffic in 
Arms Regulations, and compliance issues. The Technical Working Group 
continues to focus on jet engine hot sections, satellites, and 
encryption policy.

Background Briefings
Clifford Bond, Deputy Director for Regional Economic Assistance, Office 
of Independent States and Commonwealth Affairs, discussed the Russian 
economy.  State planning and centralization have been abolished, trade 
liberalized, and foreign investment encouraged. The defense sector no 
longer controls resource allocation. To bring about a full market 
economy, the government must diffuse economic power to the provinces, 
create a social safety net, and become more involved in building up 
selected industrial sectors. Elsewhere, Ukraine is suffering 
economically. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Moldova also face financial 
hardships, but are proceeding with economic reforms.

Ed Malloy, Director of State's Office of Science, Technology, and 
Health, described the rapid development of U.S. / Russian space 
cooperation. Although some in the Russian government feel Russia is 
sacrificing too much Soviet technology, many more favor increased 
cooperation. The U.S. and Russia are cooperating on missile 
nonproliferation, a technical safeguard agreement for INMARSAT, and the 
space station partnership.  Meanwhile, Kazakhstan and the Ukraine want 
to broaden space collaboration with the United States. 

Andrew Church of the Office of Export Control Policy outlined U.S. 
efforts to help Eastern Europe and the former Soviet states establish 
effective export controls. State is in the process of amending the ITAR 
list of proscribed destinations to reflect progress by various states.

In the case of the former Soviet states, the U.S. is most likely to 
approve sales of non-lethal civilian end-use items.  Albania, Bulgaria, 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Romania have made progress toward 
becoming free-market democracies; while they remain proscribed, State is 
approving some transfers in support of legitimate defense needs.  The 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia were removed from the 
proscribed list in 1991.  They have the region's most effective export 
control systems, and are likely to be the most active Partnership for 
Peace participants.  These countries are eligible for FMS transfers, and 
State is likely to approve commercial sales which fulfill these 
countries' legitimate defense needs.

Dean Rogers of the Office of Export Control Policy and Daniel Cook of 
the Office of Defense Trade Controls discussed developments on 
reconnaissance satellite and encryption policy.

Under Secretary's Overview
Finally, Under Secretary of State for International Security Affairs 
Lynn E. Davis took questions on prospects for U.S. participation in the 
upgrade of Soviet systems, human rights as a factor in licensing 
decisions for countries such as China, the Conventional Arms Transfer 
policy review, defense export financing, and the COCOM successor regime.

DTAG-related questions can be directed to Linda Lum of the DTAG 
Secretariat at  (202) 647-4231. 

(###)


ARTICLE 11:

U.S. CUSTOMS REPORT

Customs and the Revised ITAR

Most of the revisions to the International Traffic in Arms Regulations 
(ITAR) which took effect July 22, 1993, had minimal effect on the import 
and export procedures of the U.S. Customs Service. The new ITAR 
exemptions from licensing requirements do change some of the 
documentation required by Customs for exports and temporary imports.

Certify Exemptions
Exporters are cautioned that they must claim an exemption from licensing 
requirements for defense articles by certifying on the Shippers Export 
Declaration (SED) the ITAR citation under which the exemption is 
allowed. The certification is a declaration that all the conditions of 
the exemption are met.

Customs regulations allow for filing most SEDs with the complete 
manifest up to four days after outbound clearance of a vessel. Most 
general cargo carriers take advantage of this procedure. SEDs for all 
defense articles listed in the ITAR must be filed with Customs before 
the shipment is exported. This includes SEDs for exports fitting within 
the new ITAR exemption provisions.

File Documents On Time
The exporter must assure timely delivery of SEDs to Customs. Delivery of 
documentation by the exporter to an agent or forwarder is not 
sufficient. The exporter is still in violation if a SED is not received 
by Customs prior to export.

