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U.S. Department of State
96/03/28: Testimony: Chemical Weapons Convention
Released As Prepared for Delivery
Office of the Spokesman
Statement by Secretary of State Warren Christopher Before the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, March 28, 1996
[TEXT]
Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee, I am pleased to testify before
you for the first time this year. With my colleagues Secretary Perry
and General Clark, I am here today to explain why prompt ratification of
the Chemical Weapons Convention this year is in the overriding interest
of the United States.
President Clinton has put stopping the spread of weapons of mass
destruction at the top of our efforts to protect and enhance the
security of every American. Working with this Committee and the
Congress, we have achieved a number of important non-proliferation and
arms control victories. We secured the indefinite and unconditional
extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. We shut down North
Korea's dangerous nuclear program and sent it on its way to the scrap
heap. Thanks to the efforts of this Committee, the Senate ratified the
START II treaty which deepens cuts in our Cold War nuclear arsenals.
And the United States joined with 28 nations in the so-called Wassenaar
Arrangement to control transfers of dangerous conventional arms and
sensitive dual-use goods and technologies.
These achievements would not have been possible without strong American
leadership. Indeed, only the United States has the power and influence
to forge a strong global consensus against the proliferation of weapons
that threaten the security and prosperity of the world. That fact was
brought home to me again during my recent trip to South America, where
Argentina and Brazil have become our partners against proliferation and
renounced the nuclear option.
Now the United States has the opportunity and responsibility to lead
the world toward another landmark achievement. The ratification and
entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention will reinforce the
security of each and every American. President Clinton again
underscored the urgency of Senate approval in his State of the Union
speech, and has made the Convention's ratification this year a top
priority.
Ratification of this Convention not only represents a remarkable
opportunity to strengthen our own security, it denies us no option that
we would ever wish to exercise. With the dramatic changes of the past
decade, the threat of a massive chemical attack from the nations of the
former Soviet Union has been drastically reduced. Under American law,
the United States is already required to destroy the vast majority of
our chemical weapons stockpile by 2004. By imposing an international
legal obligation to destroy chemical weapons, the Chemical Weapons
Convention puts all other states capable of deploying chemical weapons
-- including Russia -- on the same footing as we are.
President Yeltsin and other senior officials have publicly and privately
reaffirmed Russia's commitment to destroy its chemical weapons arsenal.
Russia must still take additional concrete steps to follow through on
these commitments and rectify remaining problems. By ratifying the
Convention, we will add the force and weight of the entire international
community to our efforts to assure the destruction of Russian chemical
stocks. Our action will also spur other nations such as China to ratify
and join the regime.
Today, Mr. Chairman, the main danger we face is the possible use of
chemical weapons against U.S. forces deployed overseas and against our
allies. The case of Iraq underscores the danger posed by a brutal
dictator possessing unconventional weapons. We now know that Saddam's
factories were capable of producing thousands of tons of deadly
chemicals per year, including mustard gas and the nerve agents sarin and
tabun. After overcoming repeated Iraqi deception efforts, the United
Nations has only recently confirmed that Saddam also produced large
quantities of the highly toxic nerve agent VX. The UN suspects that
Iraq may still be hiding stocks of weaponized VX, which confirms the
threat that Saddam continues to pose.
If we had had the Convention two decades ago, we might have been able to
prevent or at least severely hamper Iraq's chemical weapons activities.
We must act now. Iran is engaged in a major effort to develop its
chemical arsenal, and we believe that some 20 countries already have, or
may be developing, chemical weapons.
The best protection against these weapons is to make it more difficult
for hostile nations and groups to obtain and use them. By blocking the
supply and demand for chemical weapons, the Chemical Weapons Convention
does just that.
