950127 1994 Report to the U.S. Congress on the Problem with Uncleared Landmines and the United States Strategy for Demining and Landmine Control  Return to: Index of "Arms Control, Counter-terrorism and Military Affairs || Electronic Research Collections Index || ERC Homepage

Hidden Killers:  The Global Landmine Crisis
1994 Report to the U.S. Congress on the Problem with
Uncleared Landmines and the United States Strategy for
Demining and Landmine Control
Prepared by the Office of International Security and
Peacekeeping Operations
                            Table of Contents
         Preface by the Secretary of State.......................iii
         Executive Summary.........................................v
         Notes on Statistical Data................................vi
I.       The Problem
          Worldwide Nature and Scope...............................1
          Military History of Landmines............................3
          Unexploded Ordnance......................................8
II.      The Effects of Landmines
          Refugee/Displaced Populations............................9
          Peacekeeping Operations.................................12
          Economic Development....................................13
III.     Regional Analyses
          The Middle East.........................................20
          The Americas............................................22
IV.     Landmine Control..........................................27
V.      Demining: The U.S. Response
          Criteria for U.S. Assistance............................30
          Role of the U.S. Military...............................32
          Mine Clearance Training Programs........................33
          Mine Awareness Training Programs........................35
          Current and Projected U.S. Government Funding...........38
VI.     Demining: The World Response
          The United Nations......................................39
          Other International Organizations.......................41
          Private Organizations and Nongovernmental Organizations.42
VII.   Demining: Case Studies
VIII.  Current Mine Warfare
          U.S. Practice...........................................53
          International Law and Practice..........................55
IX.     Research and Development..................................58
          Landmine Control........................................60
          A: Organizations and Resources.........................A-1
          B: Common Antipersonnel Landmines......................B-1
          C: Current Mine Clearing Equipment.....................C-1
                             The Secretary 0f State
     Antipersonnel landmines pose an enduring threat to post-
war reconstruction around the world.  These weapons continue
to take thousands of innocent civilian lives every year,
even in those countries where conflicts have ceased.
     The United States urges countries that manufacture
antipersonnel mines to adopt export moratoria and encourages
all countries to become parties to the international
convention governing landmine use.  The United States also
solicits international contributions to multilateral mine
clearance programs in those countries that must contend with
this man-made scourge.
     In his address to the United Nations on September 26,
1994, President Clinton called for the eventual elimination
of antipersonnel landmines.  As a first step toward this
ultimate goal, the President proposed an international
control regime to regulate the production, export and
stockpiling of antipersonnel landmines.
     This report, "Hidden Killers 1994:  The Global Landmine
Crisis," details the steps taken by the United States to
help solve the landmine problem.  The United States will
continue to work closely with other governments, the United
Nations, and private relief organizations in a multi-faceted
approach to addressing the problems caused by this most
deadly debris of war.
                                        Warren Christopher
     Executive Summary
Despite the efforts of the United States and others, the
global antipersonnel (A/P) landmine problem is getting
worse.  The simple fact is that more landmines are deployed
in armed conflict every year than are removed by mine
clearance personnel.  The world is now littered with an
estimated 80-110 million A/P landmines in 64 countries,
which maim or kill an estimated 500 people every week,
mostly innocent civilians.  The majority of these mines were
deployed during the last 15 years.  The burden imposed by
the proliferation and indiscriminate use of these weapons is
beyond calculation.  The world must take stronger steps to
address this problem, and the United States will remain at
the forefront of that effort.
In September 1993 the U.S. Government formed the Interagency
Working Group (IWG) on Demining and Landmine Control to
coordinate and administer U.S. efforts in this area.
Chaired by the Assistant Secretary of State for Political
Military Affairs, with the Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Humanitarian and Refugee Affairs as vice chair,
the group also includes representatives from the U.S. Agency
for International Development, the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the U.S.
Information Agency, and the National Security Council.
In his address to the UN General Assembly (UNGA) on
September 26, 1994, President Clinton called for the
eventual elimination of A/P landmines.  As a first step, the
President proposed the negotiation of an international
control regime to regulate landmine production, export, and
stockpiling.  The United States and other countries can move
most effectively toward the ultimate goal of eventual
elimination of A/P mines as viable and humane alternatives
are developed.
The United States has already taken several other steps to
address the landmine problem.  The United States declared a
moratorium on the export of antipersonnel landmines,
introduced a resolution into UNGA calling on all states to
adopt similar moratoria, submitted the Convention on
Conventional Weapons (CCW) to the Senate for advice and
consent to ratification, and proposed measures to strengthen
the CCW's provisions regarding landmine use.  To address the
mines already implanted, the United States established the
Demining Assistance Program to provide mine awareness
training and mine clearance training to nations with
landmine problems and also initiated research and
development into cost-effective demining techniques.
The United States leads the world's endeavors to address the
multi-faceted landmine problem, and welcomes the opportunity
to coordinate with other nations and international
organizations to develop a global solution to the global
problem.  The world faces a landmine crisis which will take
many years to resolve, but the efforts of the United States
and others constitute an important first step.
     Notes on Statistical Data
The data contained in Hidden Killers 1994:  The Global
Landmine Crisis, is a compilation of reports filed from U.S.
Embassies around the world.  The members of the Interagency
Working Group on Demining and Landmine Control dispatched a
survey to all U.S. diplomatic posts in December 1993,
requesting information about the landmine situation in host
The embassies consulted a broad range of sources within each
country to provide complete responses.  These sources
included, but were not limited to, government ministries,
hospitals and medical authorities, international
organizations such as the United Nations and the
International Committee of the Red Cross, and private
nongovernmental organizations locally active in humanitarian
The data contained in this report is a compilation of the
estimates provided by these sources to U.S. Embassies.  The
embassies were not in a position to evaluate the veracity of
the estimates provided by local sources.  The figures can
represent only an approximate order of magnitude of the
landmine problem, due to the inherent difficulties in
gathering accurate data.  The casualty estimates in this
year's report are higher than the figures in the 1993
report.  This can be attributed to increased awareness and
attention to the issue in affected countries and to
increased emphasis on reporting and tracking casualty data,
rather than any significant increase in the size of the
The aggregate figure for global landmine distribution
includes mines which were deployed in strict accordance with
current international law, and which therefore pose little
threat to civilian populations.  The United States
Government cannot at this time accurately determine what
percentage of the mines implanted around the world were
illegally deployed.
The U.S. Government considers the figures in this report to
be rough estimates at best, and uses the figures to define
the approximate magnitude of the problem and to establish
priorities for the allocation of U.S. resources to combat
the global landmine problem.  More specific data on the
landmine situation cannot be obtained, due in part to the
size of the problem and the frequently remote regions of
landmine deployment.  As a result, the global landmine
problem cannot be quantified with precision.
CHAPTER ONE:    The Problem
     Worldwide Nature and Scope of the Problem
Antipersonnel (A/P) landmines are devastating weapons of
war, but they are equally devastating weapons after a war.
The vast majority of landmines stockpiled and in use today
around the world have no means of self-neutralization or
self-destruction.  These mines remain active and deadly long
after conflicts cease, killing and maiming an estimated
26,000 people, mostly innocent civilians, every year.
The Department of State's first landmine report, issued in
September 1993, indicated that the total number of uncleared
landmines in the world was between 65 and 110 million,
scattered through 62 countries.  The figure popularly
accepted by governments, NGOs, and the private sector has
been 100 million landmines worldwide.  See the section
entitled "Notes on Statistical Data."
According to the United Nations, ongoing and new mine
clearance efforts managed to extract 80,000 mines worldwide
in 1993.  However, another estimated 2.5 million mines were
implanted.  These facts, combined with the latest U.S.
global survey, bring the worldwide estimate to 80 to 110
million landmines.  To quote UN demining expert, Brigadier
General (Ret.) Patrick Blagden, "we're losing the battle."
Many of the 110 million mines are each capable of wounding
or killing several people, and efforts to destroy the mines
are slow, painstaking, and expensive.  But the human costs
of not destroying them are proving even more expensive.
Thousands of lives are lost to explosions; entire regions
are denied basic services because repairs to infrastructure
are impeded; humanitarian aid shipments are disrupted; and
societies are thrown into chaos.
The problem is greatest in Africa, where mines have been
used extensively in wars for independence, and also in the
subsequent power struggles.  Approximately 20 million
landmines are strewn in nearly one half of Africa's
countries, killing over 12,000 people per year.
Landmines are a continuous impediment to the world economy.
Mines which cost as little as $3 each on the open market
cost up to $1,000 each to clear.  If not cleared, mines will
continue to inflict injuries.  In Afghanistan, it is
estimated that $5,000 is required for treatment and
rehabilitation for every survivor.  The fragile economies of
many mine-plagued countries cannot support the cost of
either mine clearance or victim rehabilitation.
The three nations with the largest landmine problem are
Afghanistan, Angola, and Cambodia.  Collectively, they are
besieged by an estimated 28 million mines and suffer 22,000
casualties every year (85 percent of the world's total).
The efforts to demine just those three countries will
require decades of work and vast amounts of resources.  UN-
initiated mine clearance programs are making progress in
Afghanistan and Cambodia, but no international effort can
commence in Angola until a lasting peace settlement is
reached.  Meanwhile, more mines will be deployed.
Other countries with more than 1 million landmines include
Iraq, Sudan, Mozambique, Somalia, Ethiopia, and Eritrea.
The United States is currently providing demining assistance
to Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Mozambique.  Many other countries
are polluted with over 500,000 mines.
Landmines affect every aspect of a nation's reconstruction
after combat.  Refugees cannot return home.  Those who do
cannot work the fields to grow crops.  Relief shipments
cannot be delivered.  Infrastructure cannot be repaired.
Herd animals cannot approach watering holes.  Peacekeeping
forces cannot deploy as effectively.  Every task required to
rebuild a war-shattered society is put on hold until the
mines are cleared, a process that can take years.  Or
reconstruction begins despite the mines, because social
pressure demands that it begin, and lives are lost to
landmine explosions.  It truly is a no-win situation for
fragile new governments.
The need for assistance around the world is growing.  Except
in those few areas where the international community has
been able to mount successful mine clearance efforts, the
mines lie waiting.  The 1993 State Department report
indicated that landmines kill or wound 150 people per week.
Further investigation, more accurate field reporting, and
increased awareness and attention to the problem now
suggests that number was greatly understated.  Landmines
maim or kill an estimated 500 people per week worldwide.
The economic implications alone of these casualties in rural
and agricultural areas is daunting.  Those who survive a
landmine blast are usually incapable of the strenuous,
mobile labor required to make a living, and they also
require extended medical attention and rehabilitation.  The
lost labor productivity and resources required for treatment
of landmine injuries can further cripple an economy already
weakened by war.
The world must recognize the landmine problem for what it
is: a global crisis.  In his address to the United Nations
General Assembly on September 26, 1994, President Clinton
called for the eventual elimination of A/P landmines.  The
United States and other countries can move most effectively
toward the ultimate goal of eventual elimination of A/P
mines as viable and humane alternatives are developed.  The
United States will continue to devote resources to the
effort to address this crisis, working with other countries,
international agencies, and private relief organizations to
provide mine awareness and mine clearance training to
affected populations.  The following chapters will explain
the full scope of U.S. demining and landmine control
     Military History of Landmines
Mine warfare began as the practice of digging underneath
fixed military fortifications to cause their collapse.  The
destructiveness of such mining increased with the invention
of gunpowder, which was used in tunnels dug during the
American Civil War and World War I.
Technological advancement shifted mine warfare from
attacking fixed targets to stopping moving troops and
vehicles, particularly the tank.  Mines were first used this
way on a broad scale in World War I.  The 1918 Armistice
Agreement provided that Germany furnish the Allies with
records showing the locations of mines and assist Allied
engineers in countermine efforts.  Inaccurate German maps
served only as a general guide to the location of mines, and
demining progressed slower and less efficiently than the
Allies had anticipated.
Incorporating World War I experiences, the world's armies
devoted more attention to mine and countermine warfare in
their military plans.  By the outset of World War II, the
major military powers had prepared doctrines of landmine
warfare that shared many common principles.  Mine warfare
was part of military doctrine related to obstacles, but it
also assumed unparalleled importance for defense against
tanks.  American and British engineers were responsible for
preparing deliberate defensive obstacles and barrier zones
and conducting flank and rear security for the defense of
the command as a whole.  Every unit, however, remained
responsible for its own defense and, theoretically, could
conduct mine and countermine operations.  German doctrine
differed by assigning engineers the sole responsibility,
even at the unit level, for all mine operations.
Antipersonnel (A/P) mines were developed to impede the
removal of antitank (A/T) mines and to prevent enemy
penetration of protective minefields.  On the offense, as an
economy-of-force measure, mines helped protect exposed
flanks.  Strict rules regulated patterns for siting,
marking, and recording minefields, although opinions varied
among armies as to the density, depth, and patterns of
minefields.  Accurate records were essential to preclude
friendly minefields from becoming a hazard during a
counterattack and for lifting mines for reuse.  American and
European doctrine differentiated minefields by tactical
purpose (protective, defensive, barrier, nuisance, or
dummy), the type of movement to be obstructed
(antipersonnel, antitank, or antiamphibious), the type of
terrain (route mining, beach mining, or ice mining), and
placement technique (hasty or deliberate).  Nuisance
minefields consisted of mostly A/P mines and did not require
coverage by supporting fire.
Mine warfare became firmly established in World War II, when
the landmine in its common formA encased explosives fitted
with fuzes or firing devices for actuation by the user or by
the target itselfAwas used by all World War II combatants.
Mines initially were used in North Africa to protect
strongpoints in fighting between British and Italian forces
on the Egyptian-Libyan border.  The British thwarted an
Italian thrust into Egypt in September 1940 by a liberal use
of mines, costing the Italians many casualties and causing
them to become mine-shy and overcautious.  Italy's use of
mines was notable for the first employment of air-delivered,
scatterable mines, or "thermos bombs," which they dropped
over British positions beyond their own ground objectives.
During the 4-week Battle of Gazala in early 1942, the
British laid over one-half million mines to defend the
Libyan fortress of Tobruk and the nearby Gazala Line, which
extended 40 miles from the Mediterranean Sea south into the
desert as far as Bir Hacheim.  Many mines for the line's
defense were lifted from Tobruk, increasing the latter's
vulnerability.  The German offensive across the Sahara came
to a halt at El Alamein in June 1942, where both sides again
used mines in enormous quantities.
Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, commander of German forces in
Africa, relied heavily on mines to compensate for shortages
of men and weapons.  He incorporated British, French,
German, and Italian mines by the thousands to create a
"minegarden" to defend against British armor.  In the
confusion of minefields at El Alamein, each side
incorporated the other's minefields in its own defenses.
British countermine operations were crucial in breaking the
stalemate at El Alamein in October 1942.  Despite the
introduction of new electronic mine detectors and the
Scorpion, a tank outfitted with flails to detonate mines,
British troops most often resorted to the hazardous probe
and lift method to clear mines.
For the Allies, North Africa was the crucible in which the
principles and techniques of large-scale mine warfare in
mobile, mechanized operations were tested and refined.
Americans, particularly, took note of the significance of
mine warfare, revitalizing production and training programs
that had suffered from neglect.  Allied and Axis Armies,
whose strengths were insufficient in North Africa, used
mines to compensate for shortages of artillery, armor, and
infantry.   Neither side believed, though, that the value of
mines extended beyond temporary tactical advantage to
strategic import.
Where mines were widespread, advancing armor units required
infantry and engineers to clear gaps and lanes, diminishing
the momentum of the armored attacks.  An American regimental
commander of the U.S. Army 1st Armored Division noted that
"The antitank mine is the biggest problem still unlicked.  A
real solution would speed the end of the war by 6 months,
for it would double the use of the tank as an effective
On the eastern front, mine warfare of massive proportions
was used by both sides during defensive and offensive
operations.  Soviet doctrine viewed mine warfare as one of
the most important elements of land combat and stressed
field improvisation and the use of captured mines.  On the
defense, Soviet engineers saturated vacated areas, including
cities, with all types of mines, many with delayed charges.
To protect against enemy counterattack while on the offense,
the Soviets used mines to cover forward positions and
Soviet forces devised intricate minefield patterns, used
staggered series of panels rather than a continuous belt of
mines, and coordinated minefields with supporting fire.
Radio-controlled mines were set to block lanes that had been
left open for withdrawing Soviet troops and, in urban areas,
to blow up strategic facilities and entire blocks of houses.
Around Moscow, exploiting swampy and heavily forested
terrain that channeled German tanks onto highways, the
Soviets prepared antitank ditches and minefields to impede
the Germans.
At Kursk, on July 5, 1943, Germany sought to regain the
offensive after successful Soviet counteroffensives.  In one
of the great tank battles of history, more than 3,000 tanks
were concentrated in a narrow belt about 15 miles deep.  The
Germans gained the initial advantage, but their success was
reversed when tanks and infantry fell prey to minefields and
effective antitank guns.  The Soviets laid A/T and A/P mines
at a density of more than 4,000 per square mile.  German
countermining, including artillery fire to clear lanes
through minefields, was ineffective.  Crippled by mines soon
after entering the Soviet forward defense zone, German tanks
were then overtaken by special tank-destruction squads.
Other Soviet minefields channeled German tanks into target
areas, where groups of antitank guns concentrated on
destroying one tank at a time.
A postwar German assessment of mine operations credited mine
warfare with achieving some temporary tactical results but
dismissed it as having no operational or strategic effect.
"The effectiveness of German mines," General Major Alfred
Toppe said, "was reduced by Soviet indifference to
casualties and diligent countermine operations."
The Soviets' success also stemmed from an assiduous use of
captured German mines and, unlike the Germans, they had
ample production and distribution capacities.  Soviet mines
were sturdy and effective, their mainstay being a powerful
wooden box mine that withstood harsh environmental
conditions.  Using an estimated 222 million mines in World
War II, the Soviet Union surpassed any modern nation in the
use of mines in recent history.  For the Soviets, the German
defeat imposed the burden of demining vast areas, including
most large Soviet and Eastern European cities.  Soviet
sources claimed to have cleared 1.5 million square
kilometers, removing some 55 million mines and other items
of explosive ordnance by 1945.
Except for their brief exposure to German mine warfare in
Northern Africa, Americans directly experienced mine warfare
on a major scale only in Italy between 1943 and 1945.  At
the battle for Cassino, January-May 1944, the Germans used
mines as their most important artificial obstacle.  Mines
were the third most effective causative agent of severe
wounds during this battle, producing 13 percent of American
casualties.  However, mine warfare played a less significant
offensive role for the Allies, except for countermine
Mine warfare did not become a factor in the West until June
1944, when Allied Forces confronted the German Atlantic Wall
during the Normandy invasion.  Field Marshall Rommel, now
commanding German forces in France, used 5-6 million mines
as part of the Atlantic Wall to protect French beaches from
an invasion; he felt that at least 50 million mines were
necessary to establish a continuous mine belt.  The Germans
also placed mines in areas suitable for glider and parachute
assaults.  Although the Atlantic Wall was still under
construction on D-Day, June 6, 1944, sufficient numbers of
A/P and A/T mines were in place to make the Allied foothold
tenuous and to severely retard the breakout of the landing
force inland.
A pattern of Allied pursuit and German route mining in
retreat eventually developed as the Germans fell back into
Eastern Europe.  Growing shortages of other arms caused the
Germans to use mines as their chief antitank defense.  In
one minefield alone in the Lorraine Region, the U.S. Army's
357th Infantry Regiment removed more than 12,000 plastic and
wooden box mines, the latter introduced in the West in late
Having repulsed the German counteroffensive in the Battle of
the Bulge in December 1944, the Allies resumed their drive
toward the West Wall, or Siegfried Line.  With its rows of
concrete dragon teeth, pillboxes, minefields, and other
obstacles, it posed the major obstacle to the Allied advance
into the German heartland.  It took several battles and
months before the Allies breached the Siegfried Line, and,
during this campaign, German minefields were the second
highest cause of American tank losses, after antitank fire.