A certification for exemption from the requirement for a temporary 
import license for defense articles must be listed on Customs entry 
documents at the time of import. The entry number on which the exemption 
was claimed and the regulatory citation for the exemption are required 
on the SED when the merchandise is exported. The annotated SED must be 
provided to Customs prior to the actual export. 

Maintain Records
The exporter needs to maintain a complete record of the Customs import 
entry numbers and documentation to assure the export requirements can be 
met. Many Customs brokers do not routinely include the entry number in 
documentation returned to the importer. The importer/exporter may need 
to take extra steps to assure the information is available at the time 
of export.

The best advice Customs can offer to avoid a delay in shipments of 
defense articles is to get documentation to Customs early to provide 
adequate time for review and verification. The exporter/importer is the 
party responsible for providing accurate and complete information. A 
deficiency caused by an agent or freight forwarder acting for the 
company does not alleviate the liability of the exporter or importer.

Any Questions?
U.S. Customs has a policy of promoting informed compliance with all laws 
and regulations within Customs  jurisdiction. If you have questions 
about import and export procedures and requirements, please call your 
local Customs office.

(###)


ARTICLE 12:

Suspensions, Debarments, Reinstatements

Japan Aviation Electronics Industry, Ltd., Japan (JAE)
Effective March 25, 1994, Japan Aviation Electronics Industry, Ltd., 
Japan (JAE)  had export/retransfer privileges reinstated pursuant to 
Section 38(g)(4) of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) and Section 
127.11 of the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR).  JAE may 
once again participate in the export or retransfer of defense articles 
or defense services subject to Section 38 of the AECA and the ITAR.

Notice of this reinstatement was published in the Federal Register 
(April 7, 1994, No. 67, Page 16681-2, Public Notice 1980). 

Rexon Technology Corporation
Gary D. Kauf
Jerome S. Shafir
James A. Bittel
Ronald L. Laib
Ordnance Technologies Ltd. (ORDTEC)
John Paul Grecian
Bryan Mason

On February 24, 1994, Assistant Secretary Robert L. Gallucci, Bureau of 
Political-Military Affairs, suspended all existing licenses and other 
approvals (including all activities under manufacturing license and 
technical assistance agreements) granted pursuant to Section 38 of the 
AECA that authorized the export or transfer of defense articles or 
services by, for, or to Rexon Technology Corporation, New Jersey; Gary 
D. Kauf (president of Rexon); Jerome S. Shafir (employee of Rexon); 
James A. Bittel (employee of Rexon); Ronald L. Laib (former employee of 
Rexon); Ordnance Technologies Ltd., a.k.a. ORDTEC, United Kingdom; John 
Paul Grecian and Bryan Mason, United Kingdom; and any of their 
subsidiaries, associated companies or successor entities.

In addition, it shall be the policy of the Department of State to deny 
all export license applications and other requests for approval 
involving, directly or indirectly, Rexon Technology Corporation; Gary D. 
Kauf; Jerome S. Shafir; James A. Bittel; Ronald L. Laib; Ordnance 
Technologies Ltd., a.k.a. ORDTEC; John Paul Grecian; Bryan Mason, and 
any of their subsidiaries, associated companies or successor entities. 
Also, these persons are precluded from using any exemptions from license 
or other approval included in the ITAR.

Notice of this suspension was published in the Federal Register (April 
7, 1994, Vol. 59, No. 67, Page 16682-3, Public Notice 1981).


Armour of America
On December 31, 1992, pursuant to Section 38 of the AECA, the Department 
of State in Public Notice 1753 suspended all existing licenses and other 
approvals that authorized export or transfer of defense articles or 
services by, for, or to Armour of America, Inc. (Armour) and any of its 
subsidiaries or associated companies, and Arthur G. Schreiber, President 
of Armour.  (See 58 Federal Register 4450, January 14, 1993.)