First, all states that are Parties to the Convention will be required to
give up their chemical weapons. The Convention requires the destruction
of existing stockpiles and bans virtually every aspect of a chemical
weapons program, from development to stockpiling. It puts in place a
comprehensive inspection regime that includes intrusive challenge
inspections, and commits parties to enact legislation to punish
violators -- who also risk international sanctions. No treaty is 100
percent verifiable, but the Convention is carefully structured so that
Parties tempted to cheat will never be sure they can evade detection and
sanctions. The sooner the Convention enters into force, the sooner
those countries possessing or seeking chemical weapons will have to make
a choice: abide by its provisions, or suffer the weight of penalties and
sanctions imposed by the international community.
Second, the Convention prohibits parties from helping any country try to
circumvent its provisions. By specifically banning trade in certain
chemicals with countries that are not members, the Convention will make
it much harder for non-Parties to acquire the key ingredients they need
to produce chemical weapons.
The Convention will also help us combat chemical terrorism. The
legislation it requires will strengthen the legal authority of countries
to prosecute anyone who tries to acquire chemical weapons. The
destruction of chemical stockpiles will reduce the threat of stolen
weapons. And international transfers of many of the key chemicals that
can be used to make these weapons will be controlled. Indeed, it is no
surprise that the Japanese government moved to ratify the Convention
immediately after the attack in Tokyo.
American leadership was vital to complete the Convention. Now it is
required again if the Treaty is to enter into force successfully and we
are to begin a transparent and orderly process to eliminate stockpiles,
stop production and erect stronger barriers against proliferation.
So far, 160 countries have signed the Chemical Weapons Convention, and
49 have deposited instruments of ratification. When 65 countries have
ratified, a 180-day countdown toward entry into force begins. We are
now only 16 ratifications away from that countdown, which could come
within just a few months.
If the United States is among the first 65 parties to ratify the
Convention, we will retain our critical leadership role in the global
fight against chemical weapons. If we are not, we will lose the chance
to ensure that our views are fully reflected in the final preparations
for entry into force. We will not be able to participate immediately in
the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, which monitors
compliance. We will not be able to join immediately in international
inspections.
Failure to ratify the Convention promptly will jeopardize not only our
security and international standing, but our prosperity. Because the
treaty restricts trade with non-Parties in certain chemicals, failure to
ratify could cut off U.S. companies from their traditional trading
partners. Uncertainty about U.S. participation in this regime could
lose business for American companies and lose jobs for American workers.
Let me note that the U.S. chemical industry enthusiastically supports
the treaty, having worked closely with our negotiators to help ensure
that it will safeguard proprietary information.
Eliminating chemical weapons has long been a bipartisan goal. By law
adopted during the Reagan Administration, our chemical weapons
stockpiles are headed for destruction. The Convention itself is the
product of years of bipartisan effort. President Bush took a strong
personal interest in the treaty, which the United States signed during
his Administration. Reagan and Bush Administration officials, including
Lawrence Eagleburger, Brent Scowcroft and Ronald Lehman, have recently
reaffirmed their support for the treaty.
Mr. Chairman, the Clinton Administration supports this treaty because it
is especially suited to the post-Cold War security environment, where
the threat posed by chemical weapons is not limited to one state or
group of states. The Convention will simultaneously remove chemical
weapons from the world's stockpiles and build up the barricades against
their future acquisition. It will make it more difficult for others to
threaten or use chemical weapons against the United States, our
soldiers, our allies and friends.
We signed the Convention in January 1993. Since November 1993 the
Senate has considered it thoroughly, holding ten hearings and submitting
hundreds of questions for the record. It is now time to bring the
Convention to a vote.
We must not let pass this opportunity to strengthen our own security and
affirm our leadership in nonproliferation. On behalf of the President,
I urge the Senate to give its advice and consent to the ratification of
this vital treaty now.
Before ending my remarks, Mr. Chairman, I would like to say a brief word
about the Nuclear Safety Convention that is also before you. Parties to
this Convention are obligated not only to operate their nuclear
facilities safely, but to report to other Parties on the steps that they
have taken to do so. The Convention will enhance our security and our
safety. It has been adopted by all of the other G-7 participants at the
Nuclear Summit next month in Moscow, where it will be high on the
agenda. I urge this Committee to give the Convention prompt
consideration.
Thank you very much.
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