In the European Theater overall, 20.7 percent of all army
tank losses and about 2.5 percent of all army battle deaths
were attributed to mines.
In contrast to Europe and North Africa, mine warfare in the
Pacific Theater occurred on a much smaller scale.  Japanese
mine warfare was unpredictable and unsophisticated.  Only in
the Philippines and on Okinawa did Japan use mines to create
strong defensive positions.  On Okinawa, Japanese minefields
delayed about one American division each week and A/T mines
accounted for 31 percent of all Allied tank losses on the
island.  Japanese mines were not as sturdy or as powerful as
those developed by Germany and Italy.  In general, Japan
neglected to formulate either a strong doctrine or tactical
concepts for the use of mines, and throughout most of the
Pacific Theater, mine warfare had little operational import.
The conventional nature of World War II, the dominance of
armored warfare in many campaigns, and environmental factors
made for similarities in mine warfare as practiced by the
various belligerents.  In all armies, as an economy-of-force
measure, the landmine, or "silent soldier," was used to
release men for combat.  While wartime experience confirmed
the importance of marking, recording, and removing mines,
application of these doctrinal tenets became lax as
operations became more mobile and during retreats.  For all
combatants, the unrecorded minefield was the equivalent of
an enemy minefield, a hazard to the troops that emplaced it
and to the civilian population.
The postwar division of Europe into Eastern and Western
Blocs, accompanied by a buildup of American ground forces in
the West, prompted the construction of barrier minefields
across likely invasion routes.  These minefields were
designed to deter and, if necessary, delay any aggressor by
channelizing and concentrating forces in target areas where
they would be attacked by air and artillery fire.  Communist
powers in Europe laid defensive mine belts along their
borders with the West for the same purposes.  These
elaborate arrays of barrier minefields became a feature of
the West's cold war scenarios of containment and deterrence
in Europe.
At the same time, mine warfare was developing in Korea
differently from World War II both in scale and in tactics.
Korea's predominantly mountainous terrain tended to channel
movement along a few restricted corridors.  Mines were most
often used to block roads, passes, and other avenues of
movement.  Compared to North Africa, where approximately
2,000 A/T mines were used per tank casualty, in Korea's
restrictive terrain the rate was about 80 mines per tank
Americans encountered the first large enemy minefields after
breaking out from the Pusan Perimeter in late 1950, marking
the war's transition from a holding pattern to a war of
movement.  Reflecting the North Korean People's Army's
(NKPA) inexperience in mine warfare, these minefields had no
standard pattern, were not integrated into an overall
defense plan, and were poorly camouflaged.  They caused only
minor delays to UN forces.  In the later UN drive north to
the Yalu River, however, about 70 percent of all UN tank
casualties were caused by mines.
The indiscriminate laying of mines, according to one
American military engineer who had fought in Korea, was
justified only "if we never intend to return and do not
value the friendship of the population."  Since the
armistice on July 27, 1953, minefields have remained
essential to UN and NKPA defenses near the demilitarized
zone.  During the period of active combat between July 1950
and July 1953, landmines accounted for 1.65 percent of
Americans killed and 3.32 percent of those wounded, out of a
total of 18,498 killed and 72,343 wounded.  Fought primarily
with World War II-era weapons and doctrine, the Korean war
was not distinguished for doctrinal, tactical, or material
innovations in mine warfare.
In Vietnam, mines figured prominently in the Viet Cong's
campaign of terror and violence against South Vietnam's
population and armed forces and American advisers.  As
mining incidents increased from 260 in 1962 to 1,536 in
1964, American military advisers increasingly became the
target of attacks.  Insurgent mine warfare contributed to
the pervasive sense of insecurity in the South that led to
the commitment of American ground combat forces in 1965.
South Vietnam's regular and paramilitary forces had
considerable practical experience coping with insurgent
mining and used mines to protect bases and to fortify
hamlets.  Americans usually reinforced perimeter defenses
around airfields and fire bases with antipersonnel mines.
Antipersonnel and antivehicular mines were employed in an
anti-infiltration role along trails and as part of a
defensive barrier along the demilitarized zone between North
and South Vietnam, where a possible armored threat also
The command-detonated Claymore mine, which most ground
commanders considered a weapon rather than a defensive
obstacle (as mines were deemed in formal doctrine), was used
in an area denial role in support of ground operations.
Americans increased their use of air-delivered, self-
deactivating, scatterable mines in the late 1960s and early
1970s as air operations increased and ground operations
expanded in Cambodia and Laos against the Viet Cong's base
areas and infiltration routes.
The Viet Cong (VC) and People's Army of Viet Nam (PAVN)
developed mine warfare doctrine that stressed the
appropriation of enemy mines, the Claymore being
particularly prized.  In one province, after American forces
had planted 30,000 mines as part of a 15-mile antipersonnel
barrier to separate the guerrillas from the local
population, the VC lifted approximately 10,000 mines.  The
insurgents were also adept at making antipersonnel mines
from American cluster bomb units.  Americans estimated that
90 percent of the material used by the VC to manufacture
mines, including explosives, was derived from American
military sources.
The VC/PAVN did not lay mines in patterned minefields, but
used them sparingly to interdict roads and trails to cause
delay.  Mines at times were placed around helicopter landing
zones, where they would be detonated by the rotor wash.  In
densely populated areas, the local guerrillas preferred to
use command- detonated mines and devised ways to warn the
populace of their presence; pressure-activated mines were
more common elsewhere.
The Vietnam War marked a change in mine warfare tactics from
previous wars fought by the United States, in that the VC
used mines as instruments of terror to intimidate selected
local populations.  The insurgents mined roads nightly,
making mine clearing by combined infantry, armor, and
engineer road-clearing teams a daily task.  In addition to
mine detectors, Americans used specially equipped tanks,
plows, and bulldozers to detonate mines, cut tripwires, and
clear vegetation to better detect mines and prevent
ambushes.  Plastic and other nonmetallic mines were
virtually impossible to detect, except by manually probing
for them.
Used in a manner and on a scale never before encountered by
American forces, landmines emerged as a major weapons system
for the VC/PAVN in South Vietnam.  Of approximately 41,840
American ground soldiers killed in battle in the Vietnam
War, slightly more than 7,400 were killed by mines or
grenades, or approximately 16 percent; some estimates
approach 30 percent.  A 1969 U.S. Army analysis of mine
warfare in South Vietnam concluded that mines accounted for
the bulk of vehicle combat losses, increasing maintenance.
At times, and in some units, the damaging effects of VC/PAVN
mines were even greater.  In the last half of 1968, for
example, 57 percent of all casualties in the U.S. 1st Marine
Division were attributed to mines and booby traps.  If
VC/PAVN mine warfare seemed improvised, with crude mines,
its effectiveness was limited only by the technology and
ingenuity available.
Insurgent and counterinsurgent use of mines characterized
mine warfare in Vietnam.  Insurgents and terrorists find
mines plentiful, cheap, and simple to use.  Lacking stronger
firepower, mines often have been used in an offensive role
as a substitute for artillery.  In African anticolonial
insurgencies, such as those in Angola, Guinea, Mozambique,
and Zambia, mines were widely used as retaliatory weapons,
for road interdiction, and in ambushes.  The conflict in
Angola against Portugal, for example, was characterized as
one of "mines versus helicopters," and 50 percent of
Portugal's casualties in 1970 were attributed to mines.
Two wars, Israel's Six-Day War in 1967 and the Yom Kippur
War of 1973, offered an approximation of mature conventional
mine warfare in the Cold War era against modern armored
forces.  In each war, Israel and the opposing Arab forces
used mines extensively.  In the Sinai, Egypt and Israel
sowed landmines to form antitank barriers similar to those
encountered in World War II desert fighting.  Mines were
also sown along the Israeli-Syrian border in the Golan
Heights, which Israel had occupied since 1967.  However,
neither in 1967 nor in 1973 were mine defenses capable of
stopping armored forces, suggesting that mine defenses, no
matter how strong, whether based on natural or artificial
barriers, could be penetrated by surprise, ingenuity, and
Scatterable mines, deliverable by air, artillery, or tank
weapons, enhanced the traditional defensive roles of mines.
Speed and remote delivery greatly increased the offensive
potential of mine warfare.  Such mines could be deployed in
front of a fleeing enemy or on alternate defense positions
to impair withdrawal.  They would often be seeded amid an
enemy's assembly areas, artillery positions, and airfields.
Fitted with a self-destruct feature (which has not always
proved to be reliable), mines could be activated, detonated,
or deactivated at prescribed times so as not to interfere
with friendly maneuvers.  With scatterable mines, impromptu
minefields could be provided on demand at particular points.
These features, however, have modified certain aspects of
mine warfare doctrine.  Scrupulous marking and recording of
minefields became more difficult.  With the advent of new
dispensing systems, responsibility for the employment of
mines has been decentralized to other branches and to lower
unit echelons, eroding the once predominant role of
engineers.  The smaller size and lethality of scatterable
mines have increased the density of minefields, making
clearing by opposing military forces more difficult, and
thereby increasing the danger to civilians.
Until the early 1970s, modern mine warfare evolved largely
in tandem with the development of armored forces.  As better
armor protection and antitank missiles were developed, the
value of mines for defense against tanks decreased while the
role of antipersonnel mines has grown.  This shift in
emphasis reflects both advances in mine technology and the
proliferation of small wars, largely in the developing
world, in which inexpensive and easily acquired and
manufactured A/P mines fulfill a doctrinal and tactical need
for a weapon of intimidation and destruction.
     Landmines Versus Unexploded Ordnance
Innocent civilians are threatened by uncleared landmines
long after combat ceases.  A similar but distinctly smaller
hazard faced by these populations is unexploded ordnance
UXO is any explosive munition, a mortar shell for instance,
which fails to explode after it has been fired, projected,
or dropped onto its target.  UXO remains live and poses as
great a danger as a landmine to any person, military or
civilian, who disturbs it.  The U.S. Army estimates that two
to five percent of all its conventional munitions fail to
explode as designed.
While the damage caused by UXO can be the same as that
caused by landmines, it is important to note the differences
between the two.  A landmine is a weapon which is designed
to detonate upon the proximity of its target.  The use of
landmines, as a distinct class of weapons, is subject to
doctrinal and international legal controls.  UXO is a
dangerous, uncontrollable, long-lived waste product of a
battle, and is only present after combat because it did not
function according to its design.  In addition, UXO is
generally located on the ground surface, not buried like
landmines, and UXO casings are metal, which make buried UXO
much easier to detect than modern plastic mines.
While UXO poses a smaller threat than landmines, it still
causes significant problems.  In general, personnel
conducting mine clearance operations should also clear and
destroy UXO when it is encountered, in order to prevent
possible injury.
The United States is taking steps to deal with both the
landmine problem and the UXO problem.  For example, all U.S.
scatterable mines have incorporated a reliable fuze with a
self-destruct capability and a backup self-deactivating
capability, which minimizes the prospect that those mines
will be present to pose a threat to civilians after fighting
ceases.  The U.S. military is constantly working to reduce
the failure rate of its conventional munitions to prevent
post-combat UXO casualties.
The indiscriminate use of landmines is the real threat the
world faces today.  The United States sets the standard for
responsible use of munitions and encourages other countries
to follow its example.  U.S. hand-emplaced mines that do not
have a self-destruct mechanism are placed only in areas that
are closely monitored.  U.S. scatterable mines, which are
difficult to monitor, employ a self-destruct mechanism.
U.S. conventional munitions are constantly being improved to
prevent the occurrence of post-combat unexploded ordnance.
CHAPTER TWO:    The Effects of Landmines
     The Effects of Landmines on Refugee Populations
Refugees and displaced persons choose to return home based
upon the general security situation and the prospect for
political stability, both of which are influenced by the
presence of uncleared landmines.  While mines do not
generally prevent people from returning, they cause deaths
and injuries on the way home and they make earning a living
and reestablishing a normal life much more difficult.  The
specific number of returnees injured by landmines is
difficult to estimate, since most casualties occur in areas
remote from hospitals or doctors.
Five countries (Angola, Mozambique, Somalia, Afghanistan,
and Cambodia) are plagued by an estimated 30 million
landmines which inhibit and endanger the return and
reintegration of some 6 million refugees and 5.5 million
internally displaced persons.  These numbers, which take
into account only a part of the worldwide condition, provide
a graphic picture of the magnitude of the problem faced by
civilian populations as well as by an international
community seeking to provide humanitarian assistance and
create regional stability throughout the world.
Landmines can imperil the lives and safety of both refugees
and returnees: first, while they flee conflict situations in
search of asylum, and, again, when they return home and
reestablish themselves in zones that have seen the scourge
of war.  Landmines laid on principal transportation routes
or in border areas can inhibit, or even prevent, the flight
of refugees.  Those mines later impede voluntary
repatriation movements and prevent reintegration and
reconstruction.  When roads and other infrastructure have
been mined, refugees must wait until organized programs can
clear the return routes of mines.  Even after the routes
have been cleared, many refugees find their preferred
destination not habitable due to landmines.
Because of their  unfamiliarity with the locations of
minefields, when the repatriates finally do return home,
their risk of harm from landmine explosion is greater than
the risk to those who never left.  Those who stayed
throughout the conflict have developed a greater awareness
of the danger and the safety habits and survival skills that
offer some protection.  A study by the International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) of landmine casualties in
Afghanistan showed a significantly larger number of deaths
and injuries among returnees than among those who never fled
and a dramatic upsurge in the numbers as repatriation
gathered momentum.
Landmines lay waste to large areas of land that would
otherwise be used for agriculture, commercial development,
or social infrastructure, such as homes, hospitals, and
schools.  Thus, repatriation may mean return to the same
general area, but not reintegration in the same community.
Repatriates denied use of their land and unable to return
home may have no choice but to congregate in refugee camps
or overcrowded cities, where job opportunities are few and
acceptable housing is extremely scarce.  This general
atmosphere is not conducive to maintaining family ties and
cultural traditions.  In Cambodia, where millions of mines
were strewn throughout formerly inhabited areas, UN High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) concentrated its
repatriation program on material assistance to returnees to
cities, rather than the preferred program of land
allotments, which would have helped the repatriates attain
greater and faster economic security and societal stability.
Repatriates generally require material and protective
assistance from the United Nations and other agencies for 6
months to 1 year following their return.  These agencies
provide food, building materials, agricultural implements
and seeds, clothing, and household equipment, which are
crucial for reestablishing and reintegrating families.  When
landmines inhibit the travel of relief and assistance
organization personnel, delivery becomes much more time
consuming and significantly more expensive.  Landmines also
pose considerable danger to relief workers.  In November
1993, for example, a truck carrying seeds and tools for a UN
Children's Fund (UNICEF) project in a returnee area of
Mozambique struck a mine on a road that was considered safe,
resulting in the death of five passengers and surgical
amputations for two of the three survivors.
UNHCR supports the concept of a comprehensive approach to
landmine clearance based on a centralization of authority
within the UN system which would coordinate with countries,
regional organizations and nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs).  UNHCR has worked with UNOCHA (UN Organization for
the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance to Afghanistan),
UNAMIC (UN Advance Mission in Cambodia) and UNTAC (UN
Transitional Authority in Cambodia), and UNOHAC (UN Office
for Humanitarian Assistance Coordination) and UNOMOZ (UN
Operations in Mozambique) on programs specifically
benefiting refugees and returnees.  These programs provided
assistance as part of wider projects also benefiting the
general civilian population.
In a number of situations over the last few years where the
safe return of refugees was impeded or threatened by
landmines and no local or international authority was able
or willing to assist, UNHCR took steps to ensure a safe and
dignified return.  Refugees often decide to return
spontaneously and to choose the areas in which they will
resettle, requiring UNHCR and others to arrange much needed
programs of mine awareness training, mine clearance
training, and minefield surveys.
In addition to the training programs and surveys, which are
common to all international demining operations, programs
designed to aid refugees must address the challenges
associated with rehabilitating injuries sustained by a
mobile population.
Rehabilitation of mine victims begins with the provision of
artificial limbs to amputees and instruction in their use.
Rehabilitation should also include readjustment therapy and
training and a campaign to sensitize the community to the
needs of amputees.  While the ICRC and a number of NGOs
provide prostheses in many mine-plagued countries,
comprehensive therapy is generally unavailable.  Afghan
refugees in Pakistan, half of them war victims including
many landmine casualties, have benefited from a physical
rehabilitation and vocational training program funded by
With the return of refugees and displaced persons to homes,
fields, and paths that have been mined, there is usually an
upsurge in the number of landmine-caused deaths and
injuries.  Until fairly recently, medical records of
landmine victims, if they existed at all, did not reflect
the status of the injured person or the circumstances of the
incident.  ICRC and other organizations are now compiling
records so that they can better understand the correlation
between recent repatriation and an increased danger of
landmine injury.
U.S. Government funds to support demining activities in
countries with refugee problems are provided in part by the
State Department's Bureau of Population, Refugees, and
Migration (PRM).  The activities are generally short-term
projects with specific goals, for instance the clearing of a
road used in repatriation efforts.  In FY 1994, PRM provided
more than $1.5 million for mine awareness and demining
activities connected with refugee repatriation in Cambodia,
Afghanistan, Somalia, and Mozambique, mainly through UNHCR
and UN peacekeeping missions such as UNOCHA.
Mine awareness and demining programs are carried out in many
countries by numerous organizations ranging from the United
Nations and its specialized agencies, such as UNHCR, to
governments such as the United States, to NGOs and
contractors.  Some programs are well coordinated and
advanced (Afghanistan and Cambodia), while others are in
early stages, still attempting to create a workable,
comprehensive administrative structure (Mozambique).
Others, such as Angola and Somalia, remain mired in civil
conflict and, despite attempts to launch demining programs,
are unable to make much progress.
At the end of 1993, some 3.4 million Afghan refugees were
still living in Pakistan and Iran.  Approximately 1 million
had returned home from those countries during the previous
year.  The returnees, like the rest of the civilian
population in many areas of the country, faced the danger of
living among some 10 million landmines.  The UNOCHA demining
program set a demanding goal of clearing 16 square
kilometers of high-priority minefields in 1994, a goal the
program has nearly completed in just the first 8 months.  It
will also provide mine awareness information to 350,000
individuals, primarily returning and recently arrived
refugees.  Mine clearance operations in priority areas of a
number of provinces have already been completed, and many
returnees have chosen those areas as their destinations.
Criteria for deciding upon priority demining activities and
areas are set by UNOCHA with input from local authorities,
UNHCR (in regard to repatriation), and other UN agencies in
relation to their rehabilitation programs. Afghanistan and
UNOCHA face a herculean demining task that will take many
years and untold resources no matter how dedicated the
participants and how efficient the process.
More than 300,000 Angolan refugees remain in neighboring
countries, mostly in Zambia and Zaire.  A preliminary
landmine survey of Angola has been completed which will be
of some value when a successful peace accord is reached.
According to UN demining expert, Patrick Blagden, an Angolan
landmine survey was produced and would still be of some
value if and when the fighting ends.  The 9 million mines
estimated to cover the Angolan landscape will most certainly
provide an obstacle for returning refugees.  There has been
no systematic assessment of the extent of the landmine
problem and no serious attempt to coordinate eradication in
an organized fashion.  It is unlikely that any demining
assistance will be effective until the civil war comes to a
definite end.