On September 20, 1993, Ms. Glenda Joyce Tucker, a former employee of 
Armour, pled guilty to the illegal export of defense articles in 
violation of Section 38 of the AECA and the ITAR, and aiding and 
abetting in violation 18 U.S.C. $ 2(b); making false statements within 
the jurisdiction of the United States in violation of 18 U.S.C. $1001; 
and bank fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. $1344. Ms. Tucker is currently 
statutorily debarred pursuant to 22 C.F.R. $127.7(c) of the ITAR. (See 
59 Federal Register 1053, January 7, 1994.)

As a result of a Deferred Prosecution Agreement between Armour and the 
Departments of Justice and State, and an Order by the Assistant 
Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs, the Department of 
State's suspension notice of December 31, 1992 was rescinded for Armour 
and its subsidiaries and associated companies and Arthur G. Schreiber, 
effective December 29, 1993. Therefore, those persons holding existing 
licenses or other approvals that were affected by the Armour and Arthur 
G. Schreiber suspension may resume exporting defense articles or defense 
services. 

Notice of this recision action was published in the Federal Register 
(Vol 59, January 26, 1994, p. 3746, Public Notice No. 1934).

Public Notices of Debarred Persons
The following persons have previously been debarred for a period of 
three years following their conviction for violating or conspiring to 
violate the AECA.  Key -- name; offense; conviction date & court; 
Federal Register citation.

Aero Systems, Inc.
18 U.S.C. $ 371 (conspiracy to violate
22 U.S.C. $ 2778) and 22 U.S.C. $ 2778
May 12, 1993, District of Columbia
(Public Notice #1868, 58 Federal Register 
50382, September 27, 1993)

Aero Systems, Inc. -- 2nd Statutory Debarment
18 U.S.C. $ 371 (conspiracy to violate
22 U.S.C. $ 2778) and 22 U.S.C. $ 2778
July 5, 1993, District of Columbia
(Public Notice #1944, 59 Federal Register 5664, February 7, 1994)

Aero Systems Aviation Corp.
18 U.S.C. $ 371 (conspiracy to violat 22 U.S.C. $ 2778)
    and 22 U.S.C. $ 2778
May 12, 1993, District of Columbia
(Public Notice #1868, 58 Federal Register 50382, September 27, 1993)

Aero Systems Aviation Corp. --  2nd Statutory Debarment
18 U.S.C. $ 371 (conspiracy to violate
22 U.S.C. $ 2778) and 22 U.S.C. $ 2778
July 5, 1993, District of Columbia
(Public Notice #1944, 59 Federal Register 5664, February 7, 1994)

Aero Systems Pte. Ltd.
18 U.S.C. $ 371 (conspiracy to violate 22 U.S.C. $ 2778)
    and 22 U.S.C. $ 2778
May 12, 1993, District of Columbia
(Public Notice #1868, 58 Federal Register 50382, September 27, 1993)

Aero Systems Pte. Ltd. -- 2nd Statutory Debarment
18 U.S.C. $ 371 (conspiracy to violate 22 U.S.C. $ 2778)
    and 22 U.S.C. $ 2778
July 5, 1993, District of Columbia
(Public Notice #1944, 59 Federal Register 5664, February 7, 1994)

Luis Fernando Arcila-Giraldo
18 U.S.C. $ 371 (conspiracy to violate 22 U.S.C. $ 2778)
    and 22 U.S.C. $ 2778
April 30, 1991, Middle District of Florida 
(Public Notice #1758, 58 Federal Register 6835, February 2, 1993)

Symone Morris Behrmann
18 U.S.C. $ 371 (conspiracy to violate 22 U.S.C. $ 2778)
    and 22 U.S.C. $ 2778
May 10, 1990, District of Columbia
(Public Notice #1771, 58 Federal Register 12440, March 4, 1993)

John L. Broussard 
18 U.S.C. $ 371 (conspiracy to violate 22 U.S.C. $ 2778)
June 26, 1992, Western District of Louisiana
(Public Notice #1928, 59 Federal Register 1053, January 7, 1994)