Virtually all of Cambodia's refugees in Thailand (over
370,000) returned home during 1993, after the U.S. Office of
Foreign Distaster Assistance funded demining of 100
kilometers of roads.  Many who returned quickly became
displaced, since agriculture and other normal activities are
severely hampered or precluded by the profusion of landmines
in the northwest provinces.  UNHCR was forced to
dramatically reduce its proposed program of securing land
for returnees due to the scarcity of available terrain
unhindered by the 7-9 million mines.  Mine awareness
training is provided to threatened civilians by the
Cambodian Mine Action Center (CMAC) and NGOs involved in
mine clearance operations. CMAC's demining suffered a minor
setback in April 1994 when operations were interrupted for
several weeks by resumed fighting.
Some 800,000 of the 1.6 million Mozambican refugees in
neighboring countries have returned home to a country with
an estimated 1 million landmines posing a threat to the
population.  More than half the roads in Mozambique were
mined during the conflict, and the slow pace of demining has
inhibited repatriation.  While individual refugees do not
seem to allow fear of landmines to prevent them from going
home, the inability to use many roads constrains organized
repatriations and delivery of food to returnees by relief
organizations.  UNOHAC, the coordinator of demining
activities, has identified 28 priority roads and 16
"bottlenecks" for demining projects.  The State Department's
Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration, as part of
its 1994 contribution to Mozambican repatriation, designated
$500,000 to be used for mine-related activities,  including
mine awareness training.
Over 400,000 Somali refugees remain in neighboring countries
such as Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Yemen.  However,
during the past year more than 60,000 Somalis repatriated,
mostly spontaneously, to Somalia.  These Somalis returned
after judging that local conditions will meet their needs
for security.  There is no evidence available that suggests
that the Somalis gave much consideration to the estimated 1-
2 million landmines littering the country in deciding to
return.  Nor have there been reports of significant mine-
related casualties among returnees, despite the limited
amount of demining completed in the southern regions.  In
Northwest Somalia, where the demining program managed by the
British contractor, Rimfire, has been halted by labor and
political problems, the number of mine-related accidents has
decreased over the past few years.  Previous demining, mine
awareness education, and even word-of-mouth allowed
civilians to understand which areas to avoid.  The United
Nations has drafted a preliminary plan for demining Somalia
after a political settlement and some measure of stability
have been achieved.
     The Effects of Landmines on Peacekeeping Operations
Many of the world's implanted landmines are in UN
operational areas, hampering peacekeeping and humanitarian
activities.  UN peacekeeping troops are coping with
landmines in many countries, including Angola, Liberia,
Mozambique, Rwanda, and Somalia.  UN forces generally
conduct their own demining operations, rather than relying
upon local militaries.  UN regulations prevent provision of
training directly to military or paramilitary personnel.
Where nonmilitary organizations are present, the United
Nations can involve them in the demining operations.
Demining as part of peacekeeping provides resources for
planning and training in demining programs, facilitates the
achievement of demining priorities in connection with the
peacekeeping mandate, and ensures continuity of the demining
program once the peacekeeping operation has completed its
In countries plagued by war and civil conflict, large-scale
demining operations must await the cessation of hostilities,
despite the urgent need for humanitarian and peacekeeping
assistance.  Rwanda is the primary example, where the civil
war forced a delay in commencing demining operations.
It is also important to note that the United Nations defines
demining as a humanitarian program.  Thus, UN-initiated
demining efforts continue, even in countries where
peacekeeping operations are no longer in effect, as in
Afghanistan and Cambodia.
The United Nations has acknowledged the importance of rapid
post-conflict demining to facilitate other humanitarian
operations.  The UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs is
striving to include demining as a standard element of all
future peacekeeping mandates.
     The Effects of Landmines on Economic Development
The proliferation of long-lived landmines (i.e., those that
do not self-destruct or self-deactivate) in the developing
world is a growing obstacle to economic growth and political
stability.  These mines do not become less deadly when the
guns fall silent.  They inflict injuries, claim lives, and
sow bitterness.  They imprison a nation and its people; they
limit every option.
Landmines prevent farmers from tilling arable land,
undermining food security and creating famine.  Mined
farmlands also deprive agrarian economies of nonfood
products for internal use and food and nonfood produce for
export.  Mines impede the repair and maintenance of
irrigation systems and watercourses, which are critical to
agricultural productivity and food production.
Landmines undermine the national infrastructure.  They
isolate power lines, bridges, water plants, transportation
systems, roads, rail networks, and waterways from efforts at
reconstruction, maintenance, and repair.  This damage to the
national infrastructure has a multiplier impact on national
development.  In Mozambique, for example, the United Nations
reports that all 28 major road systems in the country are
blocked by uncleared landmines.  When roads are impassable,
goods and services cannot be transported easily by land
within the country.  Workers cannot move from one part of
the country to the other, and economic development is
further impeded.  The breakdown in transit disrupts internal
markets, leaving domestic suppliers with the choice of
either exporting or ceasing operations.
Landmines put heavy inflationary pressure on local
currencies.  As product availability dwindles due to the
breakdown of transportation abilities, prices skyrocket.
Local businesspersons then raise their prices and workers
demand wage increases.  Even in an otherwise healthy
economy, landmines can artificially limit supplies of
critical products, producing an inflationary spiral that is
politically destabilizing.
The health care costs associated with large numbers of
landmine victims are far greater than developing countries
can handle.  Landmine injuries cause tremendous trauma, and
the costs of emergency care for victims are extremely high.
The wounds caused by landmines require extensive medical
treatment for extended periods of time.  There are also
expensive follow-on costs: nursing, drugs, and physical
therapy, as well as the need for prosthetic devices and
rehabilitation training.  Victim recovery time, prosthetic
devices, lost productivity, social support for the spouses,
childrenAand parentsAof victims, all are tremendous economic
and social burdens.
For countries where medical facilities, equipment, and
supplies are limited, mine injury cases can simply overwhelm
the health care system.  The International Committee of the
Red Cross reports that following the return of 1 million
refugees to Afghanistan in the first 6 months of 1992, the
number of mine victims in ICRC hospitals increased
threefold.  In 1991, ICRC orthopedic workshops in 14
countries made limbs for 7,876 amputees and produced 11,116
orthopedic appliances for mine-injured amputees.
In 1992, relief organizations working on the Cambodian
border with Thailand delivered 1,000 artificial limbs.  In
Croatia, the United Nations reports an estimated 48 people
are maimed by landmines each week, and 24 are killed.  Few
developing countries have health care systems sufficiently
developed to handle the massive increase in severe trauma
cases caused by landmines.  Many victims, who might
otherwise live, die because the facilities to save them
simply do not exist.
The sheer cost of removing mines is often a massive obstacle
to economic growth.  The most commonly cited example of an
economy burdened by landmines is Cambodia.  The Cambodian
Mine Action Center estimates that from 7-9 million landmines
are scattered throughout Cambodia, a number roughly
equivalent to the national population.  The United Nations
estimates that the aggregate cost for mine clearance is from
$200 to $1,000 per mine, and Cambodia's annual per capita
GDP is only $200.  Thus, to completely demine Cambodia
(assuming no international assistance and no economic
growth) would require every Cambodian to devote to demining
every penny produced in the economy for the next 1-5 years.
While this is unimaginable, it highlights the fact that
landmines have cost Cambodia nearly a decade of economic
development.  The arithmetic is similar for other less
developed countries that are trying to emerge from conflict.
The U.S. Government attaches special importance to the needs
of nations that are attempting to make the transition from
civil conflict to sustainable development.  The United
States recognizes that these nations have needs that are not
addressed by short-term humanitarian and food assistance,
peacekeeping programs, nor long-term development projects.
These nations are inherently fragile; having achieved a
cessation of fighting, they often are positioned for renewed
growth and political consolidation.  But having just emerged
from conflict, they are also prone to return to war and
national and societal collapse.
The United States believes that the political and economic
costs of supporting a successful transition are lower than
the costs of dealing with a wider conflict.  Yet landmines
make it more difficult for nations to make the transition
from conflict to growth.
Civil conflicts create huge numbers of refugees and
displaced people.  Landmines prevent them from returning
home and from earning a living once they return.  In this
situation, the government faces a choice: it can divert
resources needed for reconstruction to feed and house these
people, or it can neglect their needs and risk the political
and social consequences.
Reconstruction and reunification require governments to
extend their presence and their services to war-torn areas.
But landmines make it difficult for any officials to
operate.  Minefields impede the delivery of government
services and act as physical obstacles to unity,
reconstruction, and reconciliation.
By impeding mobility, landmines undermine the work of people
who are critical to reconstruction and whose mobility is
critical to their success: teachers, technicians, extension
agents, doctors and health care workers, as well as
representatives of foreign and domestic private voluntary
organizations  and nongovernmental organizations.
The constant toll from landmines has a powerful and
deleterious effect on an already traumatized society.  This
is particularly true because so many of the victims are
children and women in the fields.  Nations and societies may
require decades to recover from the irresponsible use of
these weapons.
CHAPTER THREE:  Regional Analyses
     Demining Regional Analysis:  AFRICA
The following countries reported no problems with uncleared
landmines:  Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi,
Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Comoros, The
Congo, C"te d'Ivoire,  Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon,
The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar,
Malawi, Mali, Mauritius, Niger, Nigeria, Sao Tome and
Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland,
Tanzania, Togo, Zaire, and Zambia.
Landmines have been laid in the past by Portugal, South
Africa, Cuba, Angolan Government forces, and the insurgency
group UNITA throughout the nearly 20-year civil war.
Estimates of the number of landmines in Angola range from 9
to 20 million.
The recent escalation of fighting in Angola has led to more
landmines being emplaced.  According to one estimate, the
combination of fighting and minefields reduced the 1993 food
harvest by nearly 30 percent.  The group Doctors Without
Borders estimates that 70,000 Angolans have required
amputations due to mine blasts, and another estimate
indicates that there are between 150 and 200 landmine
victims every week.  Unfortunately, continued civil strife
has put an end to initial demining efforts, and further
demining will be futile until a peace settlement is reached.
In February 1994 the United Nations issued an appeal for
$326,000 to create a mine clearance center to coordinate
future demining activities.  The money will also fund
personnel and equipment to conduct a nationwide minefield
Chad faces a serious landmine problem, complicated by the
fact that no records are kept of mine numbers or mine
victims.  Landmines are generally located in the desert and
mountain areas of the north and along the border with Niger.
During the occupation of the Aozou strip in the 1980s, Libya
deployed mines covering 45,000 square miles (one-tenth of
Chad's total area).  Many more landmines were implanted as a
result of internal conflicts near the Sudanese and Nigerien
Landmines restrict travel in many parts of the country and
affect the potential for developing Chad's tourism,
industry, housebuilding, and farming.  Chadian military
engineers are ill-equipped to perform demining operations,
and the minefields remain uncleared.  The French military is
currently providing training to a platoon of Chadian
military engineers.  The French goal is to train an entire
company of Chadian engineers in order for them to demine
their own country.
Over 1 million mines, of an estimated 2 million originally
emplaced, have been cleared in Eritrea since 1977.  However,
due to inadequate techniques and poor equipment, an
estimated 150,000 landmines remain in areas previously
cleared by Eritrean forces.  Furthermore, large areas of the
country, much of it underpopulated, have not yet been
surveyed for mines.
Eritrean clearing teams have suffered hundreds of casualties
during demining operations.  An estimated 2,000 civilians
have died as a result of landmine explosions since the end
of the war in 1991, primarily because of inadequate medical
facilities in rural areas.  Mines are found in rural
farmlands, near water sources, and along borders, primarily
in areas surrounding former battle zones.  The mines were
laid by all major factions during the 30-year civil war,
particularly in the period from 1975 to 1991.
As part of the reorganization of the military, the
government has begun to designate units for demining
operations, and with U.S.-provided training and equipment,
expects to begin large-scale operations early in 1995.
An estimated 500,000 landmines, and even more pieces of
unexploded ordnance (UXO), remain from the civil war in
Ethiopia, causing between five and ten casualties per week.
The government has begun to organize the military for
demining operations, and with U.S.-provided training and
equipment expects to begin large-scale operations early in
A slight problem with uncleared landmines exists in Guinea-
Bissau, from the struggle for independence from Portugal
(1959-73).  Although there have been relatively few
incidents (five in the last 3 years), landmines still are a
problem, as they prevent the local population from using all
of their land for agriculture and herding.
Demining operations in the late 1970s removed most of the
mines, which were Russian and Portuguese in origin.  The
Portuguese left maps of the minefields, but the local
populations were illiterate.  Many of those old enough to
remember the locations of the mines have since died.
Liberia has been divided because of a brutal 5-year civil
war.  The war has resulted in a widespread mine problem of
approximately 1,000 A/T mines.  These mines killed 20 people
in 1993, more than half of them civilians.
Mauritanian soldiers and civilians are occasionally killed
or injured by mines remaining from the war in the Western
Sahara.  Travel in these regions is considered risky, and
vehicles generally stick to well-worn paths.  These mines
are of Spanish, French, Russian, and German manufacture.
Two decades of war have left Mozambique littered with more
than 1 million uncleared landmines laid by several different
factionsARENAMO, FRELIMO, the Portuguese, and the
Rhodesians.  Landmines are a severe problem as they inhibit
refugee resettlement and economic rebuilding.  (See case
study in Chapter 7.)
Namibia has suffered not only from its own internal struggle
for independence, but from the spillover effect of the
conflict in neighboring Angola.  A public education campaign
regarding the hazards of landmines has begun to improve the
overall situation in Namibia.  According to a Halo Trust
Report, 88 percent of post-1980 landmine casualties were
Nearly 50,000 A/P and A/T landmines were implanted over the
course of the Rwandan civil war.  Both sides
indiscriminately used landmines to restrict troop mobility
and to protect military defensive positions.
Many known minefields stretch along the border with Uganda.
The heaviest concentration of known landmines is in the
northeastern portion of the country, in the rural farmlands
and tea plantations north of Kigali.  The Red Cross has
reported that minefields in the north alone have caused 40
severe injuries and one death since 1993.
The latest round of fighting, which resulted in the
overthrow of the Hutu government, left additional landmines
and UXO in combat zones, including the capital, Kigali.
Between two and four mine casualties are reported daily in
Sierra Leone
Rebel forces in the East and South have employed landmines
along roads, which resulted in three to four mine incidents
per month in 1993.  Of the 37 landmine-related deaths in
1993, three were civilians.  Mines are discouraging relief
operations in certain areas.  As government forces restore
control over the country and economy, the resulting increase
in traffic could lead to more vehicles and personnel being
The anarchy in Somalia for the past several years has
resulted in the deployment of many landmines, in addition to
those laid during numerous conflicts since the 1960s.
Uncleared landmines present a severe hazard not only to the
military combatants, but also to farmers, pastoralists, and
urban dwellers.
Most of the mines were laid by the former Somali Armed
Forces along the border with Ethiopia.  Since the collapse
of the national government, mines have been laid by warring
factions to vector opposing forces away from grazing areas
and villages.  Mines are also found around military bases,
schools, towns, and even individual homes (a deadly burglar
Demining has been conducted in the Northwest by Rimfire and
by Doctors Without Borders, in conjunction with UNHCR.
Despite the efforts of Rimfire, UNHCR, and UNOSOM, Somalia
remains heavily mined.  Although no reliable figures on mine
casualties are available, the problem is considered
extremely severe.  The border with Djibouti alone is
littered with 76-96 minefields.
There is an extremely severe problem in Sudan with landmines
due to the ongoing civil war between the Sudanese Government
and the two factions of the Sudanese People's Liberation
Army (SPLA).  Approximately 1 million landmines were laid in
Sudan by early 1993 and the deteriorating situation there
has likely resulted in more mines.
Mines were laid by the Government forces around garrison
towns in southern Sudan to protect access routes.  In
retaliation, the SPLA has deployed rings of mines around the
towns to forestall missions by the governmental garrisons.
Landmine incidents are routine in the civilian and refugee
populations.  International demining assistance is needed in
Sudan but is not feasible until a peace settlement is
Local press reports in Uganda indicated the first known use
of landmines occurred in August 1994.  A mine planted by the
insurgent force destroyed a truck carrying humanitarian
relief workers, killing four and wounding others.
The war of national liberation (1965-79) left a legacy of
uncleared landmines scattered mainly around the country's
north and east borders.  To a lesser extent, the civil war
in adjacent Mozambique has added to the landmine problem.
The mines are European, South African, and Soviet, as well
as some local models.  The mined areas were uninhabited
during the conflict, but increasing population pressure has
resulted in unauthorized resettlement in these regions.
The Zimbabwe National Army Engineers performed demining
operations using bulldozers supplied by the U.S. Government
until recently.  The military has been forced to cease
demining operations due to a lack of funds.
     Demining Regional Analysis:  ASIA
The following countries reported no problems with uncleared
landmines:  Australia, Bangladesh, Brunei, Fiji, India,
Indonesia, Japan, Kiribati, Malaysia, Marshall Islands,
Micronesia, Nauru, Nepal, New Zealand, Pakistan, Papua New
Guinea, Philippines, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Taiwan,
Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, and Western Samoa.
Afghanistan remains one of the most heavily mined countries
in the world, with at least 10 million mines still
uncleared.  Mines are found in all areas of the country, in
urban and rural areas, near water wells and irrigation
canals, on roads, around mountain strong-holds, and in
agricultural lands.  Between 3.5 and 4 million Afghan
refugees in Pakistan and Iran wait to go home, but the
danger of landmines contributes to their inability to
return.  (See case study in Chapter 7.)
Both government and insurgent forces have used landmines
extensively to disrupt the major lines of communication
between the battle zones in Kachin, Karen, Mon, and
Tenasserim, causing a moderate problem with uncleared mines.
The primary mine used is similar to the U.S. M-18 Claymore.
Over 1,500 people per year are fitted for artificial limbs
as a result of landmine explosions.  Many more never receive
medical attention.
There are between 7 and 9 million landmines in Cambodia,
where one of every 236 people is an amputee because of mine
blasts.  However, the Cambodian Mine Action Center is one of
the most successful demining programs in the world.  (See
case study in Chapter 7.)
China has used landmines to block access to military and
strategic targets along its borders with India, Russia, and,
especially, Vietnam.  However, the danger of these mines is
minimal due to the sparsely populated, mountainous terrain.
China is currently clearing mines in the provinces along its
common border with Vietnam.  The effects of the use of as
many as 10 million mines along the Soviet and Vietnamese
borders will eventually be felt as economic growth
necessitates the use of the extensively mined areas.
There is a serious problem in Laos with unexploded ordnance
(UXO) and landmines remaining from the Vietnam War.  A
limited effort to clear these explosives is underway in two
provinces, but the ordnance is scattered randomly throughout
the country, not limited to easily identifiable fields.  The
problem will require larger and more systematic operations
to make significant progress.  To further complicate
demining, many of the mines are equipped with anti-handling
Most landmine incidents today involve farmers plowing their
fields and children playing with the mines they find.  Many
tracts of fertile farmland are deserted when a single mine
is found.
A slight problem with landmines in Mongolia exists in the
east and northeastern areas of the country.  These regions
were heavily mined by the Japanese during World War II, and
many of the mines remain active.  Although the majority of
mine blasts kill livestock, there are occasional human
fatalities.  In the area where these incidents occur, few
adequate medical facilities are available.
Republic of Korea
Korea has had very few landmine casualties, despite the 2.4
mile demilitarized zone (DMZ) separating North and South
Korea.  The DMZ is littered with thousands of landmines, but
is clearly marked, and its boundaries are well known.
Sri Lanka
Both government forces and separatists have used mines
during the decade-long insurgency, primarily in the northern
and eastern regions.  The separatists mine specific routes
used by government forces, and usually warn the local
population, thereby lowering civilian casualties.  The
separatists use pressure mines captured from the army, as
well as their own improvised version, known as a Johnny-
Landmines, both antitank and antipersonnel, remain a serious
problem along parts of the Thai border with Cambodia,
plaguing villagers and refugees.  Although the landmine
problem has been identified and recognized in recent years,
neither the Thai Government nor any international
organization has been able to undertake large-scale
clearance efforts.  While the number of uncleared mines in
Thai territory is impossible to estimate, innocent civilians
continue to be affected.
     Demining Regional Analysis:  THE MIDDLE EAST
The following countries reported no problems with uncleared
landmines:  Algeria, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia,
Tunisia, United Arab Emirates.
Uncleared landmines represent a moderate problem in Egypt.
Large numbers of uncleared mines are scattered throughout
the country, largely in thinly populated areas.  Landmines
remaining from the Second World War, particularly in the
area of El Alamein battlefield, are a notable problem.
Uncleared minefields throughout the Sinai Peninsula resulted
from wars with Israel.  Frequent civilian casualties occur
in remote areas, where medical care is inadequate.
Iraq's severe landmine problem results from the Gulf War,
the Iran/Iraq War, and two decades of internal conflict.
Mines Advisory Group, a demining nongovernmental
organization active in Iraq, estimates at least 4 million
landmines are laid in northern Iraq, most of which date from
the war with Iran.  Italian, Chinese, Soviet and Eastern
European, and local mines are found along borders, in or
near water sources, and in rural farmlands.
Landmines have prevented the return of refugees and
displaced persons, particularly to the area bordering Iran.
In the area near Penjwin, the most seriously affected by
landmines, a hospital employs local doctors who have
developed expertise in dealing with mine injuries, but
support personnel and medical supplies are still lacking.
A moderate problem with uncleared landmines in Israel
involves minefields laid during the 1967 Six- Day War.
Landmines inhibit agricultural activity, limit potential
urban growth, and have restricted hiking and touring in the
Golan Heights and the Jordan Valley.  Landmine incidents are
not common; most mines are marked and fenced.  Some injuries
involve accidental entry into a marked minefield or mines
washed out of marked minefields in floods.
A slight problem in Jordan with uncleared landmines results
in an average of five to ten landmine accidents annually.
Mines are restricted to military-controlled areas along
borders with Israel and Syria; however, sporadic floods have
washed mines downstream.  Shepherds, farmers, hunters, and
military personnel suffer the brunt of mine casualties.  The
poor maintenance of warning signs and barbed-wire fences,
and the lack of information on the precise location of each
mine cause most of these accidents.
Three years after liberation, landmines still pose a serious
problem in Kuwait.  Although all of the 728 square
kilometers of minefields have undergone initial clearance,
many have not passed quality assurance inspections and are
being re-cleared.
Uncleared minefields are scattered throughout the country,
but are concentrated in the south in sandy desert terrain.
Mines crisscross oilfields and roads, and also run parallel
to power lines.  Landmines are responsible for the majority
of the people killed and injured in Kuwait since the Gulf
War.  Over 1.6 million mines have been cleared since the
Gulf War.
Demining in Kuwait has been successful, albeit expensive.
The Kuwaiti Government has paid the equivalent of $700
million to demine the country.  Eighty-four explosive
ordnance disposal personnel have been killed during demining
operations in Kuwait, most from unexploded ordnance rather
than landmines.
Many fighting forces have battled in Lebanese territory,
resulting in approximately 20,000 landmines spread in 182
unmapped minefields covering both urban and rural areas.
Seven mine incidents in 1993 killed four people and injured
five.  Two incidents in 1992 killed one person and injured
another.  Lebanese demining relies upon the use of probes, a
method which is complicated by the rocky terrain.
While concrete information from Libya is limited, it is
likely that there is a moderate landmine problem on the
southern border with Chad, as well as mines remaining from
World War II.
Morocco has a serious landmine problem in its southern
region and the Western Sahara, resulting from a continuing
dispute between the Government of Morocco and the Polisario
Front.  The government cannot determine the exact location
of the mines due to the shifting sands.
Defensive minefields in Syria, many established over 20
years ago, were set up in grazing areas adjacent to the UN
buffer zone.  Randomly patterned, unmapped minefields cover
large areas of the Golan Heights, currently divided between
Israel, Syria, and a UN buffer zone.  Once a peace
settlement is reached, demining will be a high priority.
According to the Tunisian military, 200-300 landmines of
World War II vintage are cleared annually.  These landmines
are generally found by local residents, who are also often
injured by detonations.  The principal concentrations are in
west central Tunisia.  Landmines are generally found on
cultivated land near villages and along roads, tracks, or
Yemen is troubled by large numbers of landmines.  Due to the
outbreak of the conflict in spring 1994, it is likely that
the landmine situation has been exacerbated.  Government
minefield maps indicate there are 23,000 mines in Arrak
Province alone.
The most common mines found in Yemen are Egyptian and
British A/T mines.  Mines have been laid around urban areas,
along roads in the northwest of the country, and in the
desert sands.  Mines in the sand pose a particular
difficulty, as the shifting sands constantly change their
location.  The local Bedouin avoid the area entirely.
The United Nations issued an emergency appeal for
humanitarian assistance to Yemen in August  1994.  The
appeal requested $150,000 to initiate a landmine survey and
     Demining Regional Analysis:  THE AMERICAS
The following countries reported no problems with uncleared
landmines:  Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Bahamas, Belize,
Bermuda, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Dominique,
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, French Caribbean, Grenada,
Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, St. Kitts
and Nevis, St. Lucia, St.Vincent and the Grenadines,
Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, and Venezuela.
The impact of landmines on local populations is moderate in
Colombia.  Homemade plastic mines are used by insurgency
groups to harass government forces and intimidate local
populations.  Daily mine incidents in Colombia are
exacerbated by a lack of convenient medical facilities,
often resulting in the deaths of victims who might otherwise
have survived.
Costa Rica
The presence of landmines in Costa Rica is a moderate
problem, with estimates of between 1,000 and 2,000 mines
distributed in isolated areas along the frontier with
Nicaragua.  Nicaragua's Sandinista army used 1970s Czech
bounding mines, which are now the most commonly found
landmine in Costa Rica.  These mined areas, however, are
generally underdeveloped with few inhabitants.
In October 1994, Costa Rican security personnel reported to
Honduras for demining instruction from U.S. military
experts, as part of an OAS/IADB regional demining program.
The newly trained personnel will return to Costa Rica to
begin demining instruction and operations in December 1994.
Cuban and U.S. forces have implanted landmines in the
vicinity of the U.S. Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay.  These
mines are contained in fenced and marked defensive
minefields.  Flooding in the region has caused movement of
some of the mines.
El Salvador
The Government of El Salvador hired a Belgian private
contractor to conduct demining operations, which were
declared successfully completed in January  1994.  The
country still faces a serious problem with unexploded
ordnance (UXO), and has requested U.S. support to continue
UXO clearance operations.
The Falkland/Malvinas Islands (administered by UK, claimed
by Argentina)
An uncleared landmine problem exists in the Falkland/
Malvinas Islands.  Mines were implanted by Argentine forces
during the war with the United Kingdom,  which ended in
1982.  There are 117 identified minefields, with a total of
25-30,000 landmines.
Due to the environment, the exact locations of the mines on
the Islands are unknown.  Eighty percent of the mines are
laid in peat and beach sand, both of which are subject to
movement.  Mines laid in 1982 probably have moved a
considerable distance and may no longer be in a horizontal
position.  Thus, the danger in demining and probing efforts
has been exacerbated.
There is a moderate problem in Guatemala with uncleared
landmines and UXO, as well as a moderate problem with the
continued use of mines in areas of conflict.  Both
government forces and guerrillas use command-detonated
mines.  Mines are used most frequently in the conflict zone
of Ixcan municipality in Quiche Province.  Both sides'
tactical use of mines involves retrieving deployed mines for
reuse, so the civilians do not consider mines a significant
There is a severe problem with uncleared landmines along the
borders with Nicaragua and El Salvador.  Although the mined
areas are not densely populated, civilians are occasionally
injured by landmine explosions.  In October 1994  Honduran
security personnel began training with U.S. military
experts, as part of an OAS/IADB regional demining program.
Mexico does not have a widespread problem with uncleared
landmines.  There is a slight, but growing, problem in
isolated areas in Chiapas where rebels have laid mines as a
result of the January 1994 uprising  and in the Sinaloa-
Sonora-Chihuahua triangle where drug traffickers use mines
and boobytraps to protect drug crops.  Incidents occur about
once a month, principally in conjunction with drug crop
eradication efforts.
After the civil war, Nicaragua was littered with roughly
132,000 mines.  The Organization of American States and the
Inter-American Defense Board launched a currently stalled
demining program in 1993, which enjoyed qualified success.
The Nicaraguan Army assumed full control of the program in
December 1993.  (See case study in Chapter 7.)
     Demining Regional Analysis:  EUROPE
The following countries reported no problems with uncleared
landmines:  Albania, Belarus, Bulgaria, Czech Republic,
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Hungary, Iceland,
Ireland, Italy, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Luxembourg, Malta,
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia,
Serbia-Montenegro, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Sweden,
Switzerland, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, United Kingdom, and
As a result of ongoing conflict in the region, there are
large numbers of mines in Armenia, particularly in border
regions.  Mines cause between five and ten casualties per
The problem with uncleared World War II-era landmines and
unexploded ordnance (UXO) in Austria is minimal, accounting
for only four to five cases per year.  The police and army
engineers conduct all explosive ordnance disposal
operations.  The latest incident occurred in May 1994 when a
WW II American bomb was found in a family garden about 10
feet from the house.
As a result of ongoing conflict in the region, there are
large numbers of mines in Azerbaijan, particularly in border
areas and in the Nagorno-Karabakh region.  Mines cause
between five and ten casualties per year.
In Brussels, farmers and construction workers continue to
unearth unexploded munitions from the two World Wars; the
vast majority of these munitions, however, are aerial or
artillery ordnance.  Uncleared mines have no impact on the
local population, perhaps due to Belgium's excellent mine
removal and destruction capabilities.  Demining teams were
part of the former Belgian peacekeeping contingent in
Somalia, and remain active with the Belgian battalion in
The conflict in Bosnia has resulted in a serious landmine
problem.  UN Protection Forces (UNPROFOR) troops have noted
concentrations of mines near the border with Serbia, on
roads, and on mountain trails.  They are used both to hamper
military resupply efforts and to strengthen control over
contested territory.  Mines are used by all three warring
parties in Bosnia.
Croatia has a serious problem with uncleared landmines
employed during the war.  Mine clearance efforts by the
Republic of Croatia and the UN forces have met with only
limited success.  The government estimates that nearly one-
third of the country is plagued by as many as 1 million
landmines.  Most mines are located in the areas in front of
fortified positions, at probable river crossing sites, and
along major avenues of movement.
The cease-fire agreement signed in Zagreb called for the
removal of mines in the separation zone.  Both sides are
removing mines under the supervision of UNPROFOR.
Because of the large numbers of mines and unexploded
munitions in Croatia, the frequency of accidents is high.
As refugees are permitted to return, the numbers of
incidents will increase.  In 1993, there were 42 deaths and
195 people seriously wounded by mines.
Despite 100 confirmed minefields, and other mined areas
likely, landmine incidents remain minimal on Cyprus.  The
majority of minefields are located within the buffer zone
separating Greek Cypriot and Turkish forces or immediately
adjacent to the cease-fire lines, remote from populated
areas.  Both Turkish and Greek Cypriot forces consider
minefields under military control as integral parts of their
In spring 1994 the German Government was forced to close 150
miles of the former intra-German border when mines were
discovered.  Hiking and other recreational uses were
forbidden while mine clearance operations were undertaken,
which should be completed by the end of 1994.  An average of
five to six mines per kilometer have been found.  Since
October 1990, a total of 670 mines have been discovered and
In Greece, a minimal problem remains in the Pindos mountain
range on the northern frontier with a few uncleared and
unmarked landmines left over from the civil war period.
Firefighting efforts in this wooded region are carried out
from the air for fear of unmarked landmines.  Although this
border is clearly marked as a mined area, occasionally
shepherds or refugees have been known to enter unlawfully.
In October 1992, two Romanian refugees were critically
wounded by a landmine while trying to enter Greece illegally
from the Turkish border.
Landmines and UXO from World War II pose a slight threat in
Latvia, but a larger danger is hazardous munitions storage
facilities and testing ranges left by departing Russian
forces.  The ranges likely contain hundreds of unexploded
bombs, mines, and artillery shells and will require
extensive clearing prior to use for other purposes.  Latvian
capabilities for clearing landmines remain rudimentary,
although a Latvian Explosive Ordnance Disposal unit has now
been established.
Lithuanian explosive ordnance disposal teams are dispatched
at least once a day to clear German and Soviet mines and UXO
remaining from World War II, but funding is limited.
A moderate landmine problem developed in the Trans-Dniester
region of Moldova during the separatist fighting in 1992.
Mines infest an area estimated at 200 hectares, killing four
and wounding over 50 in the last year.
A tripartite control commission, consisting of Russia,
Moldova, and the Trans-Dniester, have begun to demine the
conflict zone, and clearance efforts have met with some
success.  Efforts have been hampered by the mud slides and
erosion along the river banks, which have shifted the
position of many mines.  The commission hopes clearance
operations will be completed by the end of 1994.
Republic of Georgia
A serious problem with uncleared mines may exist on the de
facto border between Georgia and the Abkhaz region
controlled by the separatists.  The number of persons killed
by mines is unknown, but there are occasional press reports
of incidents resulting in death or injury.  Reliable sources
indicate that Abkhaz forces continue to mine selected border
areas in order to prevent the wholesale return of ethnic
Georgian refugees who were driven from their homes in
Abkhazia during the fighting late in 1993.  Medical
facilities in mined regions are limited, and the government
has little capability to address its landmine problem.
While Tajikistan's 1992-93 civil war did not involve
significant landmine usage, the Collective Peacekeeping
Force's border guards are now laying mines to prevent cross-
border infiltration by the Afghanistan-based opposition.
The opposition is also reportedly mining transport routes.
Iraq laid significant numbers of mines along the ill-defined
common border with Turkey between 1988 and 1991, many on the
Turkish side.  Turkey also uses mines as a defensive measure
along its borders with Iraq and Syria.  Mines are reportedly
laid along main infiltration routes used by the Kurdistan
Worker's Party (PKK).  The PKK also uses mines on
transportation routes in eastern Turkey.
These mines claim occasional victims among the smugglers,
shepherds, and others living and working near the border.
In 1993 two buses struck PKK-placed mines in eastern Turkey,
killing 10 people and injuring dozens.  Mine injuries are
often untreated because of inadequate medical care in the
remote mined areas.
CHAPTER FOUR:    Landmine Control
     Landmine Control
The United States is pursuing a multifaceted effort aimed at
preventing the continuation and spread of the human and
economic tragedy caused by the presence of uncleared
landmines.  First, the U.S. is leading the effort to
strengthen the existing international laws regulating the
use of antipersonnel (A/P) landmines in times of armed
conflict.  Second, in an effort to slow the proliferation of
A/P mines until a more permanent international control
mechanism can be negotiated and implemented, the United
States has imposed a unilateral moratorium on the export of
these weapons and is encouraging other countries to do the
same.  Finally, in his speech at the United Nations on
September 26, 1994, President Clinton announced the U.S.
proposal for a multilateral control regime to govern A/P
Convention on Conventional Weapons
Landmines are an established weapon of war long used by many
belligerents in ways that minimize the threat to civilian
life.  The landmine problem arises largely from the
willingness of some warring parties to ignore these
established practices and deliberately use landmines in
irresponsible or cruel ways.  The international community
must respond by tightening and vigorously enforcing the
existing legal requirements and constraints.  The legal
vehicle for codifying these rules is the 1980 Convention on
Conventional Weapons (CCW) and its Protocol II on the use of
The United States is a signatory to the CCW, but is not yet
a party.  In May 1994 President Clinton submitted the CCW to
the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification, which
will help the United States take the lead in pressing for
improvements to Protocol II.  In order for the United States
to participate as more than an observer in the September
1995 conference to review and update the convention, the
United States must formally submit the instruments of
ratification to the United Nations by March 1995.
The United States is helping to lead efforts to improve the
landmines Protocol in a series of international experts
meetings that will culminate in a review conference of the
CCW in September 1995.  Among the improvements the United
States is seeking are:  an extension of the scope of
Protocol II to cover armed internal conflict; a system of
stricter use controls that would prohibit the use of A/P
mines which do not incorporate self-destruct devices, unless
they are placed in a marked and monitored area; the
establishment of the principle that the party that lays a
minefield is responsible for maintaining the minefield in
accordance with CCW rules until the minefield is cleared or
turned over to a party who accepts responsibility for the
minefield; a ban on the use of undetectable mines; a
requirement for marking minefields; and the establishment of
a practical verification system for the CCW.
Such changes would be broad and far-reaching.  Extending the
rules of the landmines Protocol to cover civil wars has
enormous significance.  Indeed, most conflicts since 1980
have not been subject to the landmines Protocol  because the
conflicts have been internal, usually in the developing
world.  An absolute ban on nondetectable mines would be of
tremendous benefit to mine-clearing operations.  Improving
minefield marking and recording and providing for more
rigorous verification both amount to real and substantial
improvements.  Finally, an effective ban on remotely
deployed mines that are not self-destructing would reduce
post-combat civilian mine casualties.
The United States is also promoting wider adherence to the
CCW.  With only 41 parties, even the most far-reaching
changes will have limited real-world impact.  The United
States is actively encouraging more states, particularly the
worst offenders, to become party to the CCW.  The CCW is
discussed more fully in Chapter 8: Current Mine Warfare.
Export Moratorium
In late 1992 the United States imposed a unilateral, 1-year
moratorium on the transfer of A/P landmines to other
countries.  In 1993, it was extended for another 3 years
(now to expire in 1996).  Also, in December 1993, the United
States proposed to the UN General Assembly (UNGA)  a
resolution calling for all countries to adopt a moratorium
on the export of A/P mines that pose a grave risk to
civilians.  UNGA adopted that resolution unanimously.  Since
its adoption, the United States has repeatedly urged other
countries, especially those which produce landmines, to
adopt such a moratorium.  A number of countries have done
so, while others have imposed export controls equivalent to
a moratorium.  The United States continues to ask all
nations that produce or export landmines to declare their
own moratoria, and the United States is introducing an
export moratorium resolution in the UNGA again this year.
By adopting a moratorium, a nation is helping impose a pause
in the spread of landmines, a pause that provides time to
negotiate and implement a more permanent international
control mechanism.
Multilateral Control Regime
President Clinton unveiled the U.S. proposal for a
multilateral control regime during his speech to the UN
General Assembly on September 26, 1994.  As a first step
toward the eventual elimination of antipersonnel landmines,
the President called on all nations to join the United
States in concluding an agreement to reduce the number and
availability of A/P landmines.
This proposal is designed to address the two fundamental
sources of the humanitarian problem associated with A/P
landmines.  The first is that these weapons too often find
their way into the wrong hands.  The landmine threat to
civilians in the recent past has been caused almost
exclusively by those who use landmines in violation of
existing laws of armed conflict, sometimes even targeting
civilians specifically.  Second, most casualties are caused
by landmines that, once deployed, remain lethal indefinitely
rather than self-destructing or self-deactivating.
The United States recognizes that A/P landmines are a
legitimate weapon of war when used in accordance with the
laws of armed conflict.  However, the United States also
recognizes that their proliferation coupled with widespread
indiscriminate and irresponsible use cause unnecessary human
suffering.  For that reason, the ultimate goal of the United
States is the eventual elimination of A/P landmines.  Regime
members can move most effectively toward that goal as viable
and humane alternatives are developed.