Maryanne E. Callaghan
18 U.S.C. $ 371 (conspiracy to violate 22 U.S.C. $ 2778)
    and 22 U.S.C. $ 2778
July 20, 1990, District of Columbia
(Public Notice #1771, 58 Federal Register 12440, March 4, 1993)

Fu Chin Chung, a.k.a. Alfred Chung
22 U.S.C. $ 2778
May 20, 1990, Northern District of Georgia
(Public Notice #1758, 58 Federal Register 6835, February 2, 1993)

B.V. Delft Electronische Producten (DEP), 
Netherlands [DEP defense-related activities]
18 U.S.C. $ 371 (conspiracy to violate 22 U.S.C. $ 2778)
    and 22 U.S.C. $ 2778
July 17, 1992, District of Columbia
(Public Notice #1798, 58 Federal Register 26028, April 29, 1993)

Delft Instruments, N.V., Netherlands
18 U.S.C. $ 371 (conspiracy to violate 22 U.S.C. $ 2778)
    and 22 U.S.C. $ 2778
July 17, 1992, District of Columbia
(Public Notice #1798, 58 Federal Register 26028, April 29, 1993)

Delft Instruments Defense B.V., Netherlands 
18 U.S.C. $ 371 (conspiracy to violate 22 U.S.C. $ 2778)
    and 22 U.S.C. $ 2778
July 17, 1992, District of Columbia
(Public Notice #1798, 58 Federal Register 26028, April 29, 1993)

Delft Instruments Electro-Optics B.V.  (DIEO), Netherlands
18 U.S.C. $ 371 (conspiracy to violate 22 U.S.C. $ 2778)
    and 22 U.S.C. $ 2778
July 17, 1992, District of Columbia
(Public Notice #1798, 58 Federal Register 26028, April 29, 1993)

Colin J. Devellerez
18 U.S.C. $ 371 (conspiracy to violate 22 U.S.C. $ 2778)
    and 22 U.S.C. $ 2778
September 14, 1993, District of Columbia
(Public Notice #1928, 59 Federal Register 1053, January 7, 1994)

Dilligas Trading Co., Inc. 
22 U.S.C. $ 2778
December 13, 1991,  Eastern Dist. of Virginia
(Public Notice #1674, 57 Federal Register 37184, August 18, 1992; Public 
Notice #1699, 57
Federal Register 43768, September 22, 1992,
Department of State Correction Notice)

Brian Joseph Fleming, a.k.a. Brian Joseph  McSulla
18 U.S.C. $ 371 (conspiracy to violate 22 U.S.C. $ 2778)
July 3, 1990, Middle District of Alabama 
(Public Notice #1758, 58 Federal Register 6835, February 2, 1993)

Franke Systemtechnik GmbH, Germany
18 U.S.C. $ 371 (conspiracy to violate 22 U.S.C. $ 2778)
    and 22 U.S.C. $ 2778
July 17, 1992, District of Columbia
(Public Notice #1798, 58 Federal Register 26028, April 29, 1993)

Louis Haneef
18 U.S.C. $ 371 (conspiracy to violate 22 U.S.C. $ 2778)
    and 22 U.S.C. $ 2778
December 30, 1991, Southern Dist. of Florida
(Public Notice #1928, 59 Federal Register 1053, January 7, 1994)

Edouard Michel Heldewier
18 U.S.C. $ 371 (conspiracy to violate 22 U.S.C. $ 2778)
    and 22 U.S.C. $ 2778
June 3, 1991, Eastern District of Michigan
(Public Notice #1928, 59 Federal Register 1053, January 7, 1994)

Hierax Co. Ltd.
18 U.S.C. $ 371 (conspiracy to violate 22 U.S.C. $ 2778)
    and 22 U.S.C. $ 2778
May 12, 1993, District of Columbia
(Public Notice #1868, 58 Federal Register 50382, September 27, 1993)