As a first step toward this ultimate goal, the proposed
regime lays downs restrictions governing A/P landmine
production and stockpiling as well as export.  It addresses
the humanitarian problem in three basic ways.  The regime
will:  Reduce reliance on those types of A/P landmines that
cause the greatest danger to civilians.  Most civilian
casualties occur in post-combat situations and are
attributable to those A/P landmines with a long lifespan,
i.e., those that do not self-destruct or self-deactivate.
The U.S. proposal calls on countries to modify their
stockpiles so that only a small percentage will consist of
these long-lived mines.  It also calls for a future
conference to consider the feasibility of eliminating these
types of mines entirely.
Restrict the availability of A/P landmines.  The regime is
designed to keep A/P landmines out of the hands of
irresponsible users.  It would allow the export of A/P
landmines only to those countries which have ratified
CCW/Protocol II.  It would prohibit exports to any state
whose actions have been condemned by the UN Security Council
or any state found to have provided landmines to an
ineligible recipient.
Reinforce the landmine use restrictions contained in CCW.
As noted above, the United States is pressing for
improvements in CCW in order to increase the protection
afforded civilians.  In parallel with that effort, the
regime would prohibit the production, stockpiling, and
export of any mine that is illegal to use under the terms of
a strengthened CCW.
In the interest of establishing a regime as quickly as
possible, the United States will seek an agreement based on
political commitments as opposed to legally binding
Taken together, the United States believes these efforts
constitute a pragmatic, effective approach to reducing the
threat to civilians being caused by the proliferation and
irresponsible use of A/P landmines.  They are also an
important first step toward the ultimate U.S. goal of the
eventual elimination of all A/P landmines.
CHPATER FIVE:     Demining:  The U.S. Response
     Criteria for U.S. Demining Assistance
The four major concerns that need to be addressed when
considering which landmine infested countries should receive
priority U.S. Government assistance are:  (1) U.S.
interests; (2) severity of the problem in the country as
compared with that of other candidates;  (3) the impact
which can be expected from U.S. assistance; and (4) the
existence of other demining programs that could be applied
in the country.
U.S. Interests
With respect to national interests, the U.S. Government
supports democratic efforts in countries where they have
begun to take root.  The United States can buttress other
kinds of U.S. Government assistance already being provided
by adding demining programs with the goal of achieving
greater security, stability, and economic growth.  The
United States can reap benefits from creating conditions for
rapid repatriation of refugees which reduce the cost of
their continued care and maintenance by UNHCR and other
humanitarian organizations to which the United States
By generating good will in the country assisted, and
positive publicity in countries with landmine problems that
might be eager to receive similar help, the United States
can increase fledgling contacts and foster bilateral working
Severity of the Problem
The severity of the problem in a candidate country will
depend on how large a population is endangered by how many
landmines.  Unmarked landmines restrict area residents from
agrarian employment and hamper the local and national
economies, as well as individual family income and
sustenance.  Where the number of unmarked landmines and the
population menaced by them is small, expending scarce
resources may not be warranted.  U.S. efforts should be
concentrated where they are likely to enhance the safety and
security of an affected population.
Impact of U.S. Assistance
Priority attention should be given to countries where
something can actually be accomplished due to the emergence
of peace, and where people and organizations already on the
ground are attempting to define and solve the problem.  The
country requiring assistance should be relatively stable,
and the results of the demining program should be
The U.S.Government is concerned for the safety of its
personnel, and will not send international mine clearance
training teams into a region where no peace settlement has
yet been reached.  While Afghanistan may be cited as an
example that contradicts this statement, it must be noted
that the limited conflict which continues there is localized
and does not threaten the safety of deminers in outlying
Recruiting, training, and utilizing local citizens for mine
awareness and demining programs can add to a country's
stability by providing useful work and needed income for
demobilized troops and insurgents.  Demining funds infused
into the local economy will have a ballooning effect.
Any chosen strategy must be feasible in the specific
circumstances, and there must be defined objectives
achievable in an acceptable timeframe.
Existence of Other Programs
Combining U.S. Government efforts with others already
ongoing will increase available funding and technical
resources and shorten the timeframe necessary to achieve the
goal, provided that an adequate central management authority
exists to prevent redundancy of effort.  On the other hand,
U.S. efforts in a country where there is no existing mine
awareness or demining effort can have the benefit of
initiating a needed program as well as attracting other
donors through our initial success.
     Role of the U.S. Military in Demining
The objectives of the U.S. Demining Assistance Program are
to stop or reduce civilian casualties caused by landmines,
and return previously mined areas to productive use.  This
is achieved by increased mine awareness and by assisting
efforts to locate and destroy landmines.  The U.S. military
has an important role to play in these efforts.
Countries that receive U.S. aid are selected by the
Interagency Working Group on Demining and Landmine Control,
located in Washington, D.C.  Once a country is designated,
the regional commanders-in-chief (CINCs) develop a program
tailored to that country's specific demining needs.  The
regional CINCs become the primary implementing agent for the
demining program, using resources allocated by the Defense
Department's Office of Humanitarian and Refugee Affairs.
The greatest military resource available to the CINCs for
demining programs is the U.S. Special Operations Command.
These forces have experience with mine clearance and mine
awareness training programs in Cambodia and Afghanistan.
Psychological Operations forces use their unique skills and
assets to design and implement mine awareness programs, and
Special Forces teach local personnel to identify, mark, and
destroy landmines.  U.S. military demining training teams
also make use of civil affairs personnel, who play a key
role in relating to local demining entities and helping them
to develop sustainable programs.
The use of U.S. military forces in the humanitarian demining
program has added side benefits as well.  U.S. forces
provide a valuable example to war-torn countries of how a
military can promote the public good rather than just wage
war.  Increased military-to-military contacts provide an
opportunity for military forces to learn from one another.
Demining deployments provide a valuable training exercise
for U.S. troops, giving them experience in relating to
diverse cultures, organizing programs in sparse, foreign
environments, and honing their foreign-language skills.
Last, providing needed aid to affected populations increases
the morale of U.S. troops.
It is important to note that a guiding rule of the program
is that no U.S. military personnel will enter live
minefields, but will only serve in the capacity of technical
expert and trainer.
     Mine Clearance Training Programs
Humanitarian demining is a concept that involves several
components, the most important of which are mine awareness
training and mine clearance training.  These programs should
be designed to complement each other to produce a more
effective whole.  Mine clearance training is generally more
costly in terms of funds, materiel, and personnel than mine
awareness training, but provides a necessary component of
the program.
The training is designed to educate host nation personnel in
the skills needed to detect, identify, and destroy the mines
that plague their country.  The goal is to develop a
sustainable indigenous demining infrastructure to give the
affected country the tools and skills to solve its own
Under the U.S. Demining Assistance Program, countries to
receive assistance are selected by the Interagency Working
Group on Demining and Landmine Control (IWG) in Washington,
D.C.  If mine clearance training is offered, it is usually
provided by the U.S. military.  However, Department of
Defense funds may be used to finance mine clearing
activities by contractors or by nongovernmental
Once an in-country assessment is performed by U.S. military
experts and further action is recommended and approved, a
program is designed to meet the local needs and
requirements, including fiscal and political realities.  One
of the aims of the assessment is to determine the primary
local organization around which to center the operation.
This could include the military, a government ministry, or
an international or private organization with operations
The U.S. military employs a concept of instruction called
"train the trainer."  In this concept, U.S. soldiers do not
enter live minefields or directly participate in mine
clearance operations.  Rather, U.S. personnel focus on
training host nation personnel to become teachers of mine
clearance and leaders of demining platoons.  The first cadre
of instructor candidates learns all aspects of mine
identification, neutralization, and destruction, as well as
proper teaching methods and leadership skills.  The training
falls into three phases, during which candidates shadow U.S.
--  Basic skills: first aid, map reading, etc.
--  Primary demining: mine identification and detection,
equipment maintenance, demolition, and safety procedures.
--  Practical exercises: multilevel training, demining
drills, immediate-action drills, leadership development, and
planning and organization skills.  Field exercises include
road, bridge, rural, and urban demining.
Host nation instructor candidates who successfully complete
the training then become the instructors for the next class
of host nation students.  It is this second class that will
perform demining operations in the field.  All training of
this class is conducted by the host nation instructors, with
U.S. instructors closely monitoring and offering assistance
as needed.  With each new class, the U.S. instructors
perform a smaller role, until the host nation no longer
requires direct U.S. supervision.
In order to reach the point of transition where the host
nation assumes responsibility for the independently
functioning program, U.S. military experts also provide
training in program management and administration.  At the
end of the operations, the host country has a program that
is administered by its own people, taught by its own people,
and turns out its own deminers.
The United States can then provide follow-on assistance in
the form of occasional refresher training, safety
inspections, or major equipment repair.  But the goal of the
program is already accomplished: an autonomous indigenous
mine clearance program which conducts demining operations
and educates new deminers.
     Mine Awareness Training Programs
Mine awareness programs are designed to educate local
populations to the dangers posed by landmines in their
environment, including villages, fields, and roads.  By
teaching people what landmines look like and what to do (and
not to do) when they discover one, the frequency of mine
casualties can be reduced.  These programs are
comprehensive, covering a wide range of related topics, and
can be tailored for specific audiences, whether children in
school, refugees in camps, or villagers in their traditional
Mine awareness programs should be viewed as an integral part
of the larger demining process and should not be divorced or
performed in isolation from that process.  Demining
typically involves at least the following four components:
locating, mapping, marking, and clearing.  There is an
informational element required in each of these
undertakings.  Public awareness, mine location, and mine
mapping involve an exchange of information with the public
as well as an effort to persuade individuals to perform
desired actions.
Mine marking and mine clearing also have information
requirements, such as informing the public of the progress
of minefield marking and clearing operations and persuading
local populations not to interfere with personnel engaged in
these activities.  Marking and clearing also require
coordination between local communities or public officials
and military or contract mine/ordnance disposal units.  This
coordination can best be facilitated through an information
The United States usually conducts these information
campaigns using military Psychological Operations (PSYOP)
forces.  These experts are trained and experienced in
developing educational programs, are skilled in the design
and development of information products, and have the
equipment necessary to manufacture the products if it is not
locally available.  The United States has employed PSYOP
forces in mine awareness programs in a number of different
regions of the world.  They have worked with Afghan refugees
in Pakistan to facilitate their safe return home, assisted
the El Salvadoran military to secure areas of previous
conflict, and, most recently, provided mine awareness
support to the Cambodian Mine Action Center.
Developing and implementing a comprehensive mine awareness
program usually requires three distinct steps: assessment,
program planning, and the development of products designed
to educate and to achieve particular behavioral objectives.
The first stage of any information campaign is a field
assessment to evaluate the existing conditions that will
affect program development and implementation.  These
include, among others, political sensitivities, social and
cultural factors, and available communications resources.
The assessment team makes specific recommendations regarding
adaptation of the flexible prototype program to meet the
needs of the local situation.  Proven techniques are
modified to add local flavor and country- or region-specific
concerns.  The team includes site survey experts as well as
personnel experienced in evaluating political, social,
cultural, and other relevant factors.
U.S. PSYOP teams fully coordinate all of their activities
with the U.S. Embassy, international peacekeeping or relief
organizations in-country, and other host country or
contractor organizations involved in the overall demining
Program Planning
While U.S. PSYOP program planning depends on a thorough
assessment, the military also maintains a number of
prototype programs that are applicable in many situations
and may be adapted to local conditions with relative ease.
These programs, which articulate campaign objectives and
product concepts rather than fully developed product
prototypes, provide the basis for selecting an approach that
can best be adapted to meet local requirements.
All mine awareness campaigns must have defined public
behavioral objectives.  Information campaigns and their
component products should also, where possible, offer actual
procedures for local populations to follow in order to
fulfill the behavioral objective.  Examples might include:
Recognition:  Teaching the local population to identify
common types of landmines or other explosive munitions and
to distinguish them from other nonlethal objects that might
be of economic interest.  Populations affected by landmines
are often refugees or displaced persons who depend on
scavenging for building materials or other useful items.
Avoidance:  Informing the local population of a dangerous
area and persuading individuals to avoid that area, and not
to try to handle, defuse, or collect the dangerous devices.
Notification:  Persuading the public to report information
about the location of mines and other explosive munitions to
designated authorities charged with coordinating awareness,
marking, and clearing activities.
Noninterference:  Persuading local populations or
potentially conflictive groups not to interfere with host
country, international agency, contractor, or other
nongovernmental personnel conducting authorized demining.
Collection or Trafficking:  Convincing elements of the
population to refrain from attempting to recover or traffic
in landmines for either criminal or economic reasons.
Status of Work:  Ensuring awareness among the population of
when and where it is now safe to enter former minefields.
Where possible, information programs should provide actual
step-by-step procedures for dealing with a mined area.
These procedures might include leaving an area without
mishap, temporarily marking a mined area so that demining
personnel can find it, notifying proper authorities of the
location of a discovered mine or minefield, and, in the
event of injury, carrying out first-aid procedures and/or
requesting medical assistance.
Product Development
Once the assessment has been completed and the initial
program planning accomplished, prototype informational
material can be developed.  This material is geared to the
local situation and will support accomplishing both the
educational and the behavioral objectives.  Depending on
local circumstances these may be:
--  Color posters, pamphlets, and leaflets illustrating
landmines known to be prevalent in targeted areas.
--  Products aimed specifically at children (often important
given their willingness to share information with family and
other household members) such as coloring books and comic
--  Posters and booklets illustrating how to exit a
--  Publicity materials concerning dates and locations of
demining team operations, including posters with tear- off
forms to be filled in by local individuals who have
knowledge of mine locations.
--  Electronic media materials, such as radio scripts and
video cassettes, carrying a variety of mine awareness
--  Products with utility for local populations, which carry
mine awareness messages.  For example: tablecloths, banners,
scarves, puzzles, buttons, fans, playing cards, matchbooks,
plastic bags, T-shirts.
--  School supplies, such as pencils, crayons, rulers,
pencil cases, and bookbags for children which carry logos
relating to the demining effort.
It is usually preferable to produce these items locally, in
conjunction with the host country government and other
organizations engaged in demining operations.  By involving
these organizations in the production process they become a
part of the mine awareness effort and typically are more
inclined to facilitate disseminaton of the material,
particularly when distributing products with local utility.
The awareness component of demining (as well as demining
itself) can be a relatively complicated and demanding
enterprise, politically, logistically, and operationally.
The United States uses PSYOP forces because of their ability
to get programs started quickly.  Any local program will
only be successful if it enjoys the support of the host
government, including a commitment to developing or
designating an infrastructure to carry out these programs
over the long term.
Mine awareness programs are a vital element of a national
effort to address the landmine problem.  Mine awareness
reduces needless suffering by reducing landmine casualties,
and does so at a relatively low cost.  Mine awareness
projects should always be an integral part of any
humanitarian demining operation.
     Current and Projected U.S. Government Demining Funding
The U.S. role in the international effort to locate and
remove landmines from post-conflict regions dates back to
1982, when U.S. military personnel conducted limited mine
clearance operations in Egypt.  Due to concern for the
safety of American citizens, the United States has shifted
its focus from committing personnel to committing resources.
U.S. aid for mine clearance and mine awareness was not fully
coordinated until the establishment in 1993 of the Demining
Assistance Program and the Interagency Working Group (IWG)
on Demining and Landmine Control.  With the Program as a
guide and the IWG as a focus, the United States has been
able to devote more financial resources to addressing this
global problem.
In FY 1992, before the international community fully turned
its attention to the landmine situation, the U.S. Government
spent $8.4 million to fund demining projects in Afghanistan,
Cambodia, and Somalia.  Over half of those funds provided
prosthetic devices to landmine victims worldwide.  This
money was contained in the budget of the U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID).
In FY 1993, the United States began its current large-scale
involvement with the landmine problem.  Spurred by the
information contained in the State Department report Hidden
Killers, the United States devoted a total of $15.4 million
to demining in 1993.  These funds were allocated in the
State Department's Foreign Military Financing (FMF)
accounts, the State Department's Bureau of Population,
Refugees, and Migration (PRM) budget, and USAID's continuing
In FY 1994, the United States increased its efforts,
continuing prior programs and adding the Defense
Department's Operations and Maintenance accounts to fund
personnel for in-country landmine assessments, as well as
instructors for mine clearance and mine awareness programs.
The total U.S. expenditure for international demining in FY
1994 was $17.9 million, contributing assistance in
Mozambique, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, Namibia,
Nicaragua, and Cambodia.
The United States plans to broaden the scope of the demining
program in the future.  The IWG plans to support a research
and development program, led by the Office of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Special Operations, to design
improved technologies to detect and destroy landmines.  The
number of countries the United States can assist will
increase significantly, and the level of aid provided to
those countries will also increase.  While all future
financial figures are of course subject to change during the
budget process, the IWG projects U.S. demining allocations
of at least $25 million in FY 1995.  This includes $10
million dedicated to the R&D effort.
CHAPTER SIX:    Demining:  The World Response
     Demining and the United Nations
The United Nations was the first international organization
to recognize the serious threat posed by antipersonnel
landmines and to do something about it.  UN agencies have
been active in limited mine clearance for many years, but
have only recently begun to address the problem on a wide
scale.  The UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, in a
report dated September 9, 1994, outlined the United Nation's
past, present, and future efforts toward demining and
landmine control.  Some of the material presented here is
drawn from that report.
According to the report, the United Nations has initiated,
is currently involved in, or will shortly be involved in
demining or mine awareness activities in the following
countries:  Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, El Salvador,
Georgia, Guatemala, Iraq, Liberia, Mozambique, Rwanda,
Somalia, Yemen, and the former Yugoslavia.
The United Nations hopes to improve its effectiveness in the
international demining effort by increasing public awareness
of the problem, by serving as a coordinating body for
civilian and military mine clearance operations in any given
country, and by serving as a repository for all landmine
information in its updated computer database (as well as new
breakthroughs in demining technology research and
Department of Humanitarian Affairs
The Secretary General has designated the Department of
Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) to serve as the focal point
within the United Nations for demining and landmine-related
activities.  This entails coordinating the UN response to
the massive humanitarian problems posed by the more than 100
million uncleared landmines currently in place around the
world.  It is important to note that DHA's approach to
demining activities is within the context of humanitarian
programs.  DHA, with technical assistance from the
Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), has moved
forward to address its task in a number of ways:
1) Designating an office within DHA that is charged
specifically with coordinating UN demining and landmine
related activities.  DHA, in conjunction with local
authorities and other interested parties, is currently
conducting demining operations in Afghanistan (administered
by UNOCHA), Mozambique (UNOHAC/UNOMOZ), and the former
Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR).  Plans for additional operations are
underway in Angola, Rwanda and Somalia.  It is estimated
that UN operations will destroy more than 80,000 landmines
worldwide this year.
2)  Establishing a database that will contain all pertinent
information available to the United Nations on uncleared
landmines and landmine-related activities.  This database is
expected to contain a wide range of technical information on
types of mines, defusing and clearance techniques; country-
based information on conditions, degree,  and types of mine
pollution and maps; and program information, including
costs, training materials, rosters of personnel, and
implementation experience.  The database will be available
to interested parties and should be operational by the end
of 1994.
United Nations Children's Fund
UNICEF has worked actively to ensure that the concerns of
children faced by the threat of landmines are fully
considered.  In 1992, for example, the Executive Director of
UNICEF called for a ban on the production, marketing, and
use of landmines which primarily target civilians and are a
major cause of disability and trauma.  This strong political
stance has been complemented by mine awareness activities on
a programmatic level in several countries, including
Afghanistan, Croatia, and El Salvador.