Hierax Co. Ltd. -- 2nd Statutory Debarment
18 U.S.C. $ 371 (conspiracy to violate 22 U.S.C. $ 2778)
    and 22 U.S.C. $ 2778
July 5, 1993,  District of Columbia
(Public Notice #1944, 59 Federal Register 5664, February 7, 1994)

Ronald J. Hoffman
22 U.S.C. $ 2778
April 20, 1992, Central District of California 
(Public Notice #1895, 58 Federal Register 58586, November 2, 1993)

Herbert J. Hoffmann
18 U.S.C. $ 371 (conspiracy to violate 22 U.S.C. $ 2778)
December 11, 1990, District of Maryland
(Public Notice #1771, 58 Federal Register 12440, March 4, 1993)

Tsotomu Ida
18 U.S.C. $ 371 (conspiracy to violate 22 U.S.C. $ 2778)
December 17, 1992, District of Columbia
(Public Notice #1895, 58 Federal Register 58586, November 2, 1993)

Instrubel N.V., Belgium
18 U.S.C. $ 371 (conspiracy to violate 22 U.S.C. $ 2778)
    and 22 U.S.C. $ 2778
July 17, 1992, District of Columbia
(Public Notice #1798, 58 Federal Register 26028, April 29, 1993)

John Jarema
22 U.S.C. $ 2778
August 30, 1990, Eastern District of Michigan
(Public Notice #1771, 58 Federal Register 12440, March 4, 1993)

Franciso Ernesto Jerez
18 U.S.C. $ 371 (conspiracy to violate 22 U.S.C. $ 2778)
January 29, 1992, Central District of California
(Public Notice #1758, 58 Federal Register 6835, February 2, 1993)

Jetborne, Inc.
22 U.S.C. $ 2778
December 3, 1992, Southern District of Florida 
(Public Notice #1928, 59 Federal Register 1053, January 7, 1994)

Hilton Langley
18 U.S.C. $ 371 (conspiracy to violate 22 U.S.C. $ 2778)
June 26, 1992, Western District of Louisiana
(Public Notice #1928, 59 Federal Register 1053, January 7, 1994)

Joseph McColgan
18 U.S.C. $ 371 (conspiracy to violate 22 U.S.C. $ 2778)
June 7, 1991, Southern District of Florida
(Public Notice #1771, 58 Federal Register 12440, March 4, 1993)

Charles Farrell Malone
18 U.S.C. $ 371 (conspiracy to violate 22 U.S.C. $ 2778)
June 20, 1990, Middle District of Alabama
(Public Notice #1758, 58 Federal Register 6835, February 2, 1993)

Miles Andrew Maynard
18 U.S.C. $ 371 (conspiracy to violate 22 U.S.C. $ 2778)
    and 22 U.S.C. $ 2778
June 3, 1991,  Eastern District of Michigan 
(Public Notice #1928, 59 Federal Register 1053, January 7, 1994)

George R. Mitchell
22 U.S.C. $ 2778
January 17, 1992, District of Maryland
(Public Notice #1674, 57 Federal Register 37184, August 18,1992; Public 
Notice #1699, 
57 Federal Register 43768, September 22, 1992, Department of State 
Correction Notice)

Seamus Moley
18 U.S.C. $ 371 (conspiracy to violate 22 U.S.C. $ 2778)
June 7, 1991, Southern District of Florida
(Public Notice #1771, 58 Federal Register 12440, March 4, 1993)

Toshiyuki Murakoshi
18 U.S.C. $ 371 (conspiracy to violate 22 U.S.C. $ 2778)
December 17, 1992, District of Columbia
(Public Notice #1895, 58 Federal Register 58586, November 2,1993)

Novacom, Inc.
22 U.S.C. $ 2778
December 13, 1991, Eastern Dist. of Virginia
(Public Notice #1674, 57 Federal Register 37184, August 18,1992; Public 
Notice #1699, 
57 Federal Register 43768, September 22, 1992, Department of State 
Correction Notice)

OIP N.V., Belgium
18 U.S.C. $ 371 (conspiracy to violate 22 U.S.C. $ 2778)
    and 22 U.S.C. $ 2778
July 17, 1992, District of Columbia
(Public Notice #1798, 58 Federal Register 26028, April 29, 1993)

Oldelft Electronic Instruments Srl, Italy
18 U.S.C. $ 371 (conspiracy to violate 22 U.S.C. $ 2778)
    and 22 U.S.C. $ 2778
July 17, 1992, District of Columbia
(Public Notice #1798, 58 Federal Register 26028, April 29, 1993)

Francisco Salvador Martin Panameno
18 U.S.C. $ 371 (conspiracy to violate 22 U.S.C. $ 2778)
January 29, 1992, Central District of California
(Public Notice #1758, 58 Federal Register  6835, February 2, 1993)

Pan Aviation, Inc.
18 U.S.C. $ 371 (conspiracy to violate 22 U.S.C. $ 2778)
    and 22 U.S.C. $ 2778
January 23, 1992, Southern District of Florida
(Public Notice #1674, 57 Federal Register 37184, August 18, 1992; Public 
Notice #1699, 
57 Federal Register 43768, September 22, 1992, Department of State 
Correction Notice)

Ricardo Benitez Perez
22 U.S.C. $ 2778
January 21, 1992, Southern District of Texas
(Public Notice #1758, 58 Federal Register 6835, February 2, 1993)

Alfredo Antonio Ramos-Tinoco
18 U.S.C. $ 371 (conspiracy to violate 22 U.S.C. $ 2778)
    and 22 U.S.C. $ 2778
April 4, 1991, Middle District of Florida
(Public Notice #1758, 58 Federal Register 6835, February 2, 1993)

Frank J. Randazzo
18 U.S.C. $ 371 (conspiracy to violate 22 U.S.C. $ 2778)
May 10, 1990, District of Columbia
(Public Notice #1771, 58 Federal Register 12440, March 4, 1993)

David R. Rosen
18 U.S.C. $ 371 (conspiracy to violate
22 U.S.C. $ 2778) and 22 U.S.C. $ 2778
June 26, 1990, Eastern Dist. of Pennsylvania
(Public Notice #1771, 58 Federal Register 12440, March 4, 1993)

Sarkis G. Soghanalian
18 U.S.C. $ 371 (conspiracy to violate 22 U.S.C. $ 2778)
    and 22 U.S.C. $ 2778
January 29, 1992, Southern District of Florida
(Public Notice #1674, 57 Federal Register 37184, August 18, 1992, Public 
Notice #1699; 57
Federal Register 43768, September 22, 1992, Department of State 
Correction Notice)

Hironobu Takahashi
18 U.S.C. $ 371 (conspiracy to violate 22 U.S.C. $ 2778)
December 17, 1992, District of Columbia
(Public Notice #1895, 58 Federal Register 58586, November 2, 1993)

Rudy Yujen Tsai
18 U.S.C. $ 371 (conspiracy to violate 22 U.S.C. $ 2778)
    and 22 U.S.C. $ 2778
March 4, 1991, Eastern Dist. of Pennsylvania
(Public Notice #1771, 58 Federal Register 12440, March 4, 1993)

Glenda Joyce Tucker
22 U.S.C. $ 2778
September 20, 1993, Central Dist. of California
(Public Notice #1928, 59 Federal Register 1053, January 7, 1994)

Phyllis Ware
22 U.S.C. $ 2778
June 3, 1991, Eastern District of Michigan
(Public Notice #1928, 59 Federal Register 1053, January 7, 1994)

Anyone needing additional information to determine whether a person has 
been debarred or reinstated should contact the Compliance Division of 
the Office of Defense Trade Controls.  
(###)


ARTICLES 13 AND 14 ARE NOT LISTED.  PLEASE REFER TO THE PAPER COPY OF 
THIS DOCUMENT.

[END OF DTN, VOL. 5, NO. 2]

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