In El Salvador, UNICEF obtained the cooperation of the El
Salvadoran Armed Forces, the FMLN forces, and the UN
Peacekeeping Mission (ONUSAL) to begin raising mine
awareness among children.  Teachers, health workers and
community leaders were trained to point out the dangers of
mines to children living in affected communities.  Mobile
units conducted the training, using a variety of educational
media.  Once trained, these individuals returned to their
communities with the necessary knowledge to pass on the
message they had learned.  Through funding from UNICEF, they
were provided with posters illustrating the dangers of
mines, flip charts explaining the basic concept of the mine
awareness project, and leaflets to distribute freely.  The
design and content of these leaflets were chosen carefully
to appeal to children.
In Croatia and Afghanistan, mine awareness programs were
also implemented through mass media and teacher training.
Plans are underway to implement similar awareness programs
as part of the demobilization and demining process in
World Food Program
WFP has been forced to delay or reroute shipments of food by
landmines on delivery routes.  WFP relies on UN demining
teams to clear those routes, but occasionally must hire
contractors to gain access to needy populations.
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNHCR's efforts to repatriate refugees are significantly
affected by the presence of landmines, which, in many cases,
cause the refugees to remain longer in UNHCR camps.
UNHCR routinely provides mine awareness training to refugee
populations, particularly as part of the overall UN demining
operations in Afghanistan, Cambodia, and Mozambique.
The training provided by UNHCR facilitates the reinsertion
of returnees in the short term and also furthers the
returnees' development and safety.  UNHCR undertakes limited
mine-disposal operations where no other capable authority is
present.  UNHCR also conducts landmine assessments in some
regions of likely resettlement.
World Health Organization
The WHO is broadening its efforts in humanitarian areas and
is coordinating with UNHCR the development of rehabilitation
services for landmine victims.
Department of Peacekeeping Operations
As DPKO becomes involved in more war-torn areas of the
world, peacekeeping forces are encountering growing problems
with unexploded landmines.  According to the Secretary
General's report, "landmines are now the second cause of
casualties to UN peacekeepers due to hostile action, after
direct fire."  DPKO conducts limited demining to ensure the
security and movement of peacekeeping forces in troubled
     Demining and International Organizations
International Committee of the Red Cross
The ICRC has played a crucial role in raising international
awareness of the global landmines problem and in encouraging
the international community to begin to take steps to remedy
it.  The ICRC is now calling for the strengthening of the
1980  Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and,
specifically, Protocol II, which deals with landmines.
Among the ICRC's proposals are the inclusion in the CCW of a
verification mechanism, extension of the CCW to cover
internal conflicts, and a clause to ensure that landmines
are manufactured to be detectable and endowed with a self-
destructive capacity.
Organization of American States
The OAS became involved in demining activities in 1991 when
five Central American Presidents requested assistance from
the Inter-American Defense Board in demining efforts.
Nicaragua was the first Central American country to receive
such assistance in the form of funding, mine clearance
training and mine awareness training.  Trained OAS
volunteers from seven different countries trained five
platoons of Nicaraguan soldiers and assisted in clearing
7,000 mines.  Additional regional programs are to be
extended to Honduras and Costa Rica by late 1994.  Funding
for such training costs and equipment are expected to come
from foreign donors, including the United States.
     Private Voluntary Organizations and Nongovernmental
A number of private voluntary organizations (PVOs) and
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have become involved in
mine awareness, demining, and medical assistance programs
seeking to help the victims of landmines.  These
organizations, sometimes working with funds they have raised
themselves, but often acting as implementing agencies for
governments or international organizations, are developing
skills and expertise regarding many aspects of the landmine
problem and methods of alleviating its often deadly
The major PVOs and NGOs working in demining are:
(1) Halo Trust, a British-based humanitarian nonprofit
agency specializing in mine clearance with programs in
Cambodia, Afghanistan, and Kuwait; (2) the Mines Advisory
Group, a British group working in Afghanistan, Cambodia,
Mozambique, Kurdistan, Angola, and Nicaragua; (3) Norwegian
People's Aid, with programs in Mozambique and Cambodia; and
(4) Handicap International, Belgium-based and carrying out
projects in Cambodia.
A Cambodian mine survey of four northwestern provinces was
commissioned by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) and carried out by Halo Trust in 1992 to determine
which lands were relatively free of landmines and suitable
for settlement by returning refugees from the Thai border
camps.  Halo Trust and Norwegian People's Aid have been
working with CARE in northwestern Cambodia to clear roads
and fields in six villages, thus permitting some 45,000
internally displaced Cambodians to return to their homes.
The Mines Advisory Group and Halo Trust have been involved
in the marking of mined areas to lessen the risk to the
local Cambodian population.  These private groups generally
select as demining targets areas that will benefit the most
local residents, giving priority to heavily-travelled paths,
school and hospital grounds, markets, and communal wells.
It has been estimated that $2 million a year will be needed
to complement the efforts of CMAC by supporting the landmine-
related efforts of PVOs and NGOs in Cambodia.  In Cambodia,
Handicap International is one of the major producers
(together with the International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC)) of prostheses for landmine casualties.
With the United Nations earmarking some $14 million for
landmine-related activities in Mozambique and the
surrounding countries where Mozambican refugees have fled,
NGOs and PVOs are already establishing themselves as a
valuable part of the demining process.  Norwegian People's
Aid has trained two 32-man teams for mine clearance and is
employing them to clear rural roads in Tete province.  Halo
Trust has been given a UN contract to carry out a nationwide
landmine assessment using six teams of questioners.  Halo
Trust has also been contracted by several British
humanitarian organizations to field three mine clearance
teams in Zambezia.  The Mines Advisory Group has approached
the European Community for funds to launch a 6-month pilot
project in Mozambique to train local mine surveyors and
clearers.  It will also co-execute a mine awareness program
with Halo Trust.
The Afghan demining program utilizes seven local NGOs and
very limited international staff to achieve its objectives.
The program's use of local NGOs has benefited from their
greater familiarity with the areas being demined, as well as
from a cost advantage.  In 1993, the seven NGOs fielded 35
mine clearance teams of 32 deminers each; 16 mine survey
teams of 4 surveyors each; and 10 mine awareness teams.
Approximately 2,700 Afghans are employed in demining
activities, equivalent to 98 percent of the mine clearance
program staff.  The program manager also attributes the
success of the program to the use of standardized rules and
regulations for the various operations.  The overall
coordinator sets the standards used by the NGOs.  Since no
central government authority exists in Afghanistan, the
organizational structure of the demining program implemented
by UNOCHA supplies needed coordination.
No American NGOs or PVOs have yet gained a wide reputation
for general expertise or administrative skills as a result
of their activities in numerous landmine-plagued countries
or participation in a large number of projects in a single
country.  The reputation established by Handicap
International in Cambodia led the U.S. Government, through
its refugee program, to give $200,000 to the organization
for its participation in the Cambodian Mine Action Center's
(CMAC) demining program in each of the 2 years, FY 1992 and
FY 1993.  Halo Trust, which had an excellent reputation for
keeping safe demining programs functioning in uncertain
circumstances both in Afghanistan and Cambodia, was given
approximately $1 million in FY 1993 to establish and
administer two fully equipped, self-supporting, 20-man teams
to conduct mine clearance in top priority areas providing
major benefit to returning refugees.
U.S. Government utilization of skilled NGOs and PVOs,
whether they are American-based or foreign, is determined on
a case-by-case basis.  They are contracted or employed to
amplify existing mine awareness and demining programs, or to
fill a need or provide expertise not available in ongoing
programs.  In some circumstances, PVOs and NGOs can deliver
a more rapid turnaround for short-term goals.  Working
bilaterally with individual NGOs can, under certain
circumstances, foster more experimentation and greater
diversity, leading to a more innovative/versatile program.
For example, in Afghanistan USAID retained complete control
over a precedent-setting project involving the training and
use of dogs in the demining process.  The project was only
transferred to UNOCHA upon USAID's withdrawal from
CHAPTER SEVEN:     Demining:  Case Studies
     Case Study:  Afghanistan
Afghanistan is one of the three most heavily mined countries
in the world.  Landmines were used extensively by both the
Soviets and the Afghans during a dozen years of war, and an
estimated 10 million mines still seriously hinder refugee
repatriation and economic reconstruction.
The effort to address the landmine problem in Afghanistan
may be the greatest success story to date in international
demining.  The program is efficient and effective, and has
progressed to the point where it requires little more from
the international community beyond funding to sustain the
In 1987, the United Nations initiated Operation Salam, in
which the United Nations provided mine awareness skills,
mine clearance skills, and demining equipment to Afghan
refugees.  The goal of this effort was to prepare the
millions of refugees with knowledge and equipment to safely
return home through mined areas.  After the 1989 Geneva
accords and the Soviet pullout, the United Nations
established the UN Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Assistance to Afghanistan (UNOCHA) and the
subsidiary UN Mine Clearance Programme (MCP).
The initial aim of the MCP was to promote mine awareness
among returning refugees, but this was quickly extended to
include rudimentary mine clearance training for 13,000
Afghan villagers, so that the villagers could clear farmland
for immediate use.  This initial training was conducted by
over 100 instructors from 10 nations, including 36 from the
United States.
After less than a year, the MCP concluded this approach was
ineffective and changed its focus, organizing mobile teams
to conduct mine clearance operations nationwide.  The new
focus was accompanied by a new organizational structure,
relying upon Afghan nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to
implement mine clearance and mine awareness operations.
This structure continues to function successfully today,
utilizing Afghans in as many of the operational, logistical,
and administrative roles as possible.  UNOCHA's goal, once
there is a functioning government in Kabul, is to hand over
responsibility for the program to the government's
Department of Mine Clearance.
The indigenous mine clearance program, the first of its kind
in the world, got off to a slow start.  During its first 2
years, the MCP was seriously underfunded, beset by
institutional disorganization, and suffered the loss of many
personnel due to landmine accidents.  It also relied heavily
on the supervision and instruction of foreign personnel,
slowing the process of making mine clearance efforts fully
Through patient and painstaking work, most of these problems
have since been overcome.  While the MCP still endures
occasional accidents, at the rate of one incident per team
per year, rigorous safety procedures and regular refresher
training have limited the risks of this dangerous operation.
The organizational structure has also matured.  The MCP's
headquarters in Islamabad, Pakistan operates efficiently,
overseeing the many diverse aspects of the demining effort.
The MCP now includes over 2,800 personnel, with only eight
positions held by non-AfghansAfour in program management and
four in technical support.  Most mine awareness and mine
clearance operations and training are run by Afghan NGO
Only one non-Afghan NGO remains active in demining in the
country, the UK's Halo Trust.  Under the Memorandum of
Understanding with its chief sponsor, the European Union,
Halo Trust's efforts are coordinated with UNOCHA.
Forty percent of the MCP's personnel are employed in
administrative and support staff, serving in the demining
headquarters in Islamabad or in the regional centers in
Quetta and Peshawar.  The headquarters and regional centers
plan to relocate into Afghanistan once the security
situation permits.
There are now 20 four-man surveying teams, 33 mine detection
dog teams with three men and two dogs each, 11 four-man mine
awareness teams, 40 manual mine clearance teams of 32 men
each, two mechanical mine clearance teams, and 6  four-man
training teams.
The work of the deminers is desperately required all over
the country.  Medical facilities operated by the
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) treat over
1,500 mine injuries every year.  The MCP estimates of
landmine-related injuries and deaths run as high as 20-25
per day, or 8,000 per year, and indicates that the average
cost of treatment and rehabilitation is $5,000 per surviving
victim.  This represents an enormous burden on the fragile
Afghan economy.
As a result of the great need for demining services, and
because the MCP has strictly maintained its neutrality in
Afghan internal politics, the deminers are welcomed wherever
they travel.  Local villagers offer accommodations and food,
as well as assistance in identifying minefields.
Since the program's inception, MCP personnel have surveyed,
mapped, and permanently marked 83 square kilometers of
minefields.  Deminers have cleared over 33 square kilometers
for return to normal civilian use.  In the process, they
have removed and destroyed over 111,000 mines and other
explosive devices.  They have also provided mine awareness
training directly to over 3.4 million people, and reached
countless others via weekly TV and radio broadcasts.
The MCP has identified 113 square kilometers of land
requiring priority mine clearance, of which 80 remain to be
cleared.  In 1993, funding was available to clear 10 square
kilometers.  MCP surveyors estimate that clearance of this
priority land would allow a majority of Afghans to resume a
normal life.
Afghan deminers have acquired vast skill and experience in
addressing the landmine problem.  The only remaining
stumbling block to progress is funding.  UNOCHA's annual
demining budget has averaged $15 million, and has been
chronically underfunded.
In late 1993 and early 1994, UNOCHA's demining program was
fully funded for the first time.  During the semiannual
appeal for aid, UNOCHA requested $6.7 million and received
$6.8 million for demining.  Higher funding levels allowed
the deminers to purchase more equipment and increase the
pace of all demining efforts.  In the first 3 months of
1994, UNOCHA provided mine awareness training to 49,000
people in Afghanistan.  In the first 8 months, 12  square
kilometers of land were cleared of mines, 96 percent of
UNOCHA's minimum goal for all of 1994.
The United States provided significant assistance to the
program's founding by supplying the greatest number of
initial trainers.  In addition, in the last two fiscal years
the United States has contributed $5 million to UNOCHA for
demining in Afghanistan.  The U.S. Agency for International
Development also pledged $3.6 million to UNOCHA in 1993 to
fully fund the Mine Dog Center for the period 1993-96.
These dog teams located nearly 22,000 mines in 1993 alone.
According to figures released by UNOCHA, the money
contributed by the United States and other donors is well
spent.  The mine clearance program manager, Lt. Col. Ian
Mansfield of Australia, reports that the program is one of
the world's most cost-effective, at one dollar per square
meter cleared.  This comprehensive mine clearance program
reflects the savings over small operations where private
firms may charge up to $1,000 per mine for clearance
Afghanistan represents a worst-case landmine scenario, a
nightmare of uncertainty and death as a result of the
massive indiscriminate use of these weapons.  The Afghan
people, with the assistance of the United States and the
others in the international community through UNOCHA, are
slowly putting their country and their lives back in order.
     Case Study:  Cambodia
Torn by internal and external warfare for more than two
decades, Cambodia is one of the world's most heavily mined
countries.  Landmines were used extensively in Cambodia
during the Vietnam War in the early 1970's, border fighting
between Cambodia and Vietnam in the mid 1970's, and the
civil war, which began in the late 1970's.  The many years
of strife have left Cambodia littered with an estimated 8
million landmines.
Cambodia has the highest proportion of amputees in its
population (1 for every 236), in large part due to landmines
and other deadly debris of war.  (By comparison, in the
United States, fewer than 1 in 22,000 people annually
undergo amputations as a result of traumatic injuries.)  The
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) estimated at
the end of the war that Cambodia had more than 30,000
Most of these landmine victims are civilians, including many
women and children, who innocently attempt to go about their
lives farming, herding animals, gathering firewood,
harvesting rice, or fishing, when they accidentally trigger
a mine blast.  Tragically, the amputees are the lucky ones.
More than 300 Cambodians are killed or maimed by landmines
each month.  Innumerable deaths go unreported when victims
die in the field from loss of blood or succumb to their
wounds because no transportation is available to get them to
medical help.
This sad picture is lightened by the valiant work of the
Cambodian Mine Action Center (CMAC), perhaps the most
organized effort against landmines anywhere in the world.
Working against huge odds and in hazardous conditions, CMAC
personnel are making significant progress in ridding
Cambodia of this scourge of war.
CMAC was founded by the UN Transitional Authority in
Cambodia (UNTAC) in April 1992 with a mandate to research
and identify the locations of minefields nationwide.  UNTAC
also established the Mine Clearance Training Unit (MCTU),
which trained 2,400 Cambodians to detect and destroy
landmines.  The MCTU was absorbed into CMAC in July 1993,
making CMAC the central coordinating body for all landmine-
related activities in Cambodia, including demining, public
awareness, and landmine control initiatives.  Prior to
UNTAC's withdrawal in November 1993, CMAC was reconstituted
as an official organ of the Royal Cambodian Government.
Funding for CMAC through the international community is a
major concern.  The UN Development Programme (UNDP) in March
1994 agreed to manage a trust fund to coordinate
international funding for CMAC.  The initial target funding
level established for its first 2 years of operation was $20
CMAC employs some 1,500 deminers organized into 42 demining
platoons.  CMAC's training center is currently housed on a
site originally set up as a UNHCR refugee
processing/reintegration center 25 kilometers outside of
Phnom Penh.  In addition to training deminers, the CMAC
demining school conducts regular refresher training courses
for deminers and trains minefield supervisors, explosive
ordnance demolition specialists, and instructors in all
CMAC's headquarters is currently staffed by some 30 foreign
technical advisors working with 20 Cambodian managers.
Military personnel from New Zealand, the Netherlands,
Australia, and Belgium serve as technical advisors to CMAC
for the purpose of maintaining technical standards, safety,
and the setting of priorities for clearance operations.  The
last two senior technical advisors to CMAC were Canadians.
CMAC leaders hope to bring down the proportion of foreigners
in management positions from the current 60/40 split to
40/60 by December, 30/70 within 12 months, and eventually to
5/95 by March 1996.
In April 1994, CMAC was forced to withdraw all demining
platoons from the Battambang and Sisophon areas due to a
deteriorating security situation in that region.  The
resurgence in fighting caused CMAC to refocus its demining
efforts in the southern provinces of Kampot and Kompong Speu
until July 1994, when the situation permitted CMAC to
redeploy several demining platoons to Battambang.
Preliminary reports indicate that few new mines were laid in
this recent round of fighting.
In addition to its own mine detection efforts, CMAC is
developing a concept of a village demining program.  CMAC
instructors will teach select village residents techniques
of manual probing for mines in and around their village.  If
a suspected mine is detected, villagers are instructed to
mark it and notify the CMAC regional office.  CMAC is also
developing a concept for mobile mine awareness teams.  These
teams will travel to other villages to teach mine awareness
using videos and other mine awareness materials, many of
which were developed by U.S. military specialists.
The CMAC demining program is making extraordinary progress
given the limited resources and primitive demining
technologies upon which they must rely.  As of April 1994,
CMAC, together with a handful of nongovernmental
organizations, had cleared over 10 million square kilometers
of mined areas and in the process destroyed over 25,000
antipersonnel landmines, over 150 antitank landmines, and
almost 140,000 pieces of unexploded ordnance.
The United States has played a large role in helping
Cambodia recover from its many years of war.  By the end of
1993, the United States alone had provided more than $135
million (of $880 million total from international donors) in
humanitarian and development assistance for Cambodia.  This
was in addition to the approximately $517 million the United
States contributed through the United Nations to support the
Cambodian peace process.
The United States became involved in assisting Cambodia with
landmines in 1992, when the U.S. Office of Foreign Distaster
Assistance provided $2.36 million to demine approximately
100 kilometers of roads for repatriation.  U.S. direct
assistance began in 1993, when U.S. military specialists
were deployed to Cambodia to help develop mine awareness
materials for a comprehensive public information and
education campaign.  The mine awareness program was
established as a wide-reaching effort that included mine
identification, mine and minefield marking, techniques for
avoidance of and movement around mines, communication and
reporting methods, first aid practices for trauma victims,
and rudimentary mine clearing.
The U.S. humanitarian demining assistance program for
Cambodia was expanded dramatically in 1994, when specialized
U.S. military trainers were deployed to help both CMAC and
Royal Cambodian Armed Forces personnel improve training
techniques for demining, trauma first aid, mine awareness,
and administrative management of mine clearance efforts.
The new training program has been widely complimented in
Cambodia and will be extended through much of 1995.
Currently, the UNDP international trust fund to support
Cambodian demining has acquired only $11.6 million.  The
United States has pledged $6 million toward demining efforts
in Cambodia in 1994 and 1995.  Fulfillment of this pledge
will consist primarily of in-kind contributions, such as
training and equipment.
Although there are many millions of landmines left to clear,
the efforts of CMAC and other demining groups have directly
helped countless refugees and internally displaced persons
return to their homes and farmlands.  They are removing one
of the most serious obstacles to the rehabilitation and
development of Cambodia one landmine at a time.
     Case Study:  Mozambique
From the mid-1960s until 1992 Mozambique was torn by
warfare, both against the Portuguese in the struggle for
independence and during a bloody civil war.  In the course
of these conflicts, an estimated 1 million landmines were
strewn about the country, which have killed over 10,000
After the peace accords were signed in October 1992, a
National Demining Plan was developed by the United Nations
and signed in early 1993.  The plan identified 2,000
kilometers along 28 roads as priority needs, and outlined a
demining program lasting 7-10 years.  The United Nations
committed $14.2 million to demining efforts in Mozambique--
$7 million as part of the UNOMOZ budget and $7.2 million
from the Netherlands, Sweden, and Italy as part of a special
UN trust fund.  Plans called for clearing priority roadways,
setting up a training school, and carrying out a detailed
survey.  Unfortunate delays occurred, and after nearly a
year and half only $1.5 million had been committed and
little demining had been accomplished.
UN delays were caused primarily by disagreements between UN
agencies in New York and Maputo.  A key problem was that the
creation of two new UN coordinating structures in Maputo,
UNOMOZ and UNOHAC, meant that existing UN agencies in
Mozambique, including UNDP, lost staff and power to the new
bodies.  Another was that these new bodies were dispatched
directly from New York and reported solely to the Secretary
General.  UNDP in New York, which had control over demining
money, was reluctant to approve demining projects proposed
by UNOHAC because of concerns over bidding procedures and
quality control.  Amid growing pressure from donor countries
for progress in demining, in May 1994 the Secretary General
transferred all remaining demining money to UNOHAC, which
reports directly to UN/DHA in New York.  The move remains
contested by UNDP.
Also in May 1994, UN/DHA New York sent a demining specialist
to Maputo to develop an accelerated demining implementation
plan.  The accelerated plan focused on improving the UN
demining training program, with the aim of showing concrete
progress to address complaints by donor nations.  Although
the UN Mine Clearance Training Center (MCTC) was staffed in
mid-1993, problems delayed the start of the first class
until early April 1994.  Following the accelerated plan, the
school plans to train about 450 Mozambican deminers, largely
recruited from demobilized troops from both sides.
In addition to a UN Mine Clearance Training Center in Tete,
there are currently four private demining operations in
Mozambique:  Ronco (a USAID-funded contractor), Halo Trust
(a British NGO), the Mechem/Royal Ordnance/Lonrho consortium
(contracted by the United Nations), and Norwegian People's
Aid (NPA).
Each group employs its own demining standards and
techniques.  Most use traditional methods with metal
detectors and probes.  Ronco and Mechem supplement these
methods with specially trained explosives-sniffing dogs.
The United Nations initially estimated the number of
landmines in Mozambique at 2 million.  Subsequent surveys
and estimates by demining operators on the ground now place
that number closer to 1 million.  But halving the estimate
does not reduce the problem.  According to the Mozambican
Association for the Handicapped, nearly 50 percent of all
civilian war casualties were caused by landmines.  In 1993,
an estimated 600 people were killed and another 600 maimed
by antipersonnel landmines.
Approximately 1 million Mozambicans fled the conflict and
reside in refugee camps in neighboring Malawi, although many
began returning to Mozambique during 1994.  The
International Rescue Committee is conducting a mine
awareness campaign in the camps, where fear of landmines has
been cited as a significant cause of the slow pace of
repatriation of refugees.  The routes these refugees would
take to return home are on the UN  list of priority roads to
be cleared.
The mine clearance efforts currently underway in Mozambique,
while enjoying some success, are small and not well
coordinated.  According to one estimate, 78 percent of
Mozambique's landmine problem is in only four of the ten
provinces, and international efforts have focused on those
regions.  The sparsely scattered mines in the other six
provinces, while causing fewer casualties, present just as
great a psychological barrier to refugee repatriation and
economic reconstruction.
One of the many problems facing demining operations is the
government's inability to provide financial support.  While
the government finds the idea of sustainable indigenous
demining programs appealing, it is unable to pay the
salaries of Mozambican mine clearance personnel, putting an
added financial burden upon international programs.  The
government hopes that Mozambican expertise, once it is
acquired through long years of demining experience and
training, will be an exportable commodity to other affected
African nations.
A particularly troublesome problem for mine awareness
programs is communications.  Broadcast media campaigns would
not be effective because most of the population does not own
a radio or television, and only 14 percent are literate.
The diversity of linguistics poses a further facet: only one-
quarter of the population speaks Portuguese, the rest speak
a broad variety of tribal dialects.
While independent and private demining programs operating in
Mozambique have met with some success, most rely upon the
United Nations  to provide some degree of logistical
support.  Halo Trust is training three demining teams which
will operate in Zambezia Province, and hopes to expand its
base to include the three neighboring northern provinces.
NPA trained demobilized soldiers and began mine clearance in
Tete Province, concentrating on transit roads from Malawi.
The International Rescue Committee has 208 mine awareness
instructors in the refugee camps in Malawi, where they have
provided training to over 250,000 Mozambicans.  The European
Union-funded Ghurka Security Guards completed operations in
February of 1994, having cleared 180 kilometers of priority
The United States, through USAID, awarded a contract to the
American firm Ronco to clear 2,000 kilometers of priority
roads.  Ronco, which uses dogs to sniff out mines, as well
as traditional prods and detectors, began its program in May
1994.  With 14 dog teams, Ronco cleared approximately 300
kilometers of roads by mid-August 1994 and expected to clear
approximately 40-60 kilometers per week under optimal
conditions.  The U.S. State Department's Bureau of
Population, Refugees, and Migration has also provided
$500,000 to UNHCR designated for demining, and the
Department of Defense contributed $5 million to expand
USAID's contract with Ronco.
All these efforts are proceeding independently, trying to
avoid overlapping and duplication.  Some of these efforts
have elected to proceed outside the supervision of the
United Nations, which serves as the coordinating agent for
demining, in order to avoid the problems associated with
large bureaucracies.
Some of the bureaucratic troubles experienced by the United
Nations were caused by problems of coordination with the
Mozambican Government.  The primary problem was one of
oversight.  The United Nations' senior officer in the
country, the Secretary General's Special Representative, did
not have authority over demining activities.  As such,
demining often proceeded without coordination with other
activities, lessening the efficiency and impact of demining
operations and UN programs in general.
The effort to address Mozambique's landmine problem is an
international patchwork of programs sponsored by several
nations.  Successes are achieved on a small scale and
against great odds.  As of July 1994, the private demining
programs had cleared approximately 350 out of 2,000
kilometers of priority roads.  While hopes are high, the
task looms large.
     Case Study:  Nicaragua
Nicaragua was beset by infighting from 1978 to 1990, first
in an uprising against the Somoza regime, and then in a
civil war between the Sandinista government and the Contra
rebels.  During these conflicts, an estimated 134,000
landmines were laid in the Nicaraguan countryside, villages,
and borderlands.
After the fighting stopped in 1990, the Sandinista People's
Army (EPS) began mine clearance operations, focusing on
mines that surrounded vital infrastructure points in the
interior of the country.  EPS deminers cleared approximately
10,000 mines in just 1 year, but suffered casualties of six
killed and seven wounded.  As a result of the casualties and
the pressure of military demobilization, the program was
halted in March 1991 and all demining engineer battalions
were disbanded.
In August 1991, the Nicaraguan Government asked the
Organization of American States (OAS) to help restart and
support the mine clearance effort.  The OAS instructed the
Inter-American Defense Board (IADB) to fulfill Nicaragua's
Under the demining plan developed by the IADB and approved
by the OAS Secretary General in September 1992, an IADB
instructor team received mine clearance training from the
U.S. Army at the School of the Americas in Fort Benning,
Georgia, in March 1993.  The team consisted of 15 military
personnel from Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia,
Guatemala, Honduras, Peru, and Uruguay.  The team returned
to Nicaragua to train the first EPS demining platoon in
April, and mine clearance operations began in June.
The IADB plan envisioned training 213 deminers and predicted
that all 116,000 remaining mines could be cleared within 5
years.  The plan divided mined areas into 841 "objectives,"
areas of land or items of infrastructure whose use was
denied by the mines.  The plan contained three parts,
beginning with the clearance of 38,000 mines from 310
objectives in the country's interior over the course of the
first year.
The program's start-up phase gave positive indications.  By
mid-July 1993, the fifth and last platoon had completed
training, making a total of 120 deminers.  Two platoons were
in the field conducting operations, and the other three were
awaiting deployment orders.  After only 1 month of demining,
the first two platoons had cleared 334 mines, freeing up 14
objectives, in this case high tension electrical towers, and
2.5 square miles of land.  The deployment of the other three
platoons was expected to greatly accelerate the pace and
efficiency of operations.
Unfortunately, problems began to occur.  Five accidents
resulted in the deaths of two deminers and injuries to five
others.  The three platoons awaiting deployment continued to
wait for another 2 months as a result of financial and
logistical difficulties.  The wettest rainy season in 20
years also severely hampered progress.  Work had to be
stopped on several occasions due to supply shortages.  The
EPS and the government, wrapped up in their own disputes,
were 3 months behind in payment of deminers' salaries.
Morale was low.
Several additional problems also hindered the process.  The
troops provided by the EPS were young, had little military
experience, and had no experience with landmines or
demining.  The initial minefield data provided by the EPS
contained errors in the numbers of mines and the sizes of
minefields.  Time was lost because the initial plan had not
taken into account the time required to defoliate the
minefields, a necessary and painstaking process.  Most of
the funds available could not be used to purchase explosives
due to the donors' restrictive terms.  Thus, the EPS had to
provide explosive material from its own stocks to detonate
the mines.
Despite all these obstacles, the program continued, if at a
slow pace.  By early-December 1993, the five platoons had
worked an average of 53 days each, clearing 70 objectives
and destroying 2,858 mines.  At that pace, the IADB
predicted that the first part of the plan could be completed
in another year, and that the country could be completely
demined in 2 years.
However, demining would have to continue without the
physical presence of the OAS/IADB, which withdrew the team
of international supervisors on December 15, 1993, primarily
due to a lack of international funding.  OAS/IADB personnel
costs were mounting rapidly, and the organization wanted to
devote scant resources to replicating the Nicaragua program
in other mine-plagued Central American countries.  The EPS,
well-trained and well-equipped by the OAS/IADB, appeared
capable of continuing on its own, as the original plan had
The progress of the program after the withdrawal of the IADB
supervisors is unclear.  The EPS issued a report stating
that it continued scaled-down operations for several months,
clearing another 4,139 mines, but was forced to suspend
operations due to lack of funds.  Other international
observers report that the EPS ceased all demining shortly
after the OAS/IADB supervisors withdrew.  In any case, there
is currently no mine clearance activity in Nicaragua,
although the EPS retains three platoons of fully equipped
deminers on active reserve, in the event financial resources
become available in the future to restart the program.
The final report of the IADB on demining in Nicaragua lauded
the efforts of the international team and the EPS troops.
It noted that the landmine threat to farmers in the interior
was significantly reduced, that demining had permitted the
restoration of electric power to many areas, and that the
EPS had carried out a humanitarian activity for the first
time.  The report made some recommendations for improving
the logistics of future programs and indicated the IADB's
willingness to support any such programs.  The United States
supports current efforts by the OAS/IADB to revitalize the
demining program to deal with the continuing landmine
CHAPTER EIGHT:     Current Mine Warfare
     Mine Warfare:  Current U.S. Practice
The U.S. military incorporates antipersonnel (A/P) and
antitank (A/T) landmines into plans and exercises in
preparation for ground warfare.  The rules which the
military follows are contained in Field Manual 20-32,
Mine/Countermine Operations, published September 30, 1992,
by the Department of the Army.  U.S. military regulations
fall within the guidelines established by the 1980
Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and by the several
International Standardization Agreements (STANAGS) between
NATO forces.
The U.S. military uses mines to channel opposing forces into
particular patterns of movement, to scatter opposing forces
over a broad area, to disrupt the command and control system
of opposing forces, and to protect allied forces from
maneuvers by opposing forces.  To accomplish these goals,
the U.S. military employs a broad array of A/P and A/T
mines.  This report details only the use of A/P mines.
The U.S. Army's A/P mines contain one of three types of
warheads: blast, bounding fragmentation, and directed
fragmentation.  Blast mines are the simplest, sending a
small explosive force directly upward, causing injury to one
or two soldiers.  Bounding fragmentation mines eject an
explosive canister out of the ground to a height of 1.5
meters, which then explodes and sends out shrapnel over a
casualty radius of 30 meters.  Directed fragmentation mines
are placed on the surface of the ground, and send shrapnel
over a 60-degree horizontal arc to a casualty radius of 100
The U.S. Army estimates that a 2-person team can hand-deploy
25 mines per hour under optimal conditions, and that a
company of soldiers can deploy 10,800 mines per day (at 50
minutes per hour, 12 hours per day).  When deploying large
quantities of mines at such a rapid pace, minefield marking
guidelines assume great importance.
U.S. military regulations regarding minefield marking were
written in accordance with the Geneva Conventions, NATO
STANAGS, and the CCW.  Minefields are encompassed by a
perimeter fence of pickets and barbed wire, with no mine
closer than 15 meters from the fence.  Warning signs are
posted on the fence every 10-50 meters.  Minefields are
marked primarily to prevent injury to allied forces, but
also to facilitate post-conflict mine clearance operations.
Whenever a minefield is deployed, an accurate written record
is made (DA Form 1355).  This form contains the date and
time of deployment, minefield coordinates, description of
location and markings, spacing between mines, pattern of
deployment, numbers and types of mines used, and a grid map
showing each mine and safe passage lanes.  Minefield records
are circulated to higher, lower, and adjacent commands on a
need-to-know basis.  Any significant changes in the
minefield require a new record.
The U.S. military also uses scatterable mines, which are
deployed by the hundreds at one time from launchers on
trucks or aircraft, or from artillery shells.  These mines
are smaller and less powerful than standard hand-deployed
A/P or A/T mines.  Scatterable A/P mines typically measure
4.75 inches in diameter and 2.6 inches in height, and weigh
1 pound.
Since these mines are deployed from a distance, it is not
possible to accurately mark or record the resultant
minefield.  Records are kept of the intended target
coordinates and of the size and density of the minefield
which should have resulted.  To compensate for this
additional uncertainty, all U.S. scatterable mines are
designed to self-destruct and self-deactivate.  These mines
can be programmed to automatically detonate after pre-set
periods of time (not all settings are programmed for all
models): 4 hours, 48 hours, 5 days, or 15 days.  In
addition, many mines that deploy incorrectly (upside down or
at a steep angle, for example) will automatically self-
destruct after several minutes.  After the mines destruct,
the area is safe for passage by allied forces.
This ability to plant a large minefield behind the lines of
opposing forces provides a tactical advantage to U.S.
forces.  U.S. or allied commanders can have minefields
emplaced where they want them, when they want them, and for
whatever duration they want them, all with minimal or no
risk to their own troops.  Once the minefield has served its
tactical purpose, it destroys itself and is no longer a
threat to allied forces, or to any civilians after the
conflict ceases.
The U.S. military conducts countermine operations, clearing
transit routes for vehicles and personnel to allow for
movement of forces through an opposing force's minefields.
Some of the techniques and equipment used in countermine
operations are similar to those used in humanitarian mine
clearance, but the goal is different.  Minefield breaching
is the rapid clearing of a lane wide enough to permit force
mobility.  This involves tracked vehicles with plow blades,
which simply push the mines out of the way and mark a safe
path.  Humanitarian demining requires slow, painstaking work
to clear 100 percent of the mines from the area.
The U.S. Army is working with the Department of Defense's
Advanced Research Projects Administration to adapt
countermine technology to humanitarian demining purposes.
The U.S. military hopes that this research will eventually
yield an efficient technological method to aid in the
clearance of A/P landmines around the world.  Until then,
the U.S. military supports international efforts to keep
these weapons out of the hands of irresponsible users.
     Mine Warfare:  International Law and Practice
When surveying the growing domestic and international
movement to restrict the use of antipersonnel (A/P)
landmines, it is easy to forget that until just a few years
ago the international community paid little attention to the
proper employment of such weapons in armed conflict.  This
report describes the terrible human toll landmines have
taken upon civilian populations following wars A a toll due
largely to the fact that until recently their use was
essentially unregulated.  Fortunately for mankind, that is
no longer true.
Since the 1980s, the international community has been
fulfilling a commitment to develop new international and
domestic laws forbidding indiscriminate use of A/P mines.
Although considerable work remains before the legal
framework can address all possible landmine uses, the pace
of that work is encouraging.  Soon, a comprehensive body of
law similar to that recently developed to regulate chemical
weapons should narrow the lawful uses of landmines to a
point where the future risk to noncombatants will be
substantially reduced.
Several elements of the legal framework to control landmines
already exist, and more are being developed.  An important
aspect of any law, however, is adherence.  Regardless of how
comprehensive the framework becomes, its value is limited
unless it actually regulates conduct.  Unfortunately, given
some nations' poor human rights records and lack of respect
for the law, it is clear that even a body of law regulating
all aspects of landmine use will not totally eliminate their
misuse.  International reality dictates that when the world
meets to negotiate new landmine use restrictions in 1995, it
should also devote time and energy to enforcing and
encouraging adherence.
The two primary sources of international law are custom and
treaty; both contain restrictions on the manner in which
landmines may be employed during armed conflict.  Of
particular note is the fact that until completion of the
Convention on Conventional Weapons in 1980, legal arguments
limiting landmine use were supported only by the slender
threads of customary international law.
Customary International Law
Under the customary law of war, either embodied in
international treaties or established by practice, landmines
have generally been regulated, if at all, by the basic
principles applicable to all other weapons.  The first, and
perhaps most important, principle is that landmines are not
prohibited by international law.  Certain weapons are
prohibited by international law because they cause
unnecessary suffering, are indiscriminate per se (such as
introducing poison into an enemy's water supply), or are
specifically outlawed by international conventions (such as
dum-dum bullets).  As currently defined, none of these
categories includes landmines.
Although they are not unlawful in themselves, landmines,
like most other weapons, can be used unlawfully.
Specifically targeting civilians or employing weapons
indiscriminately or without regard to disproportionate
civilian casualties are examples of such unlawful use.
Unfortunately, the very nature of landmines and the ways
they can be used in armed conflict have made their unlawful
use commonplace.
For example, the placement of landmines without properly
recording their locations has made post-conflict demining
efforts almost impossible.  Such use without taking proper
precautions to protect the civilian population is arguably
indiscriminate.  It is only "arguably" indiscriminate
because at the time they were employed, most landmines
served a very definite and discriminate military purpose: to
deny the enemy entry into specific areas.  The problem, of
course, is that when wars end, the landmines remain and
their continued victims are mostly civilians.
Convention on Conventional Weapons
In response to the overwhelming need to regulate more
strictly the use of this and other weapons, the
international community in 1980 concluded the Convention on
Conventional Weapons (CCW).  Protocol II of the CCW governs
the use of landmines and established a new balance between
the military need to continue using these weapons and the
humanitarian need to prevent their misuse.
Although one of the CCW's avowed long-term objectives is to
put "an end to the production, stockpiling and proliferation
of" landmines, its intermediate step of more strictly
regulating their use implicitly acknowledges the fact that
landmines continue to have legitimate military utility.
Their use, however, is no longer relatively unconstrained.
The balance the CCW strikes between these two concerns is
really nothing more than the establishment of rules of
responsible military conduct.
The first rules are simply restatements of customary
international law: it is unlawful to target civilians and to
use landmines indiscriminately.  The CCW's major improvement
over customary law is its focus on the protection of
civilians after the conflict ends.  For example, article 5
allows the use of remotely delivered mines only if such
mines are used within an area that is a military objective,
unless their location can be recorded or they are self-
neutralizing.  Both caveats address the need to clear the
battlefield of unexploded ordnance after the war is over.  A
similar requirement exists for preplanned minefields:
records must be kept and the force employing the landmines
must provide the information at the end of active
hostilities to the party in control of the territory so the
mine can be removed.  A technical annex provides guidelines
on recording landmine location.
While the CCW has been useful in providing guidelines for
the use of landmines internationally, it has been
ineffective due, in large part, to its narrow scope.  The
CCW can only be applied to international conflicts, while
most of the egregious misuses of landmines have occurred
during internal conflicts.  The international community,
including the approximately 40 parties to the convention,
has acknowledged the weaknesses of the CCW, and has
scheduled a review conference for September 1995 to
strengthen and update the CCW's terms.  The U.S. position
and proposals for the review conference are discussed more
fully in Chapter 4: Landmine Control.
United States Export Controls
Lawful use of landmines by the United States armed forces
has never really been an issue.  Although not yet a full
party to the CCW, the United States has conformed to the
specifications of the terms of Protocol II.  What has been
an issueAboth internationally and in the United StatesAis
the manner in which less-responsible states have employed
In 1992, the United States Congress, in an effort to take
A/P landminesAat least U.S. A/P minesAout of the hands of
irresponsible states, established a unilateral landmine
export moratorium.  Although Congress recognized that the
United States is not a major exporter of A/P landmines, it
sought to "set an example for other countries . . . by
implementing a 1-year moratorium on the sale, transfer, or
export of antipersonnel landmines," which has since been
extended through 1996.
Given the United States' minor role as an international
exporter of A/P landmines, the moratorium will have little
if any practical impact on their continued use.  This points
out an important fact: in the case of landmines, principle
becomes practical only when all landmine exporting nations
unite to deny such weapons to irresponsible states or when
the only landmines available in the international arms
market are "responsible" ones.  The United States is
currently leading efforts on both fronts.  In 1993, the
United States introduced a resolution into the UN General
Assembly calling upon states to refrain from exporting A/P
landmines "that pose grave dangers to civilian populations."
Additionally, in his speech to the United Nations on
September 26, 1994, President Clinton announced U.S. plans
for a permanent international control regime to regulate
landmine export, production, stockpiling, and use.  This
conforms to the Congress' 1992 statement of U.S. policy,
which established as a national goal the pursuit of
"verifiable international agreements prohibiting the sale,
transfer, or export, and further limiting the use,
production, possession, and deployment of antipersonnel
The greatest benefit of the emerging body of law is the
increased clarity it offers military commanders whose
responsibility it is to determine when and where landmines
may be lawfully employed.  What is lacking is a law
development yet to be seriously introduced: enhanced
enforcement.  Until the law becomes something political and
military leaders must obey, it remains only a guideline for
those states willing to follow it.
CHAPTER NINE:     Research and Development
     Demining:  Research and Development
While the technology involved in creating landmines has made
many leaps forward since they were introduced, the
technology and methods for mine clearance have not
progressed significantly.  Most indigenous mine clearance
programs around the world use tools that are little more
sophisticated than a sharp stick.  The stick is a
nonmetallic long probe, which is inserted slowly into the
ground at 2-centimeter intervals until it encounters
resistance, which may or may not be a landmine.
The United States and other countries are devoting resources
to develop improved technologies for humanitarian mine
clearance.  In FY 1995, Congress allocated $10 million to
the Department of Defense to continue the R&D program.
In the short term, the program will focus on adapting
technology from military countermine programs, foreign
demining equipment, and existing equipment which was
developed for other purposes.  In the longer term, the
program will develop entirely new technologies designed for
humanitarian demining.
The principal challenge in demining is detection.  While
there are many landmine variations in use, the largest
problem is with antipersonnel mines with little or no metal
content.  Since all detection devices in use today are
essentially metal detectors, the need to detect nonmetallic
mines remains high.
The primary focus of the demining R&D program is low-tech,
short-term solutions that can be directly exported to mine-
plagued countries.  The low-tech approach will quickly
survey existing materiel solutions available worldwide for
application to the problem.  These solutions will be tested,
and useful solutions will be added to available demining
Demining equipment must perform four functions: detect the
mine, neutralize the mine, protect the deminers, and provide
quality assurance.  Because the goal is 100 percent
clearance of all mines, the process must be well managed.
Current means of demining include:
--  hand held metal detectors
--  metallic and non-metallic probes
--  mine/minefield markers
--  global positioning systems
--  grapnel hooks (to remove trip wires and booby traps)
--  protective clothing
--  explosive charges (to destroy mines in place)
--  mine resistant vehicles
--  vehicle hardening kits
--  canine detection unit (dogs can smell explosive vapors)
--  comprehensive global landmine database
A significant overlap exists between military countermine
operations and humanitarian demining in the area of
detection.  Detection is the greatest challenge for a
demining mission.  While the detection technologies are
generally the same for both missions, the program can take
advantage of some of the differences in mission profiles in
the development and assessment of equipment.
For instance, demining missions can make multiple passes
over terrain, can tolerate higher false alarm rates to
increase the probability of detection, and can use sensors
that are not suitable for all weather or day/night
conditions, all of which are factors in evaluating equipment
for military countermine operations.  In addition, equipment
for humanitarian demining missions does not have to meet the
stringent weight and size requirements imposed by military
Another focus of the U.S. R&D program is the destruction of
landmines in place rather than lifting the mines, which is
very dangerous.  By concentrating on destruction of mines in
place, the program can avoid the extensive training which
would be required to teach indigenous populations to perform
such operations.  It also prevents the possibility of mine
For demining, two classes of equipment must be developed.
The first group would consist of highly sophisticated
equipment that is operated by well-trained, experienced
personnel.  Examples of this class might include airborne
detection systems with complex readouts that require
interpretation, and remotely controlled vehicle-mounted
systems with complex controls and extensive maintenance
requirements.  These systems would be used during the
initial phases of the operation to locate, identify, and map
mine areas for planning purposes.
The second group would consist of inexpensive and simpler
equipment which would be provided directly to mine-plagued
nations for their use.  Unfortunately, many of the countries
most affected by landmines also have an under-educated
populace and limited materiel resources.  For these reasons,
demining equipment must be simple to operate and easy to
maintain.  For equipment that is retained and maintained by
the affected country, U.S. law requires an assessment of
cost and technology transfer issues prior to any equipment
The R&D program includes study of longer-term solutions,
some of which may not be available for 10 years or more.
Possibilities include:
--  airborne detection systems
--  enhanced mechanized broad-area clearance
--  explosives detectors
--  non-metallic mine detectors
--  vehicle-mounted detection systems
--  chemical neutralization of mines
The U.S. R&D program for humanitarian demining will look for
ways to make the dangerous, lengthy, labor-intensive, and
costly mine clearance process safer and more efficient.  The
program has received $10 million for FY 1995, and draft
budget figures indicate the project will be maintained and
funded for at least the next 4-5 years.  Demining R&D is led
by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Special Operations.
     Landmine Control Glossary
Any munition designed and manufactured to be detonated after
it has been laid by the presence, proximity, or contact of a
person or vehicle.
Self-destructing mine
A mine that automatically destroys itself by means of an
incorporated mechanism.
Self-neutralizing mine
A mine that automatically renders itself inoperable by means
of an incorporated mechanism.
Command-destructing mine
A mine that can be detonated by a remotely delivered
Self-deactivating mine
A mine that automatically renders itself inoperable by means
of exhaustion of a component of the mine that is essential
to the operation of the mine.
Non-reconstitutable mine
A self-deactivating, self-neutralizing, or command-
neutralizing mine that, once it has self-deactivated, self-
neutralized, or command-neutralized, cannot be re-activated
by means available outside its manufacturing plant or a
comparable facility.
Self-eliminating mine
A mine that is self-destructing, self-deactivating, and non-
     Demining Glossary
Any munition designed and manufactured to be detonated after
it has been laid by the presence, proximity, or contact of a
person or vehicle.
The complete removal of all landmines from an area in order
to safeguard civilian populations.
Host Nation
For the purposes of this report, a mine-plagued country
which requests demining assistance from the U.S.
Mine Awareness Training
A program to assist host nation governments, international
organizations, and nongovernmental organizations to train
local populations to deal with landmines until the mines can
be permanently removed.  The program minimizes the danger of
uncleared landmines by training host nationals in mine
detection, identification, marking, avoidance, reporting,
mapping, rudimentary extrication, and first aid skills.
Mine Clearance Training
A program to train host nation military, government, or NGO
groups in the techniques of locating and permanently
clearing landmines, using the Train the Trainer methodology.
Mine clearance training includes mine detection and disposal
techniques, emphasizing destruction of the mine on site.
Train The Trainer
A concept for training instructors who then train other
personnel in learned techniques.  This method develops a
host nation infrastructure capable of training other host
nation personnel to execute mine awareness and mine
clearance operations.
U.S. Demining Program
As enacted by Congress, the program aims to establish
sustainable host nation mine awareness and mine clearance
training programs in nations which are experiencing adverse
humanitarian effects from uncleared landmines.
     Appendix A: Organizations and Resources
Davies, Paul. The War of the Mines: Cambodia, Landmines and
the Impoverished  Nation.  Colorado: Pluto Press, 1994.
Hidden Death: Landmines and Civilian Casualties in Iraqi
Kurdistan.  New York: Human Rights Watch, 1992.
Hidden Killers: the Global Problem with Uncleared Landmines,
a Report on International Demining.  Washington, D.C.:
Department of  State, 1993.
Jane's Military Vehicles and Logistics. 12 ed.  Virginia:
Jane's  Information Group, 1991.
Landmines: A Deadly Legacy.  New York: Human Rights Watch,
Landmines in Mozambique.  New York: Human Rights Watch,
McGrath, Rae. Land Mines in Angola: an Africa Watch Report .
New York: Human Rights Watch, 1993.
Westing, Arthur H. (ed.) Explosive Remnants of War:
Mitigating the Environmental Effects.  London: Taylor and
Francis, 1985.
Periodicals and Journals
Breisch, S.L. "Look Out for Landmines." The Journal 87 (no.
4 April 1994): 181.
Browne, Malcolm W. "Land Mines Called a World Menace." New
York Times (Nov. 15, 1993): A9.
"Clearing Landmines." The Economist  330 (no. 7852, Feb. 26,
1994): 45.
Doucet, Ian. "The Coward's War: Landmines and Civilians."
Medicine and War 9 (no. 4, Oct. 1993): 304-316.
Drinan, R.F. "Can We Ban Landmines?" Commonweal  121 (Feb.
25 1994): 5-6.
Isaacs, Dan. "Mozambique: Life After Landmines." Africa
Report 38 (no. 3, May 1993): 22-24.
Kent, Bruce. "The Landmines Scandal." The Tablet 248 (no.
8207, June 11, 1994): 732.
"Landmines: Calls for a Ban." Middle East International
(no. 478, June 24, 1994): 15.
"Landmines: Reaping a Deadly Harvest." West Africa (no.
3999, May 23, 1994): 908.
Leahy, Patrick. "Landmine Moratorium: A Strategy for
Stronger International Limits."  Arms Control Today 23 (no.
1, Jan. 2, 1993): 11.
McGrath, Rae. "Trading in Death: Antipersonnel Mines."
Lancet 342 (no. 8872, Sept. 11, 1993): 628-629.
Marshall, E. "To Stop Kuwait's Fires, First Clear The
Mines."  Science 252 (June 21, 1991): 1609.
"Mass Murder by Landmine." The Economist 329 (no. 7839, Nov.
27, 1993).
Neier, A. "Watching Rights." The Nation 253 (Oct. 14, 1991):
"100 Million Infernal Machines." New York Times (Nov. 29
1993): A16.
Rosenberger, J. "Cambodian Land Mines: Vietnam's Shattering
Legacy." E: The Environmental Magazine 4 (Mar/Apr 1993):
2, 14-21.
Ryle, John. "The Invisible Enemy." New Yorker 69 (no. 40,
Nov. 29, 1993): 120-135.
"The Scourge of Landmines." The Economist  327 (no. 7808,
April 24, 1993): 46.
"The Sweep of Land Mines." US News and World Report 115 (no.
21, Nov. 29, 1993).
Webster, D. "One Leg, One Life at a Time." The New York
Times Magazine (Jan. 23, 1994): 26-33.
Wurst, J. "Still Killing." The Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientist 50 (May/June 1994): 12-13.
Wurst, J. "Ten Million Tragedies, One Step at a Time." The
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 49 (July/Aug. 1993).
"Landmines: Time for Action." International Humanitarian
Law. Geneva: ICRC, 1994.
"Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain
Conventional Weapons which may be Deemed to be Excessively
Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects." Report of the
International Committee of the Red Cross. Geneva, 1994.
Commercial Contacts
Alliant Technological Systems
1725 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 901
Crystal Square 2
Arlington, Virginia  22202
Tel: (703) 413-4600   Fax: (703) 413-4629
Conventional Munitions Systems, Inc.
4904 Eisenhower Boulevard
Tampa, Florida  33634
Tel: (813) 882-4477   Fax: (813) 884-1876
Environmental Chemical Corporation
1240 Bayshore Highway, Suite 300
Burlingame, California  94010
Tel: (415) 347-1555   Fax: (415) 347-4571
EOD Technology, Inc.
111 Robertsville Road
Oak Ridge, Tennessee  37830
Tel: (615) 483-0007
Essex Corporation
9150 Guilford Road
Columbia, Maryland  21046
Tel: (301) 953-7797   Fax: (301) 953-7880
Explosive Ordnance Disposal World Services, Inc.
11 Racetrack Rd., NE - Suite C-3
Fort Walton Beach, Florida  32547
Tel: (904) 864-6600   Fax: (904) 864-1052
395 Java Drive
Sunnyvale, California  94086
Tel: (408) 734-4616
Golden West Products International
15233 Ventura Boulevard, Suite P-8
Sherman Oaks, California  91403
Tel: (818) 981-6400   Fax: (818) 501-6181
Hermes Technology Corporation
1 Yonge St., Suite 1801
Toronto, Ontario
Canada M5E 1W7
Tel: (416) 868-1539  Fax: (416) 512-0198
Human Factors Applications Inc.
Explosives Ordnance Disposal Division
1078A North Strauss Ave.
Indian Head, Maryland  20640-1894
Tel: (301) 743-2377  Fax: (301) 753-6052
Information Technology Solutions, Inc.
2 Eaton St. Suite 908
Hampton, Virginia  23669
Tel: (804) 723-3544   Fax: (804) 723-3617
International Development and Resources, Inc.
3900 Jermantown Road, Suite 450
Fairfax, Virginia  22030
Tel: (703) 591-5523   Fax: (703) 591-5537
Metratek Incorporated
12330 Pinecrest Road
Reston, Virginia 22091
Tel: (703) 620-9500
Mining Resource Engineering Limited
1555 Sydenham Road, RR 8
Kingston, Ontario  Canada  K7L4V4
Tel: (613) 545-0466   Fax: (613) 542-8029
The Plowshare Project: Terra Segura/Terra Cognita
4020 Honeycutt
San Diego, California 92109
Tel: (619) 574-1865
Projects International Associates Inc.
1025 Thomas Jefferson St., N.W. - Suite 509
Washington, D.C.  20007
Tel: (202) 333-1277   Fax: (202) 625-2070
Raton Technology Research
P.O. Box 428
Raton, New Mexico 87740
Tel: (505) 445-3607   Fax: (505) 445-9659
Rimfire International Limited
22 South Audley St.
London W1Y6ES
Tel: 010 44 71 499 9252   Fax: 010 44 71 493 5037
Robbins Gioia Incorporated
209 Madison St.
Alexandria, Virginia 22314
Tel: (703) 548-7006   Fax: (703) 684-5189
RONCO Consulting Corporation
2301 M Street, N.W. - Suite 400
Washington, D.C.  20037
Tel: (202) 785-2791   Fax: (202) 785-2078
Royal Ordnance
Euxton Lane
Euxton Chorley
Tel:  02-57-265-511
FAX:  02-57-242-609
SDS International
2231 Crystal Drive, Suite 1105
Arlington, Virginia  22202
Tel: (703) 553-7525
SNC Industrial Technologies, Inc.
Heritage Place
155 Queen St.  Suite 1304
Ottawa, Canada K1P 6L1
Tel: (613) 238-7216   Fax: (613) 236-6752
UXB International, Inc.
14800 Conference Center Drive, Suite 100
Chantilly, Virginia  22021-3806
Tel: (703) 803-8904
Other Contacts
His Excellency Faisal Al'Dawoud
Undersecretary, Ministry of Defense
Kuwait City, Kuwait
Lt. Col. Abdul Azziz Bin Ali, Contracting Officer
Tel: 965-484-5866
Lt. Col. Khalid Al-Sabah, Foreign Supplies Directorate
Tel: 965-484-6788
Brigadier General Patrick M. Blagden
United Nations/DPKO, Room S-0927
New York, NY  10017
Tel: (212) 963-2627   Fax: (212) 963-6460
Lt. Col. Ian Mansfield
Programme Manager
Mine Clearance Programme
United Nations Office for the Coordination of
   Humanitarian Assistance to Afghanistan (UNOCHA)
13, Street 19, F-8/2, Islamabad  Pakistan
Tel: 253789-92, 855939   Fax: 851717
Ieng Mouly, Director
Cambodian Mine Action Center
Building #22, Road 122
Mittapheap Quarter, District 7 January
Phnom Penh, Cambodia
Tel: 855-23-50083/4   Fax: 855-23-60096
The United States Government does not endorse or recommend
any of the companies listed in this chapter, and provides
this information only as a reference guide for further
     Appendix B: Common Antipersonnel Landmines
This Appendix presents examples of some of the many
different types of antipersonnel (A/P) landmines.
A/P mines are produced in 50 countries around the world, but
many are near or exact duplicates of each other.  In those
cases, only the more common model has been included here.
This Appendix also does not include antitank (A/T) mines,
which require much larger amounts of pressure to cause
detonation.  A/T mines do not pose as great a numerical
threat to innocent civilian populations as A/P mines.
     Appendix C: Current Mine Clearing Equipment
This Appendix presents some of the technology available to
detect and remove implanted landmines.  While current
technology may be effective, it is far too limited to fully
address the huge mine problem facing the world.  New
research and development programs underway in several
countries show promise for new methods which are safer and
more effective.  The international community must act now to
foster and further these research programs in order to
provide mine clearance personnel in the field a better tool
than a sharpened stick.
Hidden Killers 1994: The Global Landmine Crisis, is the
product of the cooperative efforts of many people and
agencies in the Executive Branch to provide the most
comprehensive, up-to-date information on the landmine
situation to the U.S. Congress.
The following people and organizations directly aided in the
creation of this report:
Ambassador Ted McNamara, Ambassador Frances  Cook, Col Dan
Layton, Col Fitz Carty, Col Larry Machabee, Valerie Belon,
Lt Col Don Cole, Eva  Alexander, Tim Reynolds, David Kemp,
Christine Lee, Vincent Demma, Mike Rugh, Bob Sherman, Lt Col
Steve Lepper, John Reingruber, Chuck Williamson, Capt Kevin
McDonnell, Capt Joey Christmas, Gene Gately, and The
National Ground Intelligence  Center.
Paul F. Schultz III, Editor
Office of International Security and Peacekeeping Operations
Bureau of Political-Military Affairs